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,
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This dissertation attempts an analysis of the traditionalist versus
progressive educational debate. It presents a conceptual and historical
analysis of the essentialist or classical tradition in American educational
philosophy. It seeks to show the identity of views among twentieth century
American essentialists, and to link this to the educational philosophy of
nineteenth century American educators and to the classical tradition of the
Graceo-Roman and European World.
The tradition is seen to be consistent with itself, and consistently
opposed to the progressive educational philosophy. This opposition is best
described in terms of a model that assumes a continuum from extreme
progressive to extreme traditionalist, with the essentialist striving to
maintain a central or moderate position between the two.
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The tradition is described historically, to demonstrate the existence
of what amounts almost to a covert club, membership of which comes by way
of an identity of views and by way of constant mutual quotation. Each
essentialist tends to read and quote his favorite authorities within the tradition.
This study attempts to see this in broader terms, and to collate all these
authorities into a greater or perennial tradition. An appropriate metaphor
is that of the "saints” of the tradition and the "heretics" outside it. To
exemplify this "apostolic succession, " Bagley and Barzun are treated in
greater detail as typical "saints, " and Dewey is examined as a source of great
,Theresy. " The review of literature finds that there has been little appreciation
either of the history of this tradition or of its conceptual structure.
Philosophically, the central concept of essentialism is seen to be
anti-absolutism or moderation at all points. The conventional view of
essentialists as conservative extremists is belied by their moderation on
such epistemological issues as the supposed opposites of the disciplines
versus integrated study, of sequential versus incidental learning, of liberal
versus vocational education, of abstract versus concrete learning, of work
versus play, of ends versus means; and their moderation on such metaphysical
continua as those of idealism versus realism, of naturalism versus super-
naturalism, and of value systems versus nihilism.
Politically, the same anti-absolutism obtains. Education is seen as
the initiation of man into his culture, ideally in a democracy that is liberal
but also highly Jeffersonian or meritocratic. Essentialists take an appropriately
central stand on such assumed opposites as elitism versus populism, anarchy
versus statism, the individual versus the society, and on communism versus
capitalism.
Psychologically they seek a moderate position, opposed to progressive
extremes as they see it, on the value of psychology, on determinism, heredity
versus environment, intelligence, creativity, learning theory, developmental
theory and motivation.
Pedagogically, their moderate views on the curriculum stem from their
moderation elsewhere, not vice versa. Language and literature are chosen
in this study for special discussion, as they are seen by essentialists to be
central to the culture of mankind. Essentialists are not die-hards for the
study of Greek and Latin; the initiation into civilization is best conducted
through the scholarly analysis of English language, literature, and by
scholarship in all the disciplines.
CHAPTER I
PROLEGOMENA: PROBLEM, PROCEDURE, AND
PEOPLE
The Problem
The problem is that few people know what they mean when they talk
of ’’traditional" or "essentialist” education. Thus it is a curious fact that,
while the practical teacher has a clear, probably intuitive, grasp of the
difference between "traditional" and "progressive" education, the more
theoretical student of education has a much less clear grasp of the
distinction.
This is perhaps because John Dewey and "progressive" educational
theory is more easily recognizable historically. It appeared at a more or
less definable moment, and has one definable philosophical father in America.
It led to a definable, even though not entirely original, pedagogy. "Traditional"
education lacks these advantages. It has been apparently always with us. It
has no clearly identifiable sponsor. Its pedagogical consequences are
less than inevitable; traditional education can be taught in any manner, and
traditional educators have been able to borrow from progressive practice
in this century.
2As a result, few students of education appear to have a clear idea of
what progressive education was really attacking. Was there anything to
attack? Was the traditionalist anything more than a proponent of Latin and
Greek ? The traditionalist is visualized, when rarely he is allowed so much
attention, as one who represents an amalgam of such influences as Oxford
and Cambridge, Tom Brown's schooldays at Rugby or Dicken's Dotheboy's
Hall, or Puritan Sunday Schools, or the recitation in unison of anything from
the multiplication table or French irregular verbs to the capitals of Europe or
the exports of Latin America. Certainly no coherent philosophy is assumed.
This is both unfortunate and the fault, in part, of educators. Those
who hold a traditionalist position seldom take the trouble to explain it. They
may assume it needs no explanation, and that the mountain should come to
the educational Mahomet. Introductory courses of education seldom define
the traditionalist position satisfactorily; instead they tend to overcomplicate
the issue by devoting a chapter to every major philosophical figure, from
Plato to Pestalozzi, often concluding with a final chapter on Dewey, without
ever defining the debate. There are, of course, exceptions to this general
truth, and some of them are discussed in this dissertation.
An unfortunate result of this piecemeal process is that the anxious
student may assume that, for instance, essentialism, perennialism, progres-
sivism, and reconstructionism are all discrete units, along with a dozen
others. Each label then assumes undue importance, and the student may
feel obliged to choose one to the exclusion of the others.
3This would seem unreasonable a priori, and in practice one finds a
great deal of common ground even between apparent opposites. Theodore
Brameld, for instance, in one of the few lengthy treatments of this issue,
namely in Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective (1955), has
diagrammed the problem by means of four overlapping circles. Progressivism
largely overlaps reconstructionism; essentialism largely overlaps perennialism;
the two pairs slightly overlap each other. That his definition of essentialism
and consequently his judgment thereof is unreasonable, is argued in this work.
His division of educational philosophy into these four areas is also unreasonable,
for it sells the traditionalist short by labelling him essentialist or perennialist.
Brameld, of course, discusses the classical roots of essentialism, but the
label remains misleading for all that. Both essentialism and perennialism
are terms coined in the twentieth century, and neither have been of much real
value; indeed, many members of those traditions refuse to be associated
with such labels.
Nomenclature remains a very real problem. "Traditionalist" is
probably the most common layman's term, but for many there is a pejorative
ring to the idea of tradition. "Conservative" suffers even more from a
pejorative association. A clever attempt to capitalize on a fashionable term
has been one writer's use of the term "counter-revolutionist, " but this cuts
off the traditionalist from his forebears. Another, who disliked being
labelled an essentialist, argued instead for the term "stalwart. " There is
much talk today of "basic education. " Some of the same confusion reigns in
4the opposing camp, and the shades of difference are small between progressives,
pragmatists, reconstructionists, revisionists and radicals.
This problem is both insoluble and unimportant. The conceptual
differences are what matter. The two main camps are generally important
to distinguish, and even they overlap considerably. The one model which
allows for this is that of an educational continuum, from progressive to
traditional.
This is the central argument of the work, and no attempt is made to
settle the dispute over names. The term essentialist is generally used, but
so are terms like conservative, centralist, or moderate. The latter two
terms suggest, as is argued later, that essentialists generally take a position
more central on the continuum than is often imagined.
The chief burden of this work is then to find and analyze the general
traditionalist or essentialist argument; to find out what such writers have
said, whether it is consistent in itself or with other similar writers, whether
they really differ from progressives; in short, whether there is a real tradition.
The Procedure
The analysis is necessarily wide ranging. Mortimer Adler has
written with Milton Mayer, in The Revolution in Education (1958), that "the
traditionalist position in education. . . draws its arguments from so many
quarters that is is easiest to present in generalized form. " This analysis
therefore examines the issue in five different but complementary ways.
5These five analyses constitute the five chief chapters of the argument;
they scrutinize the history of essentialist literature, together with essentialist
views of philosophy, politics, psychology, and pedagogy.
The first of these live chapters, The "Pedigree, " with the review of literature
discusses the research methodology and limitations of the study. There exists
no authoritative history or analysis of essentialism, and there is therefore no
clear precedent to follow and no single reputable bibliographical source. The
authority adopted is thus the internal authority of the essentialists themselves.
The result is an attempt to define essentialists, not by any external criteria,
but simply on internal evidence of what they claimed to be and whether or
not they were felt by other essentialists to be members of the same tradition.
The review of literature helps to explain why this is necessary; there is very
little external evidence; the internal is strong. The reader can start with
any recent essentialist and, by noting his "heroes" and his "villains," continue to
chart out the former especially. Few essentialists fail to quote and refer
voluminously. The high concentration of quotations in this work is therefore in
the essentialist tradition. This chapter divides the tradition into the more
recent strictly essentialist tradition; and the longer perennial tradition, which
includes many great classical writers back to Plato and Aristotle. It attempts
to show the large agreement and the minor disagreements of the tradition. It
seeks for compromise views which are so typical of the tradition. It examines
essentialist attitudes to Dewey, in an attempt to show both their general agree-
ment on Dewey and to illustrate their own range of opinion on a subject of
6importance. This process has the merit of being inductive and de facto, and
it avoids reliance on any previous analysis.
No claim can be made that this study is exhaustive, but all the major
figures and most of the minor have been included. Their names become
progressively familiar in the text, and a tentative list is provided in the next
section. Membership has always been a matter of opinion, and remains so
here. This study then goes on to analyze the material in the areas of
philosophy, politics, psychology, and pedagogy.
The most important argument is that essentialists, contrary to popular
belief, are not extremists but are vigorously anti-absolutist, at every point.
They are instead relativists and centralists on most issues, philosophical,
political, psychological, and pedagogical. Differences exist among them,
of course, but generally these are over degrees of tolerance about the mid-
point of the continuum, with some bias to the right or conservative end.
The most central chapter is that on philosophy. The anti-absolutist
view is there most clearly evident. Barzun's works are analyzed at some
length to illustrate this relativism. Essentialist literature in general is
ransacked to analyze their views on epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.
The subsequent chapter, on essentialist political views, seeks to root
the tradition in a concept of Jeffersonian democracy. Jefferson is consistently
and constantly invoked to bolster a view of democracy that is both open and
meritocratic, some would argue almost aristocratic, a view which relies
on education both of the mind and of the character, and a view with a strong
7bias against undue federalism and vigorously opposed to all absolutisms or
totalitarian views: one concerned essentially with the nature of freedom and
its difficult reconciliation with discipline, duty and national integrity.
The chapter on psychology applies similar anti-absolutist views to such
issues as that of determinism. Essentialists are strongly anti-determinist,
while recognizing that both heredity and environment profoundly limit the
degree of human choice. They are opposed to the falsely scientific views of
some extreme Freudians though not against Freud properly understood, just
as they can be socialist but never communist. They hold essentially moderate
opinions on the nature of motivation in education and of readiness in
developmental theory.
The chapter on pedagogy limits itself, for reasons of space, to the
analysis of essentialist views of the function of language and literature, both
classical and English. These are seen to be central to the development of
man through culture, and to reflect the pragmatic view of man which is neither
absolutist nor falsely scientific.
An early chapter is added to clarify some of the issues by the
analysis of one important essentialist, indeed the founder of the twentieth
century tradition, and it serves the special purpose of outlining all the
conceptual issues early on. A purely conceptual approach would perforce
leave some concepts until the very end. This chapter analyzes Bagley in each
conceptual area in, as it were, a microcosm of the general argument.
8Dewey and Barzun likewise receive fuller individual treatment. The chapter
on philosophy may be seen to maintain a similar function, for it inevitably
strays at points into issues which could be termed political, psychological
or pedagogical. This is both inevitable and useful, for it denies the other-
wise rather compartmentalized and unintegrated suggestion of the structure.
It is correspondingly a longer chapter than any other.
There is room, of course, for much further research or analysis.
Large areas of the curriculum are little discussed. No predictions are
made of the future. No comparisons are made with other countries, especially
Britain, where there has been a recent resurgence of essentialist opinion
in the "Black Papers. " No analysis is attempted of the effect of essentialism
on educational practice at any time in history, nor of its standing today.
No measures are proposed to remedy this.
The study concludes with a summary, a bibliography and appendices.
9The People
The mainstream of the essentialist tradition, or the covert club which
emerges from a reading of the literature, can be represented tentatively by
the following names, with birthdales.
M. J. Adler 1902
J. Barzun 1907
W. C. Bagley 1874
I. Babbitt 1865
B. I. Bell 1886
A. Bestor 1908
F # S. Breed 1876
W. W. Brickman 1913
T. L. Briggs 1877
H. S. Broudy 1905
N. M. Butler 1860
H. Buchholz 1879
J. B. Conant 1893
M. J. Demiashkevich 1891
A. Flexner 1866
J. W. Gardner, 1912
A. Griswold 1906
G. Highet 1906
H. H. Home 1874
R. M. Hutchins 1899
R. Kirk, 1918
I. L. Kandel 1881
J. D. Koemer 1923
J. W. Krutch 1893
A. Lynd 1910
T. Mendenhall 1910
A. Meiklejohn 1872
H. Mumford Jones 1892
A. J. Nock 1870
P. H. Phenix 1915
D. Riesman 1909
Admiral H. G. Rickover 1900
M. Smith 1906
M. Van Doren 1894
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To this mainstream there are various minor tributaries. There are
a number of earlier Americans, for instance, who are generally read and
quoted with approval, especially Henry Barnard, Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Walter Torrey Harris, Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann and Henry David
Thoreau.
Another small group of Americans who, although they scarcely address
themselves to educational philosophies, endear themselves to essentialists
by their strongly conservative spirit, includes Henry Adams, Walter Lippman
and H. L. Mencken.
There is also that small band of Europeans who are quoted with constant
approval, especially T. S. Eliot, Ortega y Gasset, Jacques Maritain and,
more obscurely, Sir Richard Livingstone.
Finally, the tradition could be said to flow from that well of Graeco-
Roman and European literature described as '‘the greater tradition, " and to
trickle on today in the bulletins of the Council for Basic Education. The
matter is more fully discussed in the next two sections.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is no single volume exclusively concerned with the essentialist
tradition. The indirect or incidental literature, on the other hand, makes a
small library, and is discussed in the subsequent chapters.
The general histories of American education are almost uniformly
inadequate in this regard. It appears that Michael Demiashkevich was
responsible for the term "essentialism, M and it first gained currency in his
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education
,
published in 1935. Of course,
the concepts that make up essentialism are much older; and there are other
claims on the subject of the title. Kandel always objected to the word;
Bagley preferred the expression ’’stalwart"; Adler despised the neologism;
and expressions like "classical" and "traditional" are equally satisfactory.
Demiashkevich coined the term, proposed essentialism as the corrective
of progressivism, and was instrumental in founding the Essentialist Committee
of 1938, with W. C. Bagley, F. Alden Shaw and others.
Merle Curti's The Social Ideas of American Educators, published in
1935 and revised in 1959, makes understandably no reference to the essentialists
as a group, but less understandably makes no reference, even in the revised
version, to Bagley, Hutchins or any other significant number of essentialist
individuals.
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J. D. Butler's Four Philosophies, and Their Practice in Education
and Religion
,
published in 1951, makes no reference to essentialism, while
quoting heavily from Demiashkevich and H. H. Horne.
S. J. Curtis and M. E. A. Boultwood, in their voluminous and
influential "A Short History of Educational Ideas," published in London in
1953, devote several pages to the American essentialists, though the discussion
is very generalized and some curiously unimportant essentialists are noted.
There is no mention of Michael Demiashkevich.
The best general analysis of essentialism, and its near relative
perennialism, occurs in Theodore Brameld's Philosophies of Education in .
Cultural Perspective, published in 1955. The title justly reminds one of
Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy , in that both attempt to
explain philosophical ideas in terms of their social background. Suffice
to say for the moment that Brameld's critique is harsh, based on an economic
argument, and conducted at a very generalized level. It is frankly reconstructionist,
and labels essentialism as a conservative ploy designed to sanction modem industrial
civilization; and, while this is clearly true of some essentialists, it is hard
to suggest in general and clearly absurd in many individual cases. Brameld's
most useful contribution is to remind us that both idealists and realists can
coexist within the same tradition. For perennialism he has no time at all,
and indeed sees it as a threat to democracy.
13
A more down-to-earth and detailed discussion, though largely
descriptive, is that of Lawrence A. Cremin in The Transformation of the
School-Proaressivism in American Education 1876-1957, published in
1961. Chapter nine, "The Crisis in Popular Education," is useful
bibliographical material, but has little space for analysis, and never mentions
essentialism by name.
J. S. Brubacher, in his Modem Philosophies of Education, published
in 1939 and revised in 1962, limits his analysis of essentialism to a few pages
and largely to the discussion of idealism and realism.
Butts and Cremin summed up the movement thus, in their History of
Education in American Culture, 1953
A few educators tried to make explicit some of
the implications of the general realistic philosophy
for education. . . Breed, Bagley, Ross
Finney. . . have in common a respect for the
stubborn facts of the physical and social sciences. . .
This view, deeply rooted in American educational
practice, had a vogue in the 1930's under the name
of essentialism. Its practice has remained vitally
present, but the name had a relatively short life
except in the textbooks of educational philosophy.
If the general textbooks restrict themselves to highly generalized
philosophizing about essentialism or to simplistic political judgements, the
few doctoral dissertations available limit themselves either to a simply
descriptive account or to analyses of one essentialist* They make little
attempt at any general conceptual analysis.
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The most useful is Father Paul A. Graul's A Historical Study:
The -Essentialist Committee for the Advancement of American Education ,
his Ed. D. dissertation of 1974 for SUNY, New York. It is valuable both in
that it is recent and that it is well written; and both characteristics distinguish
it from its rivals. The study is limited to a detailed historical analysis of
the earliest meetings of the Essentialist Committee and the subsequent
correspondence of its members.
Steven Innocent Miller’s Ph. D. dissertation of 1970 for Michigan State,
The * Essentialist Movement in American Education; A Critical Analysis , is
more ambitious but, as Granl argues, less logical and, as Graul hints, too
much indebted to Brameld’s reconstructionist simplicities. Both criticisms
are just.
Rather less helpful is Charles E. Dyer’s Ph. D. dissertation of 1954
for the University of Oklahoma, A Study of Essentialism in Contemporary
American Education .
Another recent dissertation which limits itself to the discussion of
one essentialist, though it never discusses that label, is Owen
George
Marley’s Ed. D. dissertation, Thomas Henry Briggs: Philosopher
and
Educator, 1974, University of Massachusetts.
Probably the least helpful is T. A. Shaver’s Ph.D. dissertation
of
1968 for Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
A Critical Analysis
of William C. Bagiev’s Concept of Essentialism and
Evidence of its Similant
in r.hnroh of Christ Youth Curriculum Materials
1963-66.
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The third body of literature is that of the periodicals. This is of two
types. First, there are those articles, printed generally in prestigious
publications like The Atlantic Monthly or the Saturday Review , which appear
in due course as books. Second, there is the more evanescent material
published only in periodicals, especially in School and Society and in the
bulletin of the Council for Basic Education. A small number of their seminal
articles are worthy of initial mention here.
W. W. Brickman’s "Essentialism Ten Years After” is a helpful but
limited survey of early events in the life of the Essentialist Committee,
published in School and Society, May 1948. Gurney Chambers elaborates on
this with his "Educational Essentialism Thirty Years After, ” in School and
Society
, January 1969. F. Alden Shaw, one of the central founders of the
1938 Committee, has recently published useful material about the original
summary of theses, as they were known, in his "The Essentialist Challenge
to American Education, " in School and Society
,
April 1971. The material in
the Council for Basic Education’s bulletin is by design little more than
current comment and criticism, and no single article stands out- for
individual mention. Bagley’s own two initial statements, discussed in
chapter four, appeared in Educational Administration and Supervision .
The periodical literature, however, suffers from the same limitations
as do the dissertations, namely of extreme specificity. The articles either
present useful but bald statements of essentialist policy, generally acceptable
16
to their author but without any more general validation, or they briefly
review some of the more obvious literature.
This work attempts to fill the gap between the extreme generalities
of the history books, on the one hand, and the extremely specific detail of
the dissertations and the periodical pieces on the other, and to analyze the
relevant concepts and their intellectual history.
The thesis therefore concerns itself largely with the literary and
intellectual tradition described historically in chapters two and three and
analyzed in chapters four, five, six, seven and eight. The tradition is,
for the sake of convenience and of historical balance, described as of two
parts: the lesser tradition and the greater tradition. The former
concentrates on late 19th and 20th century essentialists or traditionalists;
the latter assumes a larger continuity of the classical tradition since Plato
and Aristotle as seen by essentialists. The two constitute a kind of covert
pedigree.
17
CHAPTER III
THE PEDIGREE
• • . stand upon the shoulders of all the
tall and sun-crowned men who have gone
before. M
W. C. Bagley
There being no map of essentialist territory, the interested reader
must start in medias re, to use appropriately traditionalist syntax and diction.
The reader gradually becomes aware of a tradition amounting almost at times
to a covert club, the password for which was quotation from and by other
members. At the most obvious level this is revealed in constant reference
to Plato, Aristotle and a select few giants; at the less obvious by reference
to lesser, more arcane figures of the tradition: the pygmies. In fact, a
favorite image in the literature is just that, of pygmies seated upon the
shoulders of giants. These two races amount to the greater and lesser
tradition, one might argue; although it may be more convenient to under-
stand the greater tradition as including the lesser.
There is no membership proof; no one carries an essentialist card.
Membership of the Council for Basic Education might, since its inception
in 1956, be the nearest approach to card-carrying status, but doubtless
many of its members would resent the label essentialist.
It must be understood therefore that the tradition described exists
chiefly in the minds of those who contribute to it. One is left with two chief
determinants of membership, perhaps, namely identity of views and degrees
of quotation. The first of these is technically impossible to determine finally.
18
as views invariably, even between two members very close to each other,
overlap and differ at certain points. The second method has the merit of some
objectivity, although it contributes only as circumstantial evidence.
Research Data
Therefore, a small project was carried out to confirm or dispel this
more purely subjective impression of a covert membership or freemasonry.
A selection of essentialist literature was analyzed for what might be
termed "in house citation," that is, for ail quotations of essentialists by one
another. Clearly quotation may imply agreement, disagreement or even
neutrality, but its usage indicates at least some degree of inheritance.
Details of the analysis are presented in an appendix. A summary of popularity
by quotation is presented below in tables one and two.
Clearly this evidence proves nothing, but it suggests or confirms a
great deal. After making all due allowance for the vagaries of the sample,
for inevitable bias against recency, as clearly Plato has been read for some
time longer than Phenix, one can discern something of both the greater and
lesser tradition.
Much of the significance of these figures will become gradually
clearer in subsequent chapters, but a few general comments are in order
at this point.
TABLE ONE
THE GREATER TRADITION
19
Authority
Plato
Aristotle
Dewey
Socrates
Jefferson
Kant
Rousseau
W. James
Hegel
Marx
Bacon
Whitehead
Herbart
Con ant
Darwin
Emerson
Spencer
Comenius
Descartes
Hutchins
Mann
Arnold
Montaigne
Pascal
Newman
Bagley
Butler
Nock
C. W. Eliot
T. S. Eliot
Bestor
Augustine
Kandel
Voltaire
Bell
Burt
Cicero
Gardner
Rabelais
References to Authority References to
133 Livingstone 9
102 Russell 9
100 Barnard
77 Comte, Maritain 8
60 De Tocqueville,
50 Freud 7
49 Harris, Flexner, Swift,
43 Thoreau, Ulich 6
41 Mar.cus Aurelius,
39 Heraclitus, Barzun,
39 Ortega y Gasset
31 Demiashkevich,
31 Renan 5
31 Keynes
30 Meiklejohn, Aquinas,
30 Lippmann 4
29 Carlyle, Mencken,
25 Brickman, Democritus 4
23 Mumford Jones, Veblen.
l
23 Einstein, Briggs, Hook 3
21 Home, Wordsworth 3
21 Highet, Rickover,
19 Berkeley, Lynd,
18 Chesterton 2
16 Riesman
15 Buchholz, Krutch,
14 Griswold, Phenix 1
14
12
11
10
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
TABLE TWO
THE LESSER TRADITION
Authority References to
Conant 31
Hutchins 23
Bagley 15
Butler 14
Nock 14
C. W. Eliot 12
T. S. Eliot 11
Bestor 10
Kandel 10
Bell 9
Burt 9
Gardner 9
Livingstone 9
Maritain 8
Flexner 6
Ulich 6
Barzun 5
Ortega y Gasset 5
Demiaahkevich 5
Meiklejohn 4
Lippmann 4
Mencken 4
Brickman 4
Mumford Jones 3
Briggs 3
Horne 3
Highet 2
Rickover 2
Lynd 2
Riesman 1
Phenix 1
Buchholz 1
Krutch 1
Griswold 1
21
For instance, it is important to note both who has and who has not
been included. Thus Person is a constant touchstone, white dackson is
rarely mentioned. The ranking is obviously important, but it is also
important to relate the ranking to the author's general stature. Thus one would
tod much reference to Plato in any educational literature, from extreme
essentials to extreme progressive. Almost more signified are those minor
amts or sinners of the canon who are revered or reviled only by essentialists.
xaxnple
, Nock ranks high, as an obscure saint; Charles Eliot ranks
high, as a lesser villain. It is important also to note that many secant
essentialists are not included in the tables above, as the sample examined
in such detail was necessarily small. The foller membership is listed in
chapter one, although again no claims are made for completeness; and they
emerge gradually in the subsequent chapters.
These statistics only broady indicate the tradition. Close reading of
the literature reveals that it is simply studded with mutual quotation, and
these range from extreme agreement to extreme disagreement, some of
which is sampled below.
Continuity
The tradition is composed of a general continuity of views, with some
manor discontinuities of various kinds. The continuity, and the minor
discontinuities, are discussed by concepts later, but a few examples are
discussed by personalities at this point, briefly and selectively, to avoid
undue repetition in the later conceptual chapters.
22
The broad agreement, for instance, sees a fundamental opposition
between progressive and traditionalist as though from left to right. It is
sometimes expressed in right and left wing terms, sometimes simply as a
dichotomy. The arc encompasses more than just educationalists.
The extreme "villains" of the hypothetical left are not always famous.
Generally they are extreme progressives or extreme bureaucrats or dangerous
political thinkers. Two of the most popular identifiable sinners are Marx
and Kilpatrick, the former for his mock-scientific predictions and totalitarian
influence, and the latter for his extreme progressivism or pragmatism.
John Dewey is justly famous and justly treated by many essentialists; the
more extreme the essentialist, the more he disapproves of Dewey; the more
moderate, the more he approves of Dewey and merely deplores his influence on
weaker minded progressive brethren. A little less feared are figures like
Charles Eliot, once president of Harvard, who is generally seen as encouraging
selective courses and thereby allowing the thin edge of the progressive wedge
to be driven into the traditional classical tradition. At the center of the
arc are such figures as Dewey, William James, Freud and Rousseau.
James is generally seen as slightly sounder than Dewey. Freud, it is
generally argued, has been misunderstood and misused by extreme progressives
and all those who seek to denigrate human responsibility by denying the will;
and essentialists argue that Freud, properly understood, replaces will and
responsibility at the center of man's life. About Rousseau there is enormous
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disagreement; Meiklejohn and Barzirn see him as the first of the modern
world, whereas extremists like Babbitt deplore his supposed influence upon
the arts and education.
Moving further across this imaginary arc, one can see that Plato and
Aristotle are generally approved, more by the extremists than others,
but there are some cries of "absolutist" against Plato, and Jefferson
thought him simply absurd.
Most thoroughly approved, and most quoted of the strictly local saints,
is Thomas Jefferson. He is the subject of several books by essentialists, and
of an enormous body of comment. He is particularly approved as one who
manages to combine a properly egalitarian view of democracy with a patrician
regard for learning and moral virtue; essentialists are especially fond of
Jefferson's view of what he calls a natural, not inherited, aristocracy. He
is a vigorous meritocrat, as well as an American founding hero and attractive
personality.
This combination makes Jefferson irresistible. The same educational
views in a less attractive personality render several of our tradition almost
persona non grata with their own fellows. Thus Nock, whose economic views
in particular closely resemble Jefferson's, is seen by many as too far right.
In fact there is a place on the far right, where congregate several minor
figures like Nock, Henry Adams, Irving Babbitt and others, who often refer
to themselves as conservative radicals, where right wing almost reaches
round the circle to join hands with left wing. Nock called himself an anarchist
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at one point. Yet they are very little different from, and quote inspiration
in, Thomas Jefferson, the fervid anti- Federalist.
Discontinuity
Almost as significant as the general agreement are the local
disagreements and personal vagaries; and we can distinguish, usefully if not
finally, several kinds of discontinuity.
First, there are those who are not, in themselves, clearly essentialists,
even allowing for the obvious anachronism embedded in the term. This is
particularly so with some of the nineteenth century characters, for instance Mann
and Emerson. It has, of course, been argued that, before the pragmatists,
everyone is an essentialist or traditionalist by definition, but Bagley long
ago pointed out that the fundamental dualism of progressive-traditionalist
is extremely old. Mann, for example, is very much a traditionalist, and
combines a burning desire for general education for all children with a
clear desire for the inculcation of moral principles, which makes him a
natural heir to Thomas Jefferson, even more so than Barnard. Emerson
is a more complicated case, in that he exhibits at times an apparent tendency
to progressivism, but his popularity with certain essentialists rests on
his idealism, his concern for the state of American culture and learning,
and his common-sense view of children and the process of teaching them.
Second, there are those figures for whom there is an expressed
disagreement as to their classification. Probably the best examples are Rousseau
and Dewey. While the former, and indeed all our examples, deserve individual
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treatment, John Dewey demands it, and is treated separately below.
Third, there are what could be described as private saints or house-
hold gods. This is a particularly significant group, as they perhaps most
clearly mark the uniqueness of the essentialist tradition. Many educational
philosophers will discuss Dewey or even Bagley, but only those essentialists
on the inside discuss, for example, Renan or Nicholas Murray Butler or
Sir Richard Livingstone or Albert Jay Nock. The best examples from
amongst these are Sir Richard Livingstone and Nicholas Murray Butler.
Butler is discussed by Buchholz, Demiashkevich, Bell, Kandel, Koemer,
Highet and Mortimer Smith.
Butler was President of Columbia University for many years, a
powerful, autocratic and self-confident educator, whose book, The Meaning
of Education.has been enormously popular with essentialists from the moment
of its publication in 1915. He combined a Jeffersonian desire for meritocratic
democracy with a reverence for Kantian idealism and Christian education,
and a firm dislike of pragmatism. He is not much read today, one suspects,
but will linger long as a minor saint of those essentialists who read each
other and fasten on each other’s heroes.
Livingstone is an even more extreme example, in that he is a
foreigner and obscure even in his own country. Indeed, one could say that
he was a prophet without honor except among American essentialists.
English essentialists appear not to know of him. Even such a standard English
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history of educational ideas as that of Curtis and Boultwood refers to
him only briefly, and nowhere discusses him. His twin claim to essentLalist
fame is that he was a great Platcnist early in the 20th century and the
president of an Oxford college. He is thus of great interest, for example, to
a perennialist like Robert Hutchins.
There is also a measure of discontinuity associated with the dates
of a member of the tradition. Larger souls like Plato survive this handicap,
and indeed gain stature by merit of their antiquity, but others suffer. For
instance, Herbart is an important general influence in 19th century American
education, and a number of essentialists like to argue that he is not so far
from being a traditionalist as extreme progressives would like to argue. He
is the nineteenth century equivalent of Dewey in this respect. Spencer, likewise,
is no longer much discussed. By the same token, twentieth century essentialists
may achieve a temporary popularity or nine-day notoriety, as did for example
Arthur Bestor with his attacks on the training of teachers; that great stir was
discussed at length in School and Society , but is less known today. Indeed,
in so far as most essentialists by definition use the same arguments and
attack the same progressive tenets, most of them repeat each other and
themselves, and therefore only the most recent and most vigorous attack is
notorious at any one period. Currently the stage is held by members of the
Council for Basic Education, for instance J. D. Koemer. Sputnik and the
armament-education scare put Admiral Rickover into brief but splendid orbit.
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Likewise also the earlier and less abiding Greek philosophers live only in a
few more classically educated minds, and examples there would be Marcus
Aurelius, Democritus and Heraclitus.
Finally
,
and most significantly, there are discontinuities associated
with conceptual differences or biases among essentialists. As these
differences, and the more important agreements, are the subject of the
following conceptual chapters, a general description will suffice for the
moment. Probably the biggest potential divide is that between realists and
idealists. Bagley differed importantly with Demiashkevich at this juncture, and
he struggled to paper over this very, as it were, real crack by claiming that
his concept of emergent idealism did away with idealism or supernaturalism,
while retaining individual ideals like duty. Allied to this dichotomy is clearly
that between Christians and humanists; many essentialists have been Christians,
and the extreme brethren are often Catholic, while the more purely classical
humanists try to derive their ideals more naturalistically. Only this can
explain the otherwise bizarre appearance of Ernest Renan in the tradition.
His significance is that he abandoned the Catholic priesthood to become a
leading 19th century scholar of languages and of the Near East and Christianity;
Gilbert Highet describes him as reducing Christ and Christianity to a humanist
level subordinate to the god of reason, while cherishing a real regard for the
historical Jesus. The person of Socrates is revered for his rather similar
humanism; Jefferson’s own very unmystical deism is distinctly akin to this.
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So one can see where the idealist enthusiasm for St. Augustine, St. Thomas,
or Kant and Hegel came from, or the realistic regard for Aristotle, White-
head and Bertrand Russell; and the fondness for Montaigne, Rabelais, or
Voltaire.
Similarly, there are those essentialists who represent a useful
touchstone in that they promote discussion in certain conceptual areas. Admiral
Rickover has been mentioned, and he is especially popular with those who
criticize progressive education for allowing national goals to be subordinated
to personal caprice. Walter Lippmann is a useful conservative political
theorist used to buttress meritocratic beliefs.
One might summarize therefore graphically by suggesting two
hypothetical arcs. The first is that arc from right to left on which one might
tentatively envisage a particular point where an educatior might be placed.
The second arc might be a smaller one, described by the diverse points upon
the larger arc representing the different views of various critics. The first
position is an average of the second.
In other words, John Dewey is arguably near the center of the first
arc. On the second he is variously distributed by those who judge him as
either progressive or moderate.
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John Dewey
A brief analysis of essentialist views of Dewey will illustrate these
arcs, will deal conveniently with the central theme of essentialist and
progressive differences, and will represent in microcosm the manner of the
later conceptual chapters, by examining Dewey in four areas of his thinking,
namely the philosophical, political, psychological and pedagogical.
There are as many views of Dewey as there are viewers, of course,
so one must expect a breadth of opinion. These opinions place Dewey at
many different points on our second arc, from arch-radical to the architect
of moderation; in other words, he ranges from extreme left of the arc to
slightly right of center.
The chief barrage of comment is directed at his philosophical views.
An early example is the comment of Nicholas Murray Butler in 1915 that
"an empirical education is futile, " and his argument that all students of
education must be serious students of philosophy as well, and that pragmatism
destroys that possibility for it
Is not a philosophy at all, but rather a denial that
philosophy can exist. With the title of the New
Realism, a group of younger writers and teachers
has thought it worth while to repeat with no little
ingenuity, and to endeavor to perpetuate, some of
the oldest and most thoroughly exposed of
philosophical errors. Both these movements are
revivals of that dogmatism in philosophy which it
was hoped had been put to rest forever by the
criticisms of Kant. *
Irving Babbitt attacked not only John Dewey but the more moderate William
James as well, because "James' relativism denied the importance of such
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constants;" and he talked exuberantly of John Dewey and his followers
"who are suffering from an advanced state of naturalistic intoxication. "3
Herman Harrell Home, a great idealist of the essentialist tradition, had
difficulty knowing where to attack Dewey first, though he also had great
respect for Dewey’s intentions and intellect. Home’s early The Philosophy
of Education
,
4
was brought up to date in 1927 with a new chapter called
"Twenty-Three Years Later, " or "Pramatism versus Idealism. " There he
recalled that Dewey’s "personal development in philosophy began with Idealism. "5
His criticisms centered round idealism and the nature of philosophy; he
found two fundamental and mutually opposed views of philosophy, that which
saw it as a study of social conflicts and that which saw it as the study of the
whole of reality. He anticipated many a later essentialist view by arguing that
Dewey’s concept of growth never explained growth for what or whither,
whereas "idealism regards education as a means, not as an end in itself.
. .
The end of ends, according to idealism, is the increasing realization of the
Absolute idea for the individual, society and the race. It includes the conception
of an ideal social order, which may very well be a social democracy.
He went on to argue that "in the one case we have an anthropocentric, and in
the other a theocentric, reality. "7 He denied the central pragmatic test
by arguing that "ideas are not true because they work, but work, or will work
o
when conditions are better, because they are true. " Home's criticisms of
Dewey were more fully worked out in The Democratic Philosophy of Education, ^
which was a paraphrase of and commentary on Dewey's Democracy and
Education. It represented the fruits of many years of graduate seminars
based on Dewey's book, and it would be presumptuous to recall all the
arguments; however, they follow the idealist argument of the 1927 work.
The book was dedicated to "G. W. F. Hegel, Absolutist, Of whom John
Dewey, Experimentalist, writes.
. . 'acquaintance with Hegel has left a
permanent deposit in my thinking*’” Horne argued, in familiar vein, of
Dewey that "there are no ends in themselves, no final values, no absolute.'^
Again he rejected the pragmatic test, when he claimed; "The truth of a view
is not determined by its influence. " His conclusion was that
Dewey's real novelty and originality is in limiting
the essentials of educational method to the essentials
of scientific method, and this originality, as we have
seen, has the defect of its quality. It is strong where
education is scientific and weak where education is
literary, historical, aesthetic and spiritual. . .
education and life are more, much more, than scientific
thinking.!-2
Michael John Demiashkevich, the co-founder with Bagley of the 1938
Essentialist Committee, was a similar idealist, and indeed quoted Home in
13
his 1935 work, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. His
arguments were in general identical to those of Horne; he concluded
that:
Religion in reality serves what seems to be an inherent
and ineradicable need of man for the ultimate certainty.
Neither science nor philosophy satisfies this need.!4
Like Butler, he argued that any such heresies were thought of long ago; progressives
^ 15
and pragmatists were dismissed as "Neo-Heracliteans.
"
Alexander Meiklejohn's criticisms were chiefly of a social and political
nature, but he included the jibe that "Dewey's followers. . . simply identify
'being scientific' with 'being wise'. " !^
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I. L. Kandel argued that "the fundamental emphasis of pragmatism is
on method for the continuous reconstruction of experience and, therefore, of
values. " He argued that Dewey used such qualitative words as
"wholesome" but failed to define them, "although they imply selection and
subjection to some standards of comparison. " His arguments were a subdued
version of those of Home and Demiashkevich.
Mortimer Adler and Milton Mayer attacked what they called
Dewey's dogmatism, quoting Whitehead;
Nothing is more curious. . . than the self satisfied
dogmatism with which mankind at each period of
its history cherishes the delusion of tte finality of
its existing modes of knowledge. Skeptics and
believers are all alike. At this moment the
scientists and the skeptics are the leading
dogmatists.
Meiklejohn likewise argued that pragmatism was out of date and therefore
irrelevant by its own criteria.
Mortimer Smith 20 attacked Dewey, "the philosophical godfather
of the movement, " on what are by now familiar grounds, namely that he never
explained growth for what purpose, that expressions such as "satisfactory"
were vague, and that "in the endprogressivism reduces education to a vast
21
bubbling confusion;" and Smith repeated these arguments in 1954.
Albert Lynd summarized his criticisms of Dewey’s philosophy
with an appeal to the community which a school might expect to serve:
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And how many communities
,
if so consulted,
would be likely to approve a philosophy which is
plainly uncongenial to certain loyalties which
most plain non-philosophizing people hold, for
better or worse, to be important: belief in super-
naturalism, in a transcendent moral law, in the
immutability of certain moral principles ?22
And Philip Phenix2° argued: "Pragmatists tend to swallow up values in
process. . . the transcendent ground and goal of the moral enterprise are
obscured, if not explicitly denied.
"
In short, Dewey and pragmatism were seen to suffer from the dogmatism
that there is no dogma, or from a faulty application of scientific method
o utside its proper field, with a consequent vacuity in the areas of ethics and
metaphysics.
A similar argument was applied by essentialists to Dewey’s political
and social views . A philosophy which relied on concepts like scientific
evolution and upon adjustment to the environment would naturally throw up that
especial horror of essentialists, namely the life adjustment movement, so
popular for a time. Paradoxically, this stemmed from an understandable mis-
conception of Dewey. Hutchins argued:
Since he is not a clear writer, his followers may
perhaps be excused for their failure to notice that
when he talked about adjustment to the environment,
he meant that the environment should first be
improved. Dewey was essentially a social reformer,
and it is tragic that he should have laid the foundation
for the proposition that the aim of education is to adjust
the young to their environment, good or bad . 24
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Yet, if one does not believe in values, adjustment is inevitable, goes the
argument. One finds it again with Mortimer Smith, quoting Bertrand
Kussell to the effect that Dewey was pre-eminently the philosopher of American
25industrialism, an opinion which is now popular with the revisionist
historians of the radical left. It is not the last time that left and right agree.
Smith also argued that one needs a theory of values to be able to choose
democracy, and that Dewey provided only expediency. 26
Russell Kirk claimed for similar reasons that Dewey "was bent,
though perhaps only half consciously, on creating an impersonal society. "27
Albert Lynd went further to claim that Dewey was "subversive of traditional
religion and of economic liberalism, " 28 which is to say no more than that
Dewey was an agnostic socialist. He went on to claim that:
There is political quackery in the new pedagogy. In
their constant use of the word "democracy, " the
educational interpreters of Dewey are evading the
first and most fundamental implication of that word: the
will of the community. ..Iam opposed to a philosophy
of education which takes for granted the
falsity of all gods. A nonreligious curriculum may and
should be quite compatible with an attitude of sincere
respect for all religions. The philosophy of Professor
Dewey is categorically incompatible with such an
attitude. You know your neighbors. How many
of them would vote for Deweyism if they understood the
philosophical ballot
The most elaborate political critique of Dewey was Meiklejohn’s
rather idiosyncratic Education Between Two Worlds . His argument, very
briefly, was that pragmatism was not primarily an epistemological or
philosophical affair in any way, but rather a movement for social reform. Its
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enemies are victorianism and aristocratic practices of any kind . 30 The
fundamental flaw of Dewey’s procedure, he claimed, was to have set up an
unnecessary dualism between an individual and his society. To reduce his
lengthy argument drastically, it was that Comeniv s was right to see the state as
theocentric. Locke and Dewey were wrong to see goverment as merely
negative, as a policeman regulating selfish interests. Roussseau got it
right;
The peculiar significance of Rousseau for our
western culture lies in the fact that he leads the way
in the substitution of the state for the church as the
primary institution of human brotherhood.
. . to
minds steeped in Anglo-American competitive
individualism
,
he seems not only wrong but also
absurd. And yet I am sure that he is right. 3 *
The clue lies in Rousseau’s doctrine of the social contract, whereby man
chooses society, for it is only in society that he can develop, and that he
is therefore clear that he has chosen certain restraints with his freedom.
The Christian tradition is maintained. . . ’whosoever
will lose his life for my sake shall find it’ was the
old doctrine. It is now replaced by the assertion
that each of us, in all well organized society, yields
to the state all he is, all that he has, and that, in
doing so, each of us becomes a free person . 22
Meiklejohn's state-centered view is unusual for an essentialist for, as we shall
see, there is a strong anarchical thread running from Jefferson’s anti-
federalism to the more extreme views of A. J. Nock, Henry Adams and others.
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wule the major criticisms are philosophical and political, these
h
'
y PlU °Ver “to the wea of psychology. The chief objections
ere are against what essentials often take to be an acceptance of at least
a f°™ " d6te“m
-—-——s on environment
--enough on here,., a false view of interest or motivation, and often a
simplified understanding of Freud.
An early and extreme view was that of Home. For instance h
,
, e argued
6 Pragmatlst
— the idealist differed radical!,, • n,Q ch ally in their opinion of the
role of intelligence:
In the one, intelligence is human; in the othenmversal
,
both immanent in human
18
transcending the limits of
former viewpoint leads man tr, it n °e * * * the
himself for his social progress
y °n
viewpoint of idealism leads man’ t'o 'rely on tL"solute, as well as on himself
.
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Likewise with the doctrine of interest anH h-311(1 dlsciplme, again the idealist
operates with and through tnuiseendent values-,,, sense of ought
.mains.
Emphasis is placed in the one philosophy on the interest that leads to effort;
in the other, in addition, on the effort that leads to interest, or, in extremis,
to doing right without interest. The latter may involve coercion and obedience
“ m°ral 1SSUes;,34Home invoked the oughts and obligations of idealism where,
for instance, Bagley tried to find them naturally through emergent or
evolutionary values. Demiashkevich was, of course, neater to Home, and
argued that "as things are now and are likely to continue, the vast majority of
people have to do work that in reality interests them very indirectly;"35
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an'i he talked of Dewey as "a moderate behavorist in psychology. " I. L. Kandel
maintained that "on the psychological side the theory of the child-centered
school was founded for a time on the stimulus
-response theory of mechanistic
psychology; and elsewhere that "the injection of a little Freudianism
provided a new justification to those who advocated the cult of freedom without
, .
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authority lest the growth of the individual should be warped. " Robert
Hutchins declared Dewey’s psychology "false, 1,38 and that the doctrine of needs
itself needed defining:
How do you know a need when you see one ? The
usual answer is that you know one by the demand.
. .
the doctrine of needs thus ends in public relations.
I think it fair to say that the dominant concern of
school superintendents and university presidents
in America is public relations .39
The practical outcome of all this is the progressive pedagogy. Henrich
Buchholz is responsible for the best example of extreme essentialist anger, in this
case against the hypothetical progressive fad called petology, a new science
of education.
Horatio Bump was a ladylike person with projecting
teeth, concave chest, and a cancerous ambition. . .
. . . somewhere he had read that Dewey stressed the
importance in education of the child’s interest. That
was as far as he felt it necessary to accompany Dewey.
He asked himself what, from the viewpoint of the
nature study department, might be represented as
the thing in which children revealed great interest, |nd
his answer was "pets. " Here truly was inspiration.
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A. J. Nock argued similarly:
One might say that the field of our pedagogy during
these three decades has been the drillground of
empiricism; large areas of it, indeed, seem to have
been, and still seem to be, the hunting-ground of
quackery.
. , Yes, yes, we kept saying, let us but
just install this one new method in the secondary
schools, or this one new set of curricular changes
in the undergraduate college.
. . and in a year or so
it will prove itself to have been the very thing we have
all along been needing. 44
In short, the curriculum becomes too practical or vocational, too
seldom theoretical, imaginative, sequential or important. Teachers
become mere aides, not authorities.
Of course, there is a more moderate view or compromise. Innumerable
essentialists point out that Dewey in his Experience and Education in 1938
took issue with some of his own less cautious imitators, and that Boyd Bode,
also in 1938, sought to prune progressive education of its excesses. 42
Compromise views will be discussed more fully later. Here it will be enough
to mention, for instance, Lynd's admission that Mof course, John Dewey knew
what he was doing at the philosophical founthead of the movement, but Mr. Dewey
is not about to set up the curriculum in your local school. " The finest
44
compromise critique is that of Jacques Barzun. Writing in 1971, he claimed
that Dewey, like every other reformer, was necessary to 'break up petrified
schooling, " and went on:
39
All that is new or seems new in Dewey (much of it
is already explicit in Rousseau) is the recommendation
to make early instruction follow the pattern of scientific
inquiry.
. . James is wiser than Dewey, as I think,
in seeing that not all modes of thought are scientific.
. .
in any case, James and Dewey agree on the essential
need to know something.
. ,
44
Similar compromise views abound in Barzun's writing. 45 William Brickman
had a similar appreciation of Dewey;46 and Robert Ulich suggested the
same, but found Dewey at fault for not being as clear as he could have been:
Had he from the beginning expressed himself .so
unambiguously about the necessity of regulative
and persistent values as he did after 1930 (see
particularly Dewey's Experience and Education)
,
when the crisis of our modern society had become
apparent, then he would not have needed to remind
his own followers that they had misunderstood
his philosophy. 4^
Thus the characteristic essentialist stance reveals itself in its
attitude to a "heretic n like John Dewey. The following chapter reveals the
same essentialist position in the analysis of W. C. Bagley, originator of
the Essentialist Committee and "orthodox" at many points, where Dewey is
not.
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CHAPTER IV
AN ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL1ST : W. C. BAGLEY
Bagley was himself one of the first to point out that the conservative
versus progressive educational debate goes back a long way. He described
it as Mat least two hundred and eight years old, " having in mind a group of
seventeenth century educators who described themselves as progressives.
No doubt one could, if ingenious and perhaps a little disingenuous, find the
same debate even earlier amongst the early Greek philosophers, perhaps
in the case of the Sophists, or even more hypothetically amongst primitive
2 3
societies. * In fact, the debate is significant especially because Bagley saw
it as a ''fundamental dualism,'* to use his phrase, which we shall examine in
due course.
Be that as it may, the debate takes on a special interest with the
arrival of Bagley upon the field. Bagley was an exemplary conservative (or
"essentialist, " though the term is anachronistic until 1935), and he was
exemplary in two ways, historically and conceptually.
First, historically he lived through a remarkable period. For the
purpose of our analysis it would be enough to say that he lived through the
entire progressive education movement of America. More generally, he lived
through what has probably been the most explosive era of education in any
44
sense. Meed, in the words of his official biographer, "to write the biography
of William Chandler Bagley is virtually to write the history of American
education in the first half of the twentieth century. "4
A brief outline of his career may help to suggest what is meant. He
attended a selective high school in Detroit, and then graduated in 1895 from
Michigan Agricultural College, (later the Michigan State College), where his
scientific training formed the basis for his thinking for a long time to come,
but whence he was doomed to disappointment in his expectation of a job
related to his training. He graduated in a period of depression and, like many
great educators, drifted into teaching, as the only opportunity which presented
itself was a post in a one-teacher school in Garth, Delta County, in the Upper
Peninsula of Michigan.
However, he found the work interesting, though he made heavy weather
of much of it and attributed this fact to the lack of scientific principles then
available. Much later he wrote of this experience:
In short, in so far as well established facts and laws
were concerned, mankind at that time knew vastly
more about the raising of pigs than about the minds
of children. In some of the reading that occupied
the long winter evenings, however, I learned that
efforts were being made to study mind in the same
way that physicists and chemists had long studied
matter; in the same way that biologists more
recently had so successfully studied living organisms. 5
In order to learn more of the application of scientific study to the
problems of education, Bagiey entered the University of Chicago as a
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graduate student in the summer quarter of 1896, to study psychology and the
physiology of the nervous system, and obtained a master’s degree in experi-
mental psychology in 1898. A graduate fellowship at Cornell University then
enabled him to obtain a Ph.D. under E. B. Tltchener in 1900, with a
dissertation on The Apperception of the Spoken Sentence: A Study in the
Psychology of Language.
hi 1901 he became principal of an elementary school in St. Louis.
Then he left to teach at the State Normal School at Dillon, Montana, for the
sake of his wife’s health; he took with him, thanks to the leadership in St.
Louis of William Torey Harris, "the dynamic value of a richly conceived
and rigidly wrought system of fundamental principles. "6
At Dillon he taught psychology, modernized the training school, served
as superintendent of the public schools from 1903 to 1906, in 1904 became vice
president of the college, and yet found time to publish in 1905 his first of
many books. The Education Process.
He transferred to the State Normal School at Oswego, New York, in
1906 to superintend the training school, published his second book, Classroom
Management, in 1907, and won a reputation which brought offers of three
university professorships in 1908. He spent the next nine years at the
University of Illinois, published four books, helped found the Journal of
Educational Psychology and Kappa Delta Pi, edited the journal. School and
Home Education, was president for a year of the National Society for the
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Study of Education, and was soon acknowledged as a leader in American
education.
In 1918 he joined Teachers College, Columbia, where he remained
until his retirement in 1939. In the meantime he published mightily,
participated in consulting work for school boards regularly from 1917 to
1930, enjoyed almost every major educational controversy, dabbled in
educational radio programs with CBS, was central in founding the short-lived
but powerful Essentialist Committee in 1938, took on the editorship in his
retirement of the journal. School and Society, and died in 1946.
In more general terms, BagLey ’’took up the profession of teaching
at a time when both the theory and the practice of education entered on a
period of transition, " in the words of Kandel. ^ It is worth quoting Kandel
at length, as he describes the period so succinctly.
With the conquest of the frontier there began a
period of social, economic and political changes
which inevitably exercised an important influence
on the course of education. A rapid industrial
development began and with it a new expansion in
the areas of commerce, transportation and
communication. This expansion continued through
the twentieth century with the multiplication of new
sources of power and challenged the inventiveness
of a people who had already displayed a genius for
inventions and innovations, the spirit of which also
infected the progress of educational development.
The conquest of the frontier and the development
of large scale industry were accomplished by an
increase in the country's population, both by natural
process and by immigration. At the same time
the larger concentration of industry produced a
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redistribution of the population and the rapid growth
of cities. The industrial economy gradually super-
seded the predominantly agricultural economy of the
nineteenth century and in turn helped to promote the
mechanization of agricultural production.
These factors would in any case have produced some
changes in the character of the American people.
But America came of age more rapidly, first, because
of the sense of national consciousness aroused and
stimulated by the Spanish American War, and second,
because of the participation of the nation in two world
wars from which she emerged as a leading international
power. Attention to the development of a sense of
national consciousness was also directed by the increasing
number of immigrants different in origin and cultural
background from their predecessors in the 18th and 19th
centuries; "Americanization" became an important aim
in education.
Urbanization, which was inevitable in a country destined
for advanced technological development, had its dis-
advantages, The influx of population, and particularly
of immigrants who sought the comfort and aid of their
fellow-nationals, too often produced slums. At the
same time there was a tendency to exploit the immigrants
industrially. Both factors stimulated a certain social
consciousness and humanitarianism which sought to
improve the lot of those who could not defend themselves
and to curb the trends of exploitation and monopolies on
the part of big business.
The era of prosperity which began and continued in the
twentieth century, despite depressions and recessions,
induced a higher standard of living. But the charge was
not infrequently made that wealth, accompanied by a
declining set of values and the disappearance of traditional
moral controls, had a certain debilitating effect. The
charges were allegedly substantiated by statistics of
crime, the rise of juvenile delinquency, and the general
decline of family life and parental control.
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The changes in American life described up to this point
would have demanded new adjustments and new orientations
and emphases in the nation’s education. The development
of urbanization made possible the construction of larger
and more schools whose number required more expert
systems of administration than had prevailed hitherto.
The improvement of means of transportation had its
effect upon the promotion of consolidation of schools and
transportation of pupils in the rural areas. Even before
these social and economic changes took place, new develop-
ments had been foreshadowed, not only in the general theory
of psychology but also in the psychology of childhood and
of adolescence. Partly as a consequence of the study of
the interests and growth of children, and, more particularly
as the result of new approaches to the philosophy of
education, the nineteenth century tradition of education,
especially at the elementary stage, was challenged in all
its aspects; secondary education was to be similarly
affected later. The foundations for a revolutionary period
in education began to be laid in the last two decades of
the nineteenth century; the full effect did not actually become
apparent until about 1915 and more definitely after 1919 when
the Progressive Education Association was established. Long
before these dates, however, there were evidences of efforts
at innovations which, though not infrequent, never succeeded
in establishing themselves for long in the public school
systems. 8
This passage deserves such lengthy quotation for a number of reasons:
because it is one of the best general descriptions of the social or political
contexts; because it is written by a gentleman who was in his own right an
essentialist; because its own assumptions are essentialist, or conservative,
as might be more obvious if we contrasted it with the arguments of the current
historical revisionists, who would lay the blame more vigorously at the door of
industrial capitalists; and perhaps because its very prose style may give us an
inkling of what it means to think like an essentialist, for the syntax is measured,
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highly wrought, antithetical, the constructions are passive and generalised, the
vocabulary Latinate. The relation of style to educational philosophy is some-
thing one could pursue further. One could fruitfully contrast, for example,
the prose styles of Kandel or Bagley with A. S. Neill, or that of Barzun
with Goodman. The process would be all the more relevant in that essentialisls
are generally most self-conscious and deliberate about their prose style, and
the teaching of composition lies high on their list of pedagogical priorities.
Bagley described this social and political setting himself on various
occasions, though perhaps less fully than Kandel attempted to do. Thus,
writing in 1929 about "The Profession of Teaching in the United States, "9
Bagley listed what he called the "indigenous handicaps, " such as ,lthe divers
standards of our conglomerate population" and others which might almost have
suggested Kandel’s later analysis, and which we shall examine more fully
later. His opinion in 1938, both in the celebrated ,TEssentialist Platform for
the Advancement of American Education, "10 and "The Significance of the
Essentialist Movement in Educational Theory, was more simple, and
perhaps even simplistic, namely that the "incontestable weaknesses" of
American education were "traceable to the vast upward expansion of the
universal school;" though this in turn was the result of many of the factors
outlined both by Kandel and Bagley himself.
Kandel, again by way of sketching in the background for an appreciation
of Bagley, also described the philosophical and psychological forces of the
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period, distinguishing them from the socio-economic-political forces which
we have just enumerated*
He saw an attack on the traditional, metaphysical psychology, starting
in Germany when Wilhelm Wundt opened a laboratory in 1879 for the experimental
study of psychology in Leipzig and sought to place the subject on a scientific
foundation. The chain of influence proceeded via G. Stanley Hall and J. M.
Cartel to the United States, then via such men as Edward Lee Thorndike and
Lewis M. Terman.
The two philosophical movements of importance in this era he also
saw as related to this psychological movement, namely Herbartianism and
Dewey’s pragmatism. These were founded on a psychological basis. 'Philosophy
and psychology were inevitably linked together as correlatives in any reform
movement. Both were necessarily associated in efforts to improve the
curriculum and methods of instruction.
Herbart’s influence in America, via American educators who had
studied in Leipzig or Jena, had a sporadic and brief success. "If they did
not introduce radical reforms in the curriculum of the elementary schools,
the Herbartians did succeed in emphasizing that instruction must proceed with
and elicit the interest, understanding, and intellectual activity of the pupils.
One wonders whether the current enthusiasm for the English elementary open
classroom and integrated day is not a similar transatlantic vogue.
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Kandel continued, 'the Herbartian method failed chiefly because of the
too literal acceptance of the 'five formal steps, * which were too rigidly
adhered to and resulted in stilted formalism and monotony.
"
John Dewey attacked the Herbartian concept of interest as something
extrinsic to the real interests and needs of the child* The Herbartian was,
according to Dewey, sugar coating something that did not in actuality represent
the child’s intrinsic or spontaneous interest which grew out of his own immediate
need for expression.
We can perhaps conclude this very brief recapitulation by noting
Kandel’ s brave reduction of Dewey to
two important points. . . . The first was that the past,
with its traditional truths and values to be imposed, is
valuable only as it can be drawn upon for present use.
. •
the chief concession that was made to traditional values
was to claim that the knowledge, facts and information
acquired through passive learning were acquired
’accidentally’ when activities were engaged in ... .
The second point emphasized in the pragmatic philosophy
was that it got rid of traditional dualisms : school and
society, the child and the curriculum, interest and effort,
thought and action, learning and doing, hi the main the
dualisms were expected to disappear when the principle
was accepted that education is life and not a preparation
for life.
. .
The curriculum is not fixed in advance but
is something that emerges in response to the child’s felt
needs and purposes. . • education, then, is a process of
self-development through active response to ’felt needs'
and the effort of solving one's problems and difficulties. 15
This was remarkably similar to, if not identical with, Bagley’s own later
views on the importance of what he called "emergent" man and idealism, which
we shall meet later,
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So much then, even though so little, for the social and intellectual
background of Bagley’s portrait. It is hoped it has been enough to establish
the first of my two general propositions, namely that Bagley is historically
a representative essentialist, and that he spans both an explosive period in
the history of education and the grand period of American progressive
educators and of their counter revolutionaries, the essentialists. The
second proposition, that he is representative conceptually may take longer;
indeed the remainder of the argument will be a documentation of this.
Immediately this presents a very real methodological problem: how
does one characterize an educational philosophy? What topological features
need describing to give the shape of an educational position? What is the
essence of essentialism ?
There have been many attempts to answer the last of these questions.
Bagley made various attempts, as we shall see. G. F. Kneller tried, by
16
listing four rather inadequate generalizations. Theodore Brameld tried,
by arguing that "essentialism, in briefest compass, views the established
beliefs and institutions of our modem heritage as not only real but true, and
not only true but good. ... Indeed, one of the basic characteristics of
essentialism is wide eclecticism, typified by the presence within its camp
of both professed idealist and professed realist. " Kandel acknowledged the
difficulty of any definitive statement: "It is difficult, from the point of view
of any of the educational philosophies current in the twentieth century, to
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classify Dr. Bagley."^ S. i. Miller in his unpublished doctorate,M likewise
avoided the issue by claiming simply,
"essentialism, as a definite philosophy
of education, has its roots both in classical realism and in idealism. It is
not, however, a system of philosophy as such, but rather it is concerned with
the need to preserve and transmit a definable body of knowledge based on the
social heritage and what it conceives of as certain principles of truth." Now this
is not very helpful; it relies too easily on Brameld, it fails to distinguish between
the suggestions that essentialism is "a definite philosophy" but that "it is not,
however, a system of philosophy as such, " and it relies too heavily on a purely
descriptive approach to the subject, 20
The practical procedure or methodology here adopted is ultimately
Bagley’s own. He talked at great length of fundamental dualisms between
progressive and essentialist, and listed what he described as "pairings of
assumed opposites, " such as "effort versus interest," "discipline versus
freedom, " ’logical organization versus psychological organization. "
This chapter further examines these "assumed opposites. " The issues
they represent are discussed below in three areas, psychology, philosophy and
politics. They are paradigmatic of the essentialist debate.
Of course this division into three areas is imperfect. Each of the three
ultimately depends on both the other two. Which of the three came first is a
form of the "chicken-egg" debate, or perhaps we may suggest "the chicken-egg-
com" debate to make it triangular. For example, Marxist politics depend
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ultimately on the epistemology of materialism.
Whatever the theoretical merits of this methodology, Bagley’s
contention was always that theories should result in conduct, or, more
humbly, that the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Philosophy
To examine Bagley’s philosophical beliefs independently from his
political and psychological beliefs is, one has already admitted, partly a
procedure of convenience, so there is no difficulty in further subdividing
philosophy for convenience into, for our purposes, epistemology, ethics,
and metaphysics.
ha the area of epistemology there are a number of traditional dualisms
with which the essentialists and progressives did battle against each other,
for example, "liberal versus vocational, ” "subjects versus integration, ”
and so on. Central to this area are two concerns, namely the nature and
structure of knowledge, and the nature of proof or logic. Generally one can’t
have one without the other, but conceivably a nihilist has a logic even if no
knowledge, so one may do well to start with the former.
At this point Bagley was incisive but almost irritating. He appears to
have believed that proof is necessary and desirable, but that it may not
prove possible, hi a brief but powerful plea for "Academic Freedom, " Bagley
reviewed the problems of teachers, especially of politics and economics, in
an age when people and especially the media and authorities may 'hold an
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absolutist position on one side or another. " The argument concluded:
Our task would seem to lie in a sincere effort to
convince the public that an absolutist position is
indefensible from any rational point of view.
After all, and in the last analysis, the only effective
remedy for prejudice is .reason, and reason
happens to be—or certainly should be—our particular
stock in trade. 22
This is a fine example of the compromise he sought. He seems to have
said, with though before Karl Popper, that reason is all, but that we cannot
expect proof. Seek, but ye shall not find.
That theorizing is necessary we find throughout his work, hi his first
book, The Educative Process (1905), he dealt with principles rather than with
details in the belief that "not the least important element in the formation of
effective ideals is substantial theory. 1,22 Already quoted above is a letter
from a former classmate, where he also wrote of his first teaching in 1895 that
"the work of teaching seemed pitiably lacking in trustworthy and experimentally
tested scientific principles. " In Classroom Management (1907) he wrote:
Evolution is simply a progressive development
towards forms that are more and more elaborately
organized, and in which system and coherence take
the place of chaos and incoherence. 24
He thus linked two of his great themes, logic and evolution, of which we shall
hear more later.
One of the great Essentialist cries has always been for certainty.
Kandel wrote a book about it in 1943, The Cult of Uncertainty. Bagiey, in an
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address of 1910, entitled "A Plea for the Definite in Education," said:
The best way in this world to be definite is to know
our goal and then strive to attain it. hi the lack of
definite standards based upon the lessons of the
past our dominant rational ideals shift with every
shifting wind of public sentiment and demand.
In an article of 1939, entitled "Progressive Education is too Soft,
"
he wrote:
When the human element enters, uncertainty enters
—
else the world could have anticipated and adjusted
itself to Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin and the
military obligarchy of Japan and would not be standing
dazed and impotent as it stands today.20
On the other hand, as suggested above, he was fiercely Popperian, hated
all forms of absolute dogma or final truth, was strongly anti-deterministic about
human nature, as we shall argue shortly, and described himself in 1932 as
one who played a humbler part than that of setting in train new fashions in
education. Rather, he saw himself serving
. . .
perhaps in the end an equally significant function
—
namely, salvaging from the scrap-pile and preserving
for the future the valuable elements which almost every
one of these fashions represents—often, I admit, in
microscopic amount, but worth saving, nonetheless.
William Brickman described this process indirectly:
Neither a philosophy nor a movement (in the political
sense), Essentialism represented a state of mind
—
one of healthy skepticism; watchful waiting, and
appreciation of the good regardless of age or label. . .
it is an approach to set the schools on a straight path, to
maintain the proper balance between subject and method,
teacher and pupils, school and home, the old and the
new. ^
'
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Bagley's subtle compromise can perhaps best be seen in his debate
with the Progressives. He saw them effectively as the cause of all that
was weak in American education, and yet he could see their many good points.
His most generous statement of this compromise, and the statement of a
pattern which governs the nature of my methodology, was in an article
entitled, "Just What is the Crux of the Conflict Between the Progressives
and the Essentialists ?"
He wrote:
Essentialism and Progressivism are terms currently used
to represent two schools of educational theory that have
been in conflict over a long period of time—centuries in
fact.
The conflict may be indicated by pairing such assumed
opposites as: Effort versus interest; discipline versus
freedom.
. .
thus baldly stated, these pairings of
assumed opposites are misleading, for each member of
each pair represents a legitimate—indeed a needed
—
factor in the education process. The two schools of
educational theory differ primarily in the relative
emphasis given to each term as compared with its mate,
for what both schools attempt is a resolution or integration
of the dualisms which are brought so sharply into focus
when the opposites are set off against one another. 28
He used exactly the same argument and many of the same phrases
in "The Essentialist Platform, " discussing this same "fundamental dualism.
"
At the same time, in this same "Essentialist Platform, " he argued vigorously
that the Progressives have led to "the discrediting of the exact and exacting
studies Tt
58
Lawrence Cremin, in his monumental history of the Progressive
education movement, noted a similar ambivalence when he observed that
Bagley was
:
... an arch opponent of progressive education; yet he
ended up the outstanding exponent of Progressivism in the
testing controversy.
. . he located the problem within
the classic argument about social Darwinism, and took a
vehemently reformist position. The IQ rightly interpreted
spoke with compelling force not for restriction but for
expansion, Bagley concluded. For there was no limit
to the educational opportunity democracy might provide—
for the super intelligent and for everyone else as well.
The only function of the tests was to tell the educator
where he began; it was the educator's vision and society's
that ultimately set the goals.
We see the same denial of absolutism in an address of 1910 to the St.
Louis Society of Pedagogy:
As I have suggested, there are always two dangers that
must be avoided; the danger, in the first place, of
thinking of the old as essentially bad; and, on the other
hand, the danger of thinking of the new and strange and
unknown as essentially bad; the danger of confusing a
sound conservatism with a blind worship of established
custom; and the danger of confusing a sound radicalism
with the blind worship of the new and the bizarre. 30
So much then for the assumed opposites of certainty versus uncertainty.
The next opposites are old favorites, namely ends versus means.
This particular debate is best left to the following section on political issues,
for it is there that Bagley finds his ends, namely in action or social evolution.
The next area, that is the structure of knowledge, is a fruitful one for
providing dualisms or opposites: subjects versus subject integration;
59
specialist teachers versus creative generalists; sequential versus incnwp!
learning.
Bagley summarized the debate thus:
The Essentialists have always emphasized the prime
significance of race-experience and especially of
organized experience or organized culture—in common
parlance, subject-matter. They have recognized, of
course, the importance of individual or personal
experience as an indispensible basis for interpreting
and assimilating organized race-experience, but the
former is a means to an end rather than an educational
end in itself. The Progressives, on the other hand,
have tended to set the 'living present" against what
they often call the "dead past. " 31
Bagley’s view of knowledge as social and intellectual heritage, or as
evolutionary, is currently a popular one, and is in a sense undeniable.
Paul Hirst in England and Philip Phenix in America are two of the firmest,
clearest and most recent proponents of this view. 32 Yet both merely refine
and bring up-to-date Bagley’s argument in the light of more recent theories
in the various subject areas.
Bagley talked, for example, of "a storehouse of organized race-
experience. " Or he argued: "The systematic and sequential mastery of
past experience as organized in the various fields of human inquiry I regard
as the most dependable source of helpful backgrounds. 1,33
The assumed opposite is the progressive panacea, as essentialists
see it, of interest, or natural motivation. In Bagley’s words
:
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So long as the pedagogical doctrine of interest meant the
following of the lines of least resistance, its failure as
an educational principle was absolutely certain.
Always to obey the dictates of interest, in this sense of
the term, would mean the instant arrest of all progress.
But if the interest means the desire for satisfaction of
acquired needs, the case is somewhat different. The
child is no longer at the mercy of the strongest stimulus;
sustained attention directed toward a remote end has
become possible. But the point never to be forgotten
is this : acquired interests are developed only under
the stress of active attention.
. . one vital necessity
of education, therefore, is to develop in the immature
child needs that will demand the acquisition of experiences
that will be beneficial j .in mature life. ^4
The assumed opposite of "immediate" and "remote" goals is another favorite
one.
Likewise his views on the subjects of the curriculum are identical
with those of the Council for Basic Education today. Language is the bed-
rock of an education, as it is the primary medium through which the culture
is expressed and how it is passed on; so we would expect it to have figured
importantly in Bagley's curriculum.
For example, he wrote:
Language is the most efficient medium for the transmission
of experience: (1) because it is the most elaborately
organized and hence susceptible of the greatest variety of
combinations expressing the finest gradations of meaning;
and (2) because it employs words which represent condensed
experiences or concepts; thus dealing with experience not
in the concrete but in the abstract—dealing in other words,
only with essentials.
There are, however, three factors that condition the highest
efficiency of language. These factors are especially important
in the use of language as a medium of instruction. (1) The
first is agreement of meaning. Hence the strenuous effort
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in every science to build up a vocabulary of technical terms
the meaning of each of which shall be absolutely unequivocal.
(2) A second factor that influences the efficiency of language
is the danger of verbalism, which is the commonest and most
pernicious species of formalism. (3) Thirdly, it is an
important task of education in its earlier stages to make
habitual the use of conventionally correct forms.
. . in
general very decided lapses from conventional forms tend
to make expression inefficient. 35
Chapter three of An Introduction to Teaching
T
by Bagley and J. A. H.
Keith, published in 1924, provided an almost splendid apologia for language
studies, with copious quotation from H. G. Wells to try to picture for us
how man developed language, and how language, literacy and, in due course,
printing produced the modem world; language is the basic factor in social
evolution. The natural conclusion was:
The teacher whose business it is to teach children to
read and write may be thought of by some people as
spending his or her time in a humdrum, formal, and
quite uninspiring task; but it is doubtful whether any
other work in the whole range of human occupations
is at basis more significant than this. 36
In the same chapter he discussed mathematics as a similar phenomenon
and tool
:
A second group of arts are almost as important as are
the arts of communication. These are the arts of
computation and measurement. . . . They are not
only essential in the cooperative living that modem
civilization has brought about; they are in themselves
instruments of the first significance in the gaining of
new knowledge. 37
The greatest value of mathematics 'lies in the very fact of its
abstractness. " He allowed a small gesture in the direction of the child's
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interest when he added: "On the other hand, there can be little doubt that,
even here, the factor of concrete and economic application would add vitality
to the pupil's conception of the method. 1,38
He allowed a similar sop to those who believe in the preeminence of
motivation in the teaching of science. The important function of science may
well be to teach "a system of attitudes and perspectives which implies. • .
a systematic and rational mastery rather than merely that empirical mastery
which is often sufficient for economic purposes;" yet he allowed that applied
science is eventually and paradoxically more useful than pure science because
its "point and vitality.
. . will, if rightly directed, make analytic and heuristic
teaching much easier and much more effective than it would be otherwise. 1,39
The study of ancient languages is an interesting case, as it involves
the very technical debate about the transfer of training. Bagley argued that
if, as seemed probable, the specifically mental-discipline argument for
Latin was not very strong, then its intrinsic worth was also questionable, as
a matter of relative worth, for mastery of the classics took disproportionately
long and the classics could be, after all, read in translation for their cultural
value. For an essentialist he took a surprisingly soft line on the matter.
History and geography were clearly vital, as they involved the self-
conscious study of man's cultural heritage, viewed in terms of time and
space. "The viewing of present situations in the light of their genesis. . .
modified in a marked degree one's adjustment to these situations. "40
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Essentialists were almost unanimous in their criticism of social-
studies in schools, perhaps because many of them were historians or had
pretentions thereto, hi the Essentialist Platform Bagiey wrote:
While the exact and exacting studies were in effect being
discredited, the primrose path of least resistance was
opened ever wider in the area known as social studies.
. . .
which are not in the same class with the natural sciences.
Their generalizations permit trustworthy predictions only
in a few cases and then only in a slight degree. When the
human element enters, uncertainty enters. 44
Literature, art and music and religion, ’’are the chief sources of
materials for the direct development of ideals, "4^ and are "for the purpose
of fulfilling appreciative and recreative functions. ”43
Some related dualisms that recurred regularly among essentialists
were those of: learning versus teaching; activity methods versus book study
or rote learning or passive learning; individual versus class learning;
abstract versus concrete; creativity versus disciplined study; logical
organization versus psychological; play versus work.
It will be obvious by now where Bagiey stood in terms of emphasis
in these cases. It is already clear what he believed about logical organization
and its relative superiority to motivational schema which entail an incidental
approach to structured knowledge.
He made no mention of creativity before 1924. He could then write:
"Of late the term ’creative intelligence' has become current. . . the putting
together of past experiences in new ways. . . all social institutions are at
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basis inventions. " In the same work he gave advice worthy of the author
of jimile: "Opportunity and stimulus must be provided for the independent
activity of the learner. "45 His approval was firm but cautious.
In 1932, in Standard Practices in Teaching, by Bagley and N. E.
Macdonald, are included a chapter on "The Project Method, " one on "Teaching
Through Activities" and a third on "Individual instruction or Self-instruction. "
The first of these especially could have been written by an enthusiastic
progressive; though, of course, Bagley believed the method chiefly suitable
in elementary grades and that "it is not a panacea. "46 This again is typical,
essentialist moderation.
He had some sensible things likewise to say about the use of the "play-
instinct. "
Again there must be a nice adjustment of forces.
. . an
environment of irksome tasks, unrelieved by anything
that could gratify the play instinct, would be as fatal
to the idea of duty.
. . . which carries men safely
through so many crises. ... as an environment that
gratified instinct at every turn. 4^
Of individual instinct he had a similar compromise to propose:
What is now known as the "Batavia System" of "class-
individual" instruction is perhaps the most successful
method yet devised of effecting a compromise between
the individual and class methods. In essence, this system
aims to preserve the stimulus which comes from group-
instruction, and, at the same time, to provide explicitly
and systematically for whatever extra instruction the
weaker members of the class may need to keep them
48
abreast of the brighter members.
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It is also everywhere implicit that for Bagley the abstract was more
valuable than the concrete; and that liberal education was more important
than vocational, and that teaching was generally what took place before
learning, rather than vice versa.
In what loosely has been called the area of ethics, Bagley appears to
have been concerned with two fundamental dualisms; freedom versus
discipline, and equality versus elitism. He was, arguably, slightly to the
right, literally and metaphorically, on both these continua.
He was, for example, worried by too much freedom;
The extent to which these softening influences have gone
is most clearly seen in the increasing vogue of what I
shall call the freedom theory of education. La its
popular form, this theory defines individual freedom,
not only as an end of education, but also as the primary
and most effective means to this end. Learning abilities
must not be imposed, they must always take their cue
from the immediate desires and purposes of the learner;
... he must get a ,Tkick" out of each learning
experience
.
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As corrective to this license, Bagley proposed duty, as we have
already seen. Discipline took its justification from the voluntary nature
of democracy; ’’The newer concept of discipline. . . recognizes that the
measures which the school must take to control its pupils should serve as
far as may be to illustrate the basic necessity for law and order in a
civilized society. ”59 The resolution of this dualism lay in the idea of
ri
"disciplined freedom. ’’ Historically he saw this process at work;
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In the history of the race, anything that remotely
resembles freedom.
. . has been a conquest not a gift.
In a very real sense, education must reflect in each
generation this element of struggle and conquest
.
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On the related continuum of equality, he was again generally to the
right, in that he was implicitly something of an elitist, though less so than
many of his essentialist successors. As an example, one may instance the
''Essentialist Platform, " where he discussed the need to fail children who
cannot keep up, for the sake of the more intelligent, an argument one comes
across repeatedly.
In the area of metaphysics one has again something of a puzzle, this
time as to whether Bagley was an idealist or a realist philosophically. S. I.
Miller, in his dissertation quoted earlier, tried to stay on both sides of the
fence, an uncomfortable position but one which seems peculiarly appropriate
in this essentialist/progressive debate.
On the other hand Bagley always denied that he was any form of
metaphysical idealist; and yet he firmly resisted, as we shall see, a
psychology of man which is mechanistic; and in his theory of emergent man
he argued that behavioral categories do not serve higher-order thinking. In
fact, he coined this higher thinking "emergent idealism. " He advocated "a
virile idealism in place of the weak opportunism that now prevails. "53 The
social heritage, on which his thinking was based, included the material
heritage of tool and machine, and the spiritual heritage of customs, traditions,
ideals, knowledge and skills. 3^ So he was clearly neither realist nor
67
idealist in the simpler sense. One gets a better idea of the complexities of
this delineation on examining his psychological beliefs.
Psychology
The central dualisms here are those of determinism versus indetermin-
ism and of heredity versus environment. Bagley’s decision on these profoundly
influenced everything else he ever said. The best source for analysis of this
is his collection of essays published in 1925 under the title Determinism in
Education.
The general argument rests on two principles, namely "that education,
far from being merely an expression or concomitant of intelligence, plays a
positive and indispensable role in the development of intelligence, " and "that,
in perhaps a limited and yet a very real sense, education does operate as an
equalizing force among individuals of varying degrees of native endowment-
in short, that education is (or can be made) in some measure a ^levelling—
up’ process. 1,55
Bagley attacked the implications of the tests and mental measurements
which were then in a state of youthful exuberance:
It is the purpose of Hie present paper to show that the
sanction which mental measurements apparently give to
this particular variety of determinizing is based, not
upon the facts that the measurements reveal, but upon
the hypotheses and assumptions that the development of
the measures has involved.
He described his own first studies in psychology a quarter century
earlier, when he was taught that the degree of mentality depended upon the
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number of nerve cells in the cerebral cortex; how later he had been taught
that the differences in the readiness of synaptic connections were the
physiological basis of differences in mentality. In other words, "we had
shifted the basis from an anatomical structure to a physiological function. 57
Likewise, he argued, the higher the ability the less relevant the
tests and conclusions from them. This is an early example of the plateau
theory: that any one with an IQ of 120 or more can understand or perform
any function, and "the contributions of experience become so numerous and
so influential that it is the height of absurdity to contend that it is a native
and unmodified fact that is being measured. "° 8 He called the two factors,
which Michael Young much later called crudely IQ and effort, 59 vertical
and horizontal growth.
For the sake of the argument I will grant that
vertical growth is limited if you will grant that
the possibilities of horizontal growth are
essentially limitless. 60
What most concerned Bagley was the application of such assumptions
to democracy: an example of how our three categories inevitably interact.
He predated the historical revisionists of our day by pointing out that tests
are being used largely to sort out children for future careers in industry:
Equity of opportunity, then, is the only true democracy
according to the determinists. Give every child
opportunity, he says—opportunity to develop precisely
as his original nature dictates: This one into an artisan. • .
that one into a captain of industry. . . 61
and concluded:
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K fte Cetermuus 4 is right, the ideal of democracy iswrong.
. . let us come then to the real issue namelvUre need of democracy for a high level of informed
“ouicttve
C
LS,n
a
.
b
6
a
2
SiS **
*”d
This he applied to his concept of social evolution most powerfully.
Bagley argued, "if I teach an average man" the principle of gravitation.
. .
I maintain that I have given him one control over his
environment substantially equal to that which Newtonhimself possessed; and maintain that in respect of thispossession I have made this common man the equal of
aLl others who possess it. 63
Differences certainly do exist, but,
resemblances in ideas, ideals, aspirations and
standards may and do unite men by bonds that are
vastly stronger than are the differences in native
endowment that would otherwise pull them apart.
More generally, in terms of social evolution, with the ndawn of
mind and language” man gained at least a partial control over his environ-
ment, and it is thus possible through culture to
stand upon the shoulders of all the tall and sun-crowned
men who had gone before.
.. and the development of
the universal school is the latest scene in this great
drama of social evolution. 65
We shall see something of his subsequent disillusionment with the universal
school in due course.
In 1925, then, he was still the optimist of his earliest years, and
could conclude this essay on a note few essentialists ever sound:
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Personally I have still to be convinced that this process
of social evolution will disappoint the world in its rich
promise to bring mankind into areal brotherhood. What
education has already done is only a feeble portent of
what education can and will do as its forces become
better organized and more keenly alive to their
tremendous responsibilities.
. . a little more light for
the common man this year, next year, a hundred years
from now, and the battle for humanity, for democracy,
and for brotherhood is won. 66
The remainder of the book reworked these themes and amassed
technical and historical evidence for them, with some very happy phrases:
mentality, among all of the variable biological traits,
seems to be the only one that distills its own
corrective. 67
and
The great turning points of social evolution have
actually been marked by improved methods of
disseminating experience--of letting more light
into common minds !
Is it undemocratic to admit one’s superiority? Yes, rather all
leaders and able people owe a "duty of service" and ought to be sincerely
"humble"—two very idealistic concepts
!
It is of interest that Bagley relied heavily on Cyril Burt's then recent
publication0^ in London, where he computed the relative influence of three
possible components on the Binet-Simon scores as follows: to the mental-
age of the children thus tested, native intelligence contributed 33 per cent,
informal education contributed 11 per cent, and formal education contributed
54 per cent. This reflects the essentialist reliance both on innate ability
and on formal schooling.
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There was an interesting analysis in his Educational Values as early
as 1911 in the chapter headed "The School Environment as a Source of Educative
Materials, " which hinted at a much later development in the studies of social
psychologists and sociologists, namely "the increasingly explicit recognition
of the educative influence of the life of the school itself, apart from the
content of the formal curriculum.
The key, however, to this antimony lay in Bagley’s concept of
emergent man. This was most fully discussed in his book Education and
Emergent Man of 1934, but was neatly summarized in an earlier paper,
"Emergent Idealism" published in his earlier book (1931) Education Crime and
Social Progress
. This dealt with the same dualisms we have been discussing,
and opposed mechanistic or behaviorist psychology with idealism, or "a
virile idealism in place of the weak opportunism that now prevails. " The
argument was that,
While the process of evolution represents a structural
continuity, it represents also and just as clearly a
functional and qualitative discontinuity. . . it follows
that higher-order functions and qualities may be and
often are quite new creations, subject sometimes to
the laws governing lower-order functions and qualities
but often departing from these laws and demanding
explanation in terms of quite new principles.
In other words, much behavior may be explained in simple behaviorist
terms, but not the activities of consciousness. He coopted the recent work
of Kohler and others of the Gestalt school for the purpose. Insight was more
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important than the laws of effect and exercise: "It is especially the so-called
law of effect that has abetted the emasculation of educational theory. "7 '^
.
He argued for three levels of mind: the primitive level of behaviorist
conditioning; the conceptual, insightful, which transcends the specific-habit
level; and most importantly, the third or social-moral level.
Here I should find a place for the unfettered operation of
ideals—especially of such regulative ideals as duty,
renunciation, and sacrifice. This is distinctly the plane
of the moral judgment.
. . conscience.
. . it may be
that, under the hypothesis of emergent evolution, freedom
of moral choice ("free will'’) and the principle of moral
responsibility can find a firm and rational basis. Thus the
conception of emergent evolution may become the
"declaration of independence" not only of biology and
psychology, but of ethics as well. 74
Here, if anywhere, was Bagley’s clearest stand on the realist/idealist
debate. He seems to have argued, paradoxically, that idealism can evolve
from the real, and that education is the key to that evolution.
He concluded the essay hopefully:
Under this theory we can find a firm place for the finest
things in human experience without involving ourselves
in treacherous dualisms, without bringing in a meta-
physical element of any sort, without committing our-
selves to supematuralism. • . we can, in short, be
both naturalists and idealists . 75
This may help to understand his puzzling statement:
I rather think I would shun the man, however intelligent,
who decided moral questions as he decided any others,
by weighing the evidence. . . I would prefer a man,
even less intelligent, who "followed the rules".
Presumably one man’s intelligence can never outweigh
the accumulated race experience on the issue; a man
may adopt as his own quite honorably the dogma of
the generations. 76
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ITUS in turn explains his insistence on the inculcation of habit, wMch
sounds at least initially unpalatable." Erwin V. Johanningmeier saw this
as one of Bagley's basic arguments.'78 He quoted Bagley as claiming "if
there is one psychological principle that may be looked upon as a universal
solvent for educational problems, it is this. " It makes sense, one can now
see, for a child to learn to react automatically to situations by building habits
according to the accumulated wisdom of the ages and sages.
Johanningmeier’s article was of considerable interest, as it traced
in scholarly manner the development of Bagley's views over the first forty
years of this century; it especially confirmed Bagley's drift away from faith
in scientific research and his gradual espousal of a more political and
philosophical attitude, even though these are based on the idea, of evolution.
This also helps explain Bagley's later insistence that the teacher is not
analogous to the engineer or artisan, and that "the effective teacher must be an
artist rather than an artisan. ”79
He also took a very central view on the experiments on the transfer
of training. The debate recurred throughout his work; one does not make
remotely adequate reference to it by simply saying that, although he believed
that the recent experiments showed the limited value and existence of transfer,
that some value remained; and that this was ignored because "it was essential
at the time that the doctrine of formal discipline should be discredited, for it
stood in the way of a very definite type of progress—namely the upward
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expansion of mass education. ”80 His views on the teaching of classics have
been quoted and are typical of his attitude.
One has likewise already seen his position with respect to the value
of tests, to the relative merits of interest and the structuring of knowledge,
of abstract versus concrete,
.
and with respect to creativity.
The use of psychology in the training of teachers, a topic much debated
in the literature, he saw not as a "propaedeutic to teaching in the sense that
physics is a propaedeutic to engineering.” Rather a successful practice could
be explained afterwards in psychological terms, but not before. It could be
post-dictive but not predictive: "Good teachers have taught well.
. . although
quite unconscious of the principles.
. . something other than an understanding
of theory is assuredly the basic element in successful practice. ”81 Essentialists
generally hold this cautious view of the value of educational psychology.
Politics
Inevitably, since the three areas of philosophy, psychology and politics
intertwine, one has already a picture of Bagley’s political and social views.
Much of this section will be recapitulation.
One has seen that the end of thinking is conduct; that Bagley was a
vigorous indeterminist who believed, as an existentialist, that we shape our
own fate, as individuals and as nations; that social evolution led man out of a
determinist past at the dawn of consciousness; that no political creed can be
final or absolute.
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From this emerges the almost paradoxical view that democracy, if
not necessary, is at least best, as it leaves itself open to change. This is
essentially Popper’s argument later.
Politically, one of Bagley’s most significant passages occurred in an
article of 1935 entitled ’’Academic Freedom. " The almost comically
evolutionary argument was that ’’academic freedom was developed and
persists because in the long run it promotes human welfare.
. .
”82
The article was meant to encourage those teachers who found them-
selves persecuted by public opinion of administrators for holding unpopular
views, for ’’today it is the teachers of economics, history and government
on
who are in the gravest danger of persecution. ” One wonders what he would
have said of the recent controversies about textbooks between religious
fundamentalists and liberals.
The central and most telling argument deserves to be quoted in full,
as it speaks for itself:
Nothing is fraught with graver danger than the increasing
disposition to regard our social and economic order
—
whether communism, individualism, or fascism—as
always the best and the other as the incarnation of all that
is evil. It is just such absolute attitudes, perpetuated
and intensified over decades or generations, that lead
sooner or later to war. It seems clear that communism
or individualism or fascism may be best according to the
situation that confronts a society. The nomadic tribes of
Mesopotamia, Arabia and North Africa are essentially
communistic because communism is well suited to conditions
of survival in the desert, where competition for a pre-
carious food supply is a competition between tribes and
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not individuals. When the tribes settled in irrigated regions
as motor transportation on the desert is rapidly compelling
*
them to do, communism is a serious handicap. Rugged
individualism is adapted far better than communism to small
scale farming.
. .
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This is quite a brave statement; it well illustrates his intellectual
approach, his openness, his fearlessness and his erudition. It is also typically
evolutionary as an argument. The implications are almost fatalistic. That
fascism, for instance, may be a. necessary form of government is a sad
view. Does the system change only when economic conditions change, as in
the example above? Elsewhere, one might argue that Bagley would expect
man to change his own destiny. What then if any is the role of self-directed
political change or even revolution ? He does not appear to discuss this.
A second fine source is his Education, Crime and Social Progress, of
which we have already examined two chapters, on emergent idealism, and
on the relationship of discipline to freedom. For the present purpose one can
concentrate on the first two chapters.
Many of the arguments of these chapters appeared elsewhere, especially
in an article entitled "The Profession of Teaching in the U.S. "85 and most
importantly in the "Essentialist Platform" of 1938. Putting these three
analyses together, one can see the picture Bagley had in his mind.
The state of education in America he identified as parlous. Age for age
the elementary pupils of America were behind those of other English-speaking
countries. For this he used as evidence the study of the Scottish Council for
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Research in Education:
"Achievement Tests in the Pr.ma
^ ^
Comparative Study with American Tests in Fife. "86
He argued the same for secondary education, though the absence of
common or comprehensive schools in Britain at the time prevented direct
comparison, and he therefore argued from such indirect data as the "consumption"
of "solid" literature, or the incidence of juvenile delinquency although, he
hastened to add, "no causal relationship is claimed. "
He listed the reasons in various publications, for example in the
"Essentialist Platform” ;
American education has been confronted with difficult
and complicated prohlems which have arisen from a
rapid growth in population; from a constantly advancing
population; from a constantly advancing frontier; from theincrease of national wealth; from the arrival year afteryear of millions of immigrants of widely diverse national
origins; from the complex social and political situations
mvolved m racial differences; from the profound changes
brought about by a transition from a predominantly
agricultural to a predominantly industrial civilization;
from the growth of cities; from an ever increasing mobility
of the population; and from a multitude of other factors
which have operated here with a force unprecedented in
history and unparalleled in any other part of the world. 87
Each of these factors, of course, is worth and gets a great deal of
analysis. There is not the time to repeat each one. Suffice to say that most
of these issues will recur in essentialist literature. Progressives would
likewise see most of these factors as problematic.
Perhaps the only controversial factor might be that of the effects of
prosperity. Most of the world would assume prosperity a boon in the develop-
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ment of education. The fear of prosperity as a moral irritant is a familiar
puritanical cry, however. Elsewhere Bagley wrote,
Certain it is that the present tendencies in our schools
towards ease and comfort and the lines of least
resistance confirm rather than counteract the operation
of that Zeitgeist which reflects so perfectly the moral
decadence that comes with prosperity—the letting loose
the grip that our forefathers, who lived under sterner
and harsher conditions, had upon the ideals of self-denial
and self-sacrifice. 8
8
This theme is linked to another familiar cry, namely that its
clear tendency is to increase the spirit of individualism--
to multiply the opportunities for the gratification of
individual desires, and to minimize the significance of
sacrifice and renunciation. The increase of wealth and
the consequent increase of leisure means an increased
moral hazard. 89
Elsewhere again,
Ease, comfort and security are inimical not only to social
progress, but to the welfare and especially the mental
growth of the individual. 90
He especially related this to what he called the slave civilization of America
where, he computed in 1931, there were effectively in terms of energy at
least thirty-five slaves per citizen
!
The converse is the struggle of discipline and exacting studies to
achieve freedom and democracy and excellence and high standards. We can
learn almost as much about Bagley from the language and imagery of the following
as in any other way:
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We should not build our democratic structure upon the
shifting sands of soft pedagogy. There must be iron
in the blood of education and lime in the bone. The
only freedom that is thinkable today is disciplined
freedom. In the individual as in the race, this freedom
is always a conquest, never a gift
.
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The corollary is clearly crime, what he called the "paradox of lawless-
ness. " Chapter two of Education, Crime and Social Progress was an interesting
indictment of American lawlessness and a rebuttal of some of the usual excuses
propounded. Bagley argued that "this .situation cannot be explained on the
theory that other nations have sent their criminal classes to our shores, " for
example. The reasons were the same, quoted above, as those for the quality
of education.
However, he went further to argue:
The spirit of the times has worked increasingly in this
direction, and educational theory, in a very emphatic
fashion, has compounded this influence. The extent to
which these softening influences have gone is most clearly
seen in the increasing vogue of what I shall call the freedom
theory of education. In its popular form, this theory
defines individual freedom, not only as the end of education,
but also as the primary most effective means to this end
.
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Education is assailed on the other hand, he went on to argue, by "the
hard materialism which stigmatizes the budgets for public education as
go
squander. " The only answer, as he concluded the chapter, was that we
could "climb to a new plane—the plane of a virile, practical and dynamic
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realism.
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in spite, however, of Bagley's attempts to stay politically neutral,
to allow that communism and fascism might be acceptable in their proper
Place, it is clear often that their proper place was for him limited. Generally
Bagley, like a progressive indeed, was fiercely democratic.
Paragraphs eight to thirteen of the "Essentialist Platform” make
this clear. He saw conflict
with the now-militantly anti-democratic peoples.
Democratic societies cannot survive either
competition or conflict with totalitarian states
unless there is a democratic discipline that will
give strength and solidarity to the democratic
purpose and ideal.
Elsewhere he spoke disparagingly of the "left in education.
"
As usual, the answer lay in essentialist education, as the platform
made abundantly clear*. Elsewhere he wrote,
The complete dependence of democratic institutions is
upon the enlightenment of the great masses of the
people.
. . the hopeful fact is that government of
the people by the people becomes stable and
effective in precise proportion to the advance that is
made toward an effective education of the masses. 95
The argument can boomerang. He argued in 1931 that
No country which had a well-developed system of
elementary schools prior to the war succumbed during
the very critical post-war period either to Bolshevism
on the one hand or to the rule of a dictator on the
other. Furthermore, in so far as I can learn, no
country that has had a well-developed system of
elementary schools has undergone a civil war or even
internal dissension resulting in serious bloodshed since
the leaven of the universal school began to operate.
. .
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as this volume goes to press (November 1930), theGerman Republic, which has so successfully withstood&e economic and political stresses of the pLt twelveL ’
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6ly to be Sh0™ ^“tany within the coming
Bagley was wrong not only as to the timing of this proof.
It was Bagley, though it might have been any totalitarian, who wrote
Of "social efficiency as the norm" in questions of conduct, and
it is hard to see why the social criterion should not have
file position of primacy in a rational theory of education,
it is true that the race is composed of individuals, but itis also true teat the individual has always been subordinate
to the race
.
v ‘
The individual is also debated and, some would argue, debased, in the
arguments of the Essentialist Platform, best represented in the following:
Failure in school is unpleasant and the repetition of a
grade costly and often not very effective. On the other
hand, the lack of a stimulus that will keep the learner
to his task is a serious injustice both to him and to the
democratic group which, we repeat, has a fundamental
stake in his effective education. Too severe a stigma
has undoubtedly been placed upon school failure by
implying that it is symptomatic of permanent weakness
—
no less a genius than Pasteur did so poorly in his first
year in the Higher Normal School of Paris that he had to
go home for further preparation.
It is also perhaps inconsistent that in the Essentialist Platform he condemned
those who would use "the lower schools to establish a new social order.
"
It is consistent that he should believe that local autonomy in the
government of education was in need of modification. In fact, with J. A. H.
,
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Keith, president of the State Normal School, Indiana, Pennsylvania, he
presented a brief in favor of federal aid in 1920, ’'The Nation and the Schools:
A Study in the Application of the Principle of Federal Aid in the United States. ”
On the other hand, his belief in the value of the individual teacher may
suggest otherwise. In 1934, he wrote: "Until recently we have been obtuse
to the fundamental factor more important than all others put together—namely,
98the teacher. ” His article, "The Profession of Teaching in the U.S. " was
immensely optimistic in 1929:
The advancement in the status of the teacher’s calling, while
the most recent of the larger developments in American
education, is in some respects the most significant and
promises for the future the most far reaching results. It
is also, I believe, a development quite unprecedented in
history and, so far as I know, unparalleled in other
countries
. . . brought about in part by conscious and
deliberate purposing and in part by the fortunate operation
of forces and factors that are largely beyond either
individual or social control.
. .
it is within our power as
an organized and responsible group to make the American
school the greatest single constructive force in American
life. I have every faith that our profession will prove
neither recreant nor inadequate to its great trust and its
great opportunity. 99
The teacher has a personal influence "on the plastic material that we
designate as childhood.
. . and can influence definitely, tangibly, unerringly
the type of manhood and womanhood that is to dominate the succeeding
generations.
He has a further duty, however, to be what he called a "minister of
education.
. .
the teachers themselves must be charged with some measure
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Of responsibility for contributing, evaluating, and criticising general education
proposals and programs*
Kandel placed this in the foremost position when he claimed: "The
innovation for which he fought in season and out of season was one that would
put a competent and cultured teacher into every American classroom, an
innovation that would do more for American education than would all the other
proposed innovations put together.
Not only is he optimistic about teachers, he is even partial to professors
of education, for whom in general the essentialists reserve their special
scorn:
Collectively, then, the professors of education exercise a
measure of influence that is almost incalculable in its
possibilities for good or for evil.
. . in the long run this
is likely to affect profoundly the course that the nation will
take in the future. *03
hi conclusion, it may be useful to ask how far one can, if the question
makes as much sense as one suspects, distinguish Bagley himself from his
views on these fundamental issues. Is this position, as we have tried to
pinpoint it, on the various continua, enough to characterize him?
Probably not. Almost more of his personality emerges from the style
of his arguments than from their content; the tenor is as important as the
tenets. One could make the following generalizations about this style.
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Bagley was profoundly Irreverent and proud to be controversial; he
regarded himself as in the minority in most cases: "I have developed in a
fairly long professional life the unpleasant habit of disagreeing with most of
my fellow workers. And he is said to have concluded an address with
the words: "But even though my profession may persist in the pleasant pursuit
of chasing butterflies, I still maintain that I would rather be right than
Progressive. " As he sat down, his friend and philosophical opponent, Boyd H.
Bode, is reported to have whispered to him: "Don't worry. Bill; you will
never be either.
At the same time he was unfailingly reasonable, as one would expect
of those who place reason at the center (see his article on Academic Freedom,
quoted earlier, where he concluded that the only remedy for prejudice was
reason "which happens to be or certainly should be—our particular stock in
trade !
"). It is, however, a quality one does not always find in later essentialists,
as Bagley himself suggested in his preface to Buchholz’ Fads and Fallacies in
Present-Day Education
T
of 1931. He chided Buchholz gently that his picture
n
is here and there.
. . a bit distorted. " Buchholz in return accused Bagley of
producing sugar and salt." Likewise, if we compare the relevant tones,
Bagley is but a prelude to Bestor’s later thunder.
He is highly, indeed irritatingly, repetitive. Themes recur regularly
in his books and articles; arguments and even large passages are regurgitated
endlessly. On the positive side, this gives his work a reassuring unity. The
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composition, scored over half a cenfery, is that of an endless fugue, but
it is never fugitive.
There is also much incidental evidence, almost Freudian slips of term
or image, to suggest that he was a natural conservative. In 1907 he wrote in
Classroom Management-
'Vherever the young teacher has an option in this
matter, then, it would seem to be the wise plan to follow the prevailing
practice.
There is constant, almost sexist (to use the current term) choice of
image: "Education theoiy must be strong, virile, and positive, and not feeble,
effeminate, and vague. ”10 7 He disclaimed the sexist bias, incidentally, in
1S38: Progressive education.
. . lacks virility not in the sense that it is
feminine but rather in the sense that it is effeminate. "-^8
His rather old fashioned ideal of manhood can be discerned in his
description of M. Vincent O’Shea, who taught him at the University of Wisconsin,
as "the most nearly perfect gentleman.
. . strikingly handsome, always
immaculately groomed, with a graceful carriage and an excellent speaking
109
voice.
"
One can perhaps suggest, though no more than that, that Bagley was
meritocratic to the point almost of being elitist, despite the humility and
nervousness which his biography describes. His remarks sometimes border
on the edge of the nationalist or racist: "The true function of national history
in our elementary schools is to establish in the pupils’ minds those ideas and
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standards of action which differentiate the American people from the rest
of thd world,
There are similar hints, one might argue, in much of his vocabulary.
Strong, weak, virile, effeminate, hard and soft are words typical of his
imagery. The syntax is, as the reader will by now be aware, enormously
structured. The sentences run out in balanced periods, replete with double
negatives, endless verbal repetitions, a highly Latinate vocabulary, and
general sonority, as though addressed from a pulpit. We shall see some
very different styles in due course; though Kandel's is somewhat similar, as
was suggested earlier.
One can see much of his most typical sentiments, and something of
the characteristic balance of the phraseology, in the only poem he published. 111
My Kingdom
For this is my Kingdom; My peace with my neighbor,
The clasp of a hand the warmth of a smile,
The sweetness of toil as the fruit of my labor—
The glad joy of living and working the while,
The birds and the flowers and the blue skies above me,
The green of the meadows, the gold of the grain,
A song in the evening, a dear heart to love me—
And just enough pleasure to balance the pain.
87
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CHAPTER V
PHILOSOPHY
. . an absolutist position is indefensible
from any rational point of view. . . . and reason
happens to be—or certainly should be—our
particular stock in trade. "
-W. C. Bagley
This chapter attempts an analysis of essentialist beliefs or procedures
in the area of philosophy. "Procedures” may prove the better term as,
contrary to the view of certain critics, the essentialist is less an absolutist
than he may at first appear, and consequently is more likely to think in terms
of process than product.
Two disclaimers are immediately in order, namely that philosophical
matters are not always kept entirely distinct from political and psychological
concerns, and that the further sub-division of philosophy into epistemology,
metaphysics and ethics is subject to the same imperfection, in that they too
stray into one another's fields. That Theodore Brameld employed this same
division, into what he called "the three chief areas of belief: reality, knowled^
and value, "’ is not so much the authority for this division as a happy
coincidence.
An extreme example of this sort of straying into inappropriate fields
must be mentioned at this point, and it is the assertion of such thinkers as
Brameld and Bode or indeed Marx that all views, whether educational,
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philosophical or religious, are ultimately of social origin. Marx’s views are
the strongest version of this form of determinism, which essentialists are
at great pains to refute wherever possible. One can therefore continue
with this division either out of convenience or out of conviction.
It is best to start with philosophy, as it is generally argued, certainly
by essentialists, that it is the most general of the ways of thinking, and clear y
the oldest. Clifton Fadiman, for example, has argued that "the present
educational controversy, like all crucial controversies, has its roots in
philosophy. ”2 Philip Phenix has argued for "the virtual identity" of philosophy
and philosophy of education. This theme constantly recurs.
That philosophy is primary or central is both primary and central to
the essentialist argument. Indeed, one of the chief arguments of this work is
that the essentialist generally gives philosophy pride of place, and that this is
especially clear in his dealings with philosophic absolutism.
Anti-absolutism.
The central argument here presented is that essentialists are generally
centralists. Briefly, the great virtue of pragmatism was that it drew attention
to the dogmatic nature of extreme absolutists, who claimed that there was an
external truth, that it was identifiable, and that they were the only identifiers.
Pragmatism argued that there were no such truths, merely conflicting hypotheses,
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and that the only test was whether something worked or not. Many essentialists
now Identify both these positions as extreme, and instead hold to what they
consider the golden mean between these two absolutes. They stand between
the final truth, on one side, and the impossibility of truth, on the other.
Clearly some essentialists veer toward the "right wing" of eternal truth, but
how far they are representative will be examined in due course. Whitehead
used this same argument, quoted above (p. 32), when he wrote "Nothing is
more curious than the self-satisfied dogmatism with which mankind at each
period of its history cherishes the delusion of the finality of its existing modes
of knowledge-skeptics and believers are all alike, At this moment the scientists
and skeptics are the leading dogmatists. " One might argue that Brameld was a
dogmatist of this latter variety.
Brameld, in fact, distinguished in his Philosophies of Education three
main contenders: progressivism, essentialism, andperennialism. However,
as he failed to distinguish firmly between the latter two, and criticized them
for similar reasons, one could reasonably argue that there are only two main
contenders, namely progressive and essentialist. This has the merit
of fitting Bagley's own picture of a fundamental dualism. In this case the
arc would be bounded by absolutism at one end and reasonable, critical
relativism at the other.
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Perhaps a better representation might be that of another arc, this
time with the two absolutismr of the right-wing final truth and left-wing nihilism
at the extremes, with the "reasonable" essentialist between. This is the model
employed throughout this work to establish the central argument, that essentialists
are generally, and see themselves as, centralists or moderates. The models
might be seen as in the diagram below.
Progressivism
1. Brameid
Essentialism Perennialism
2. Bagley Progressive Essentialist
3. Proposed Model Pragmatism Absolutism
Essentialist
Relativism
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As this model will dominate the argument hereafter, a lengthy
presentation of the evidence may be in order, although the chief objections
to John Dewey's pragmatism, which provided some evidence of essentialist
aversion
. to absolutism of one sort,have already been observed.
The following paragraphs will examine primarily philosophical expression
of this view. Political and psychological and pedagogical expression of it will
be reserved for later chapters.
A good place to start is always with Thomas Jefferson. His hatred of
absolutism was primarily of a political genre, but philosophically too he was
a relativist. An example might be his attitude to religious dogma, as when
he wrote?
Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal
every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even
the existence of a god; because, if there be one, he
must more approve the homage of reason, than that of
blindfolded fear. You will naturally examine first the
religion of your own country. Read the bible then, as
you would read Livy or Tacitus. ... If it ends in a
belief that there is no god, you will find incitements
to virtue in the comfort and pleasantness you feel in
its exercise and the love of others which it will
procure you.
This shows a detachment to match even William James’ much later The Varieties
of Religious Experience. This toleration is central to any appreciation of
Jefferson, and it is well demonstrated in his famous announcement in the first
inaugural address at Washington in 1801 that "if there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this union or to change its republican focus, let them
98
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. 1,4 n
further expanded in the next chapter. Writing of a then c
; error of opinion may
This political theme is
ontroversial book
Jefferson explained:
If M. deBecourt's book be false in its parts, disprove
them; if false in its reasoning, refute it. But, for God's
sake, let us freely hear both sides, if we choose.
...The Newtonian philosophy seemed the chief object of
attack, the issue of which might be entrusted to the
strength of the two combatants; Newton certainly not
needing the auxiliary arm of the government, and
still less the holy Author of our religion, as to what
in it concerned Him. 5
Essentxalists have always admired this trait of Jefferson. For example,
Ulich wrote of him: nIn one conviction he was unshakable to the point of one-
sidedness; this was his hatred of every sort of absolutism or even monarchism;”6
a judgment which suggests interestingly that Jefferson's political views
were subservient to his philosophical views and not vice versa.
A. J. Nock's enthusiasm for Jefferson is likewise instructive, and his
charmingly unpretentious biography of Jefferson makes excellent reading. It
in an intimate portrait with much apparently trivial detail about Jefferson's
many minor interests, such as technical inventions or agricultural experiments,
like his proposal to transplant olive trees to America; and it is concerned to show
a very practical, non-dogmatic man, a great anti-federalist, and a man who
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could defend Washington with the remark: "He errs as other men do, but he
errs with integrity. " 7 This might be the motto for the essentialist view of
the search for truth.
Another extreme essentialist is Irving Babbitt who yet, like Nock, is an
anti-absolutist, in spite of criticisms to the contrary: "Standards are a matt
of observation and common sense, the absolute is only a metaphysical conceit. 8
Babbitt is an interesting example of the tradition, for he is often bracketed with
Nock as an extremist member of whom it is best to beware, Barzun speaks
slightingly of Babbitt, and Babbitt attacks both William James and John Dewey,
even though the quotation above would seem to suggest a certain affinity at least
with moderate pragmatists like James. Both Babbitt and Butler, already quoted
to the effect that pragmatism is a denial that philosophy can exist, seem to
argue, as did Whitehead, that there is an absolutism of the left. Bagley has
already been quoted several times on absolutism, to the effect that "an
absolutist position is indefensible from any rational point of view, " (chapter 4),
Another extreme statement, this time with little redeeming moderation,
9
is Kandel’s The Cult of Uncertainty which, as its title suggests, was an
attack on pragmatism and progressive education for the uncertainty they
promoted. In this instance, he might be seen on the right flank, as it were,
of the moderate essentialist view.
Walter Lippmann, a minor "saint" read normally for his political views
by essentialists, takes a suitably anti-absolutist view about religious and
10moral toleration.
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Philip Phenix used comparable reasons for preferring an educational
philosophy which was analytic to one which was speculative or ideological.
He related this to current philosophical inquiry in EngLand and America today
which 'is largely analytical in method and critical in temper. 1,11 in the same
breath he invoked Whitehead, Bertrand Russell and Einstein; on the other
hand, the ideological philosophies "are Marxism, pragmatism, logical
positivism and existentialism, each of which, despite denials of the charge,
does purport to exhibit the one true way to understanding. interestingly,
as early examples of non-ideological analysis, he quoted Socrates, Aristotle
and St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus today, "the attempt to fit educational issues
into neat systematic packages according to speculation or methodological
criteria thus proves to be a questionable exercise in pedantic ingenuity.
The answer instead was through inquiry among the various disciplines, the
various modes of thinking:
It seems clear that the study of typical concepts and
methods in the disciplines is the task to which
philosophical analysis may most profitably be
directed. Such an approach emphasizes the virtual
identity of philosophy and the philosophy of education,
for the divisions into which philosophical study
naturally falls are mainly the disciplines, which
also constitute the basis for the curriculum.^
The manner, composed jointly of piecemeal analysis and the
epistemology of the so-called disciplines, is characteristic of Phenix's
15Realms of Meaning. ^ In fact, this volume, together with Barzun’s House of
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Intellect, is probably one of the only two volumes in the entire American
essentialist literature which are well known outside America.
Some of the same argument can be seen much earlier in Horace Mann's
claim that
All our earlier colleges.
. . aimed to indoctrinate
their students into special denominational tenets,
instead of establishing the great principles of
practical morality.
. . . They ignored the ever-
lasting truth that a man's creed grows out of his
life a thousand times more than his life out of his
creed.
. . . But if truth be ONE and not MANY,
then all but one of these faiths
—
possibly all of
them—are wholly or partially wrong. . . . Mean-
while truth exists as certainly as God exists. There
it lies, outside or partially outside of all, or of
all save one. . . to be capable of impartiality of
thought opens all the avenues to truth. 16
This is a fascinating and early example of the attempt to reconcile idealism
and criticism, God and reason.
William James wrote in 1899 of what he called the pluralist or
individualistic philosophy: "There is no point of view absolutely public and
universal.
. . the practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well known
democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.
. . at any rate, the
outward tolerance of whatever is not in itself intolerant. . . " On the same
page he wrote, "the truth is too great for any one actual mind, even though
that mind be dubbed 'the Absolute', to know the whole of it. John Jay Chapman,
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a private saint ' of Barzun's, has a delightful eulogy of James, which underlined
James’ pragmatic yet not dogmatic nature: "The great religious impulse at the
back of all his work, and which pierces through at every point, never became
expressed in conclusive literary form, or in dogmatic utterance. ”18 Barzun
himself wrote: "No sufficient distinction is made between James and Dewey.
'
;i °
Mortimer Smith confirmed this distinction when he wrote of James "whose
pragmatism was bound up with matters of religion and beliefs which have no
appeal for Dewey. " 2^
Elsewhere in the same volume Mortimer Smith fulminates characteristically
against the false application of scientific method to education, when public
school education "has been taken over by a coteri-e of experts who have erected
it into an esoteric ’science’ where every prospect pleases and only the amateur
is vile. " 2 ^ The answer for Smith is the familiar theme of criticism, that
22
individuals should commit themselves to individual action.
Russell Kirk, one of the more extreme essentialists, wrote that
"ideology does not mean political theory or principle. . . it really means
political fanaticism" and he used the familiar argument that "objectivity" and
"scientism" are abused concepts . 23 He attacked David Riesman for being
24
too far, as it were, left on the continuum as "a Gnostic of the right wing. "
A sophisticated discussion of this issue is to be found in Mark Van
Doren’s Liberal Education. Van Doren attacked the pragmatists:
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The priests of change are melancholy fellows who have
little hope for the intellect. ... The absolutists of the
new are unaware that the present as they see it is 'but
an ambiguous sentence,' says Jacques Barzun, 'out
<
of context.
' The problem is one of reading—an art
they despise. The past, which they mistakenly
identify as the sole concern of liberal education, puts
them on the defensive. They think of it, in John
Dewey's words, as 'a rival of the present,'.
. . .The
educated person recognizes no dry stretch between now
and then. They are one river, and the more he
knows about its length the better.
. . . The changes he
wants are radical; they are improvements in persons.
. . . The problem is the primeval one of permanence
and change.
. . The life of the mind would be simple
if there were no change or if every change were total
.... Past, present and future—they are three gods
in one, and worship of them should be wisely distributed
.... The past is a burden which crushes only those
who ignore it. . . dismissed from the mind by
'practical' men, it can bring them to deserve Robert
Maynard Hutchins' definition of them as 'those who
practice the errors of their forefathers. '25
This is a remarkably pregnant passage, for it not only invokes Barzun,
Hutchins and Dewey, but it strongly supports the thesis of essentialist moderation
by identifying the "absolutists of the new, " and raises the issues of the significance of
culture, of history, of continuity and tradition, of liberal education, of reading
and scholarship, of conservative radicals, of personal change, permanence and
change, the life of the mind and false practicality. It is an essentialist creed
in miniature.
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Van Doren elaborated usefully on these themes by making a number of
identifications between elements often thought to be in contradiction to one
another. For instance, he sought to resolve the dualisms of ends and means,
and of liberal and vocational knowledge,by arguing:
All education is useful, and none is more so than
the kind that makes men free to possess their
nature. Knowledge and skill to such an end are
ends in themselves, past which there is no place
for the person to go. It is both useful and liberal
to be human, just as it takes both skill and
knowledge to be wise.
. . .The distinction is false.
Technique was the Greek word for art. . . no
antipathy appears between technique and liberal
education, if we remember that both are concerned
with art. 26
It is characteristic of centralists or essentialists to curb the spread of
false dichotomies or dualisms. A purely vocational education is no less
absolute than a purely liberal education out of touch with life.
It is for these reasons, though Van Doren would deny their application
in this case, that Sidney Hook attacked Robert Hutchins and the St. John's
College curriculum of "The Great Books. "
Those who appeal to tradition as a bulwark against
change are curiously unaware of its actual content.
For most traditions represent departures from
earlier traditions, and their subsequent history
is full of further departures from their original
purposes and beginnings. No one can survey the
history of American religious practice, for example*
without realizing that tolerance to dissenters marked
a break with earlier traditions. . . . Those who speak
of the great tradition of the Western world, and charge
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"decadent liberals with attempting to ignore
it, betray an insensitiveness to the richness,
complexity and contradictory features of what
is summed up by the phrase .27
Now
,
while this may be almost fair comment on a rigidly held view that
"The Great Books" curriculum is the only curriculum, it is not very fair
comment on the less rigid view that it is a good curriculum.
If Hutchins, admittedly well to the right of our essentialist spectrum,
is understandably misunderstood, no one could reasonably criticize Jacques
Barzun in this way. In fact, Barzdn is the clearest and most influential
exponent of the middle way, and it is not insignificant that Van Doren leans
on him. The concept of moderation permeated Barzun’s work.
Barzun versus Absolutism.
Barzun’s earliest book was The French Race, derived from his doctoral
work on the theme, where he examined the phenomenon of nationalism and found
it rooted in a false science of race. He concluded:
It has been shown that the very roots of French history
since the sixteenth century have been buried deep
under and around the issue of race, that is determining
whether the France of their day was chiefly German or
Roman or Gallic. The respected historians of each
century, as well as the obscure pamphleteers of each
party, have touched on eveiy important national
question. . . .If the actual invasions of Gaul by the
Germans are examined in the light of modem
scholarship, it is discovered that the process of racial
mixture was in fact thorough and its effects reciprocal.
Contrary to a long established belief, the fusion of the
two races—Romanized Gauls and Germans—was
28
accomplished by the seventh century, not the tenth.
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If this appears unlike a philosophical argument appropriate to the
immediate theme, it is because one cannot avoid occasional excursions and
because this excursion is necessary to see the development of Barzun's view
of this centralist theme. His next book was Race, A Study in Superstition .
where one can again see the inevitable intertwining of scientific or scholarly
views on race with political and philosophical issues. Thus Barzun could argue
in the space of only a few pages
:
What does genetics actually show about race ? It
shows by statistics that genes recur in predictable
linkages that permit certain physical characteristics
to endure in certain successive generations.
.
.
genes
will help accouitfor so-called white skin, not for
socialism, genius, dipsomania or delinquency.
. .
all the more reason, then, for the discipline of
judging only individuals and thus limiting harm by
limiting error.29
Related closely to this scientific-historical argument is the political and
psychological one that
Whatever its source, the urge to build theories in
order to justify collective hostility is strong, as
the Nazi regime proved in Germany and as
Communist literature continues to prove. Not
merely Marxist propaganda but Marxist doctrine
at its purest is in form- and effect racist thought.
Indeed, the class struggle is but the old race
antagonism of French nobles and commoners
large and made ruthless. Marx's bourgeois is
not a human being with individual traits, but a
social abstraction, a creature devoid of virtue
or free will and without the right to live. . . I
am aware that to elucidate the racial conflicts
of our time by condemning false abstraction is
not usual or popular. 30
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From this point it is not far to the philosophical concomitants, for
example that
the issue of equality is in fact irrelevant and
unmeaning. Equality is neither provable nor
disprovable. This is so for groups and individuals
alike. Equality is not a scientific but a political
idea, and it is valid only when one assumes it, as
do the Declaration of Independence and the French
Declaration of The Rights of Man.3*
In other words, when one has exploded false psychologies and ideologies,
based on false use of scientific method, one can proceed to philosophical
questions. It therefore finally follows that nto ask these questions is to answer
them. Peace springs only from the desire for peace and the use of reason in
OO
removing grievances.
"
This is a fascinating example of the use of reason and its evocation in
the solution of problems, where science alone cannot prevail. It is a very
essentialist argument. If "reason” is one of the mainsprings of the
centralist’s battle against opposing absolutes, the function of criticism,
discussed below, is another. Barzun, in this same work, criticized a scholarly
"racist"' for arguing that comparative linguistics "has established ethnography
33
on fixed principles by methods that are safe from all criticism. " And he
soon after invoked his own philosophical preference, relativism, when he
argued that,
On the one hand, race appeals to those who find
discomfort in relativity—hence its charm for
fascists; on the other, it appeals to all lovers of
teleology and straight determinism—hence its use
by communists in the form of the absolute class-
myth. The bourgeois and the capitalist become
genetic entities that engage in necessary strife
apart from immediate desires. 34
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The same fundamental argument reappeared in his next book in 1939,
Of Human Freedom. His introduction was to the effect that,
the events in Russia, Spain, China, Italy,
Germany, India, Africa have made it perfectly
clear that the absolute dogmas and authoritarian
systems which bid for our admir ation and
support not only are not doing what is claimed for
them but are doing just the opposite.
. . .
We must all acknowledge that we have failed first
of aU to control our beliefs. We have believed
in absolute democracy, absolute personal freedom,
absolute peace and fairness in international affairs.
Liberals have imagined a slice of European history
characterized by absolute moral improvement; or,
on turning Marxist, by absolute middle-class
evolution grounded in material causes. And when
these beliefs proved untenable they were replaced by
the bugbear of absolute one-man rule and absolute
chaos. 35
Of the economic question he wrote: "Can the solution of the economic
problem be more readily attained under our limping system of theoretical-
practical liberties, or under a system of absolute-paternal dictation? That
Of?
and nothing else is the issue. " Barzun's usual answer was given again,
that reason and criticism are our best weapons:
If any person or group held the answer, it might
conceivably be practical to give up the right to
criticize and let them dictate. . . that system is
the more practical which leaves as many thinking
minds as possible to grapple freely with the realities
that hamper us. That relation of the general
intelligence to reality is the key relation in the
modem world.^
Barzun reiterated the main argument in the same work by stating:
Holding radical opinions is by no means a guarantee
that one belongs to the thinking part. It is just as
easy to be blind on the left as on the right.
. . how
to stick to principle or social aims is the peculiar
problem for human intelligence in a democratic culture,
and this reliance on brain power always implies that it
is free, that the choice is real. Hence the need of
resisting absolutes—that is, party labels, rigid
loyalties, simple rules of thumb, easy or cynical
fatalism. Anyone can take sides when things are
labelled "revolutionary," "reactionary" or "democratic.
Again he wrote: "The absolute is commonly nothing more than a penny foot
rule applied to cases where we need complicated instruments of precision. In
the realm of ideas it is a single arbitrary notion used where we need a many-
sided concept. "39 This statement is filled out with a footnote about the
philosophical labels of mataphysics, idealism, realism, materialism. As
expected, he favors a "realistic" compromise:
To the philosophical student it will be clear that the
declared indebtedness to James—and, it may be
added here, to Berkeley
—
puts the writer amongst
those who reject subjectivism equally with material
causation. Objects are real, they truly exist, but
the forms of their existence depend upon mind. . .
The realm of mind is thus continuous with that of
being and its values are to be judged by nothing
else than human minds. What mind is, in itself,
cannot be answered except metaphorically. Since
it means existence, it can be called God, or the Life
Force, or Energy, according to one’s religious, poetic
or scientific bent, without enlightening us much further.
As usual, the important thing to decide is what mind
does, not what it is.^°
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A similar fusion of political and epistemological concerns followed
this, when Barzun declared: "What ever the dogmatist may feel about it, this
relativist instrumental philosophy is the philosophy of free democracy par
excellence, it is rooted in its culture and it stands confirmed by the two great
techniques of the human mind which are synonymous with civilization—science
and art. " 41 Briefly Barzun argued that neither can be used absolutely. Science
must not be erected into a "sinister cast-iron absolute of which racialism is
only one manifestation. " Art must be neither a mere pasttime nor.a
propaganda tool for politicians; rather "the man of art, then, is essential to
civilization because he is in fact the Eternal Pragmatist, the bom enemy of
absolute systems, the champion of mind in its struggle with matter.
. . in
the light of these reasons it becomes clear why it is of the essence of
totalitarianism to control art, science and thought. "4^ The lesson of art is
that "it mirrors diversity and refutes absolutism. " 44
Epistemological argument again leads back to political conclusion
later in the same:
The political application is simple if reality is at once
individual, like perception, and social, like 'normality,
'
then free democracy, with its diversity and flexibility,
clearly parallels the human mind functioning at its
best. . . . Culture is a common heritage which can be
added to or changed, but not against our will. . . free
democracy is a reality insofar as we sustain it. . . we
must resist institutional absolutes, but this does not
mean that anarchy should be our goal. Anarchy would
only land us in the ^gposite absolute of gang warfare
and perpetual fear.
Ill
This is the basis, of course, for Barzun's and others' criticism of campus
activists years later in the 1960's.
The last page of this book of Barzun's was perhaps the most far-
reaching, for he provided a possible resolution to an important paradox. How
can one argue that essentialists are against absolutism, as they clearly are,
when so many of them adhere to moral absolutes? One answer is Babbitt's,
namely that a moral absolute is not really an absolute, but rather a probabilistic
concept, a convenient rule of thumb. Barzun's resolution is different, and it is
that
If we desire to accept rather than to exclude, then
the love of variety rather than of sameness should
combine with an actively pragmatic attitude in a
democracy like ours, and even the private, static
absolutes in philosophy or religion could find a
place. The man who has at last got hold of the
truth can live among the infidels if his intelligence
is as strong as his faith.
. . let us face with open
eyes a pluralistic world in which there are no universal
churches, no single remedy for all diseases, ... no
world poets and no chosen races cut to one pattern or
virtue, but only the wretched and wonderfully
diversified human race which can live and build and
leave cultural traces of its passage in a world that
was apparently not fashioned for the purpose.46
The footnote to this magnificent passage was an example drawn from the two
very different absolutists, Cardinal Newman and Thomas Hardy, representing
a benevolent and a mindless absolutism respectively. Both were acceptable if
they would leave each other in freedom and leave the pluralists likewise.
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The fullest and most powerful statement of this theme was in Barzun's
next book in 1941, Darwin, Marx, and Wagner
. Referring significantly to
Henry Adams as "the great American who first perceived the fact, " 47
Barzun summarized his argument--’! have spoken of Darwin, Mara, and
Wagner’s contributions as forming a single stream of influence which I have
called mechanical materialism: "the cold world in which man's feelings are
illusory and his will powerless. ” 48 There follows an immensely detailed and
powerful proof that these three drove purpose, meaning and will out of man’s
view of life. They are absolutists of the left. Barzun’s expressed preference,
to be painfully brief, is for the thinkers of the Romantic period. He argued
that they in fact provide much of the material which Darwin, Mara and Wagner
merely codified and killed in the process; that
We know further that in diverting Romanticist thought
from vitalism to materialism, the three realists
knotted together so many incongruous strands of
thought that confusion is apparent in their work and
chaos in the acts of their disciples. 4^
What Romantic philosophy had achieved was
To bring back into favor certain social purposes and
human attributes that the materialism of the eighteenth
century and the violence of the French Revolution had
obscured. Rousseau, alone in his century and
ahead of the Revolution, forecast the achievement; he
made clear the function of feeling in life and in the work
of reason; he stressed thetwin realities of the individual
and the group and he stimulated science, together with
the love of nature and the direct worship of God.50
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He made Rousseau sound the perfect centralist. The Romantic movement,
however, failed on account of the French Revolution and the subsequent
quarteringof Europe in a spirit of nationalism. "So the Romanticist doctrines
of cooperation and association, of democratic inclusiveness, of social experiment,
and of cultural individuality struggled.
. . and succumbed at last before the new
political strategy, which was nothing but ’nationalism’ applied to class, race
or country. This era was replaced with one where there was a false
scientism, whereas "the truth is that hypothesis, imagination, creation, must
precede the collecting of facts; after which what we may expect is not scientific
law, but descriptive generalities or measured relations, that may find a place
in completed theory.
The final chapter, "The Reign of Relativity, " was prefaced with William
James' famous exclamation, "Damn the Absolute!" It was a brief analysis of
the reappearance of consciousness:
Absolutes were going down one by one before statements
of relations. The observer as a mind, a fact, a reality,
was re-entering the universe from which he had
excluded himself lest the cosmos appear anthropomorphic.
Knowledge itself was relative. . . a new reign of
consciousness, purpose, teleology, relativity, and
pluralism was being quietly ushered in with the new
century.53
Some of the heroes involved were Einstein, William James, Freud, Bergson,
Nietzsche. They were all, in Barzun’s mind, relativists and anti-absolutists.
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m 1943 Bar.ua further adored some of these themes m Bomautfofo,,
—^ M0dem E«°
,
^ter republished under the title, Classle.
and Mod^rq,54 for reasons explained in the preface of the second edition.
In that preface he explained that
I still see the difference between the neo-classic
Enlightenment and its successor, Romanticism, as
fundamentally social and political. This may seem a
ouble paradox, first because Romanticism is generally
believed to pose an aesthetic,not a political, question;
and second, because Romanticism in politics is variously
taken to mean the excessive individualism that leads to
anarchy and the excessive authority that leads to tyranny.
Rousseau is made to bear the guilt of both.55
The views of Babbitt and Meiklejohn on Rousseau have been discussed above
and it is significant that Barzun singled out the former in this same preface:
"Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard was only one of numerous publicists who
demonstrated the folly of Romantic thought in art and life. Rousseau, being
well known by name as well as a central influence upon the Romantics, was
the chief scapegoat. "°6 And again: "It was logic and not accident that Irving
Babbitt should see in Mussolini the hope of undoing Rousseau's work, even
though the dicatator's appeals to heroism might superficially suggest the
Romantics' love of risk and daring. Barzun's very central position was
again clear:
Today, when threats to a passable life are found
severally in mass culture, in the conservative
revolution, and in the revolt of the beat generation,
the temptation is again strong to explain and damn
them all by reference to a new wave of romanticism. . .
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lliis divergence of classic and Romantic corresponds
to that which obtains in the conception of the individual:
the eighteenth century entrusts everything to the
intellect and loves Man abstractly, as an archetype,
whereas Romanticism studies sensation and emotion
and embraces man as he is actually found—diverse,
mysterious, and irregular. "58
And he concluded this powerful preface with the conclusion:
Such are the reasons why this many-faceted art and
philosophy of Romanticism must be understood
otherwise than through cliches and must be
regarded first as responses to a political desire.
If the movement also proposes to answer the
psychological riddle—what is the nature of man? —
that, too, is a way of stating the political issue.
All political theories begin with a psychology,
explicit or assumed, for the same reason that all
revolutions want to control the mind. Romanticism
has this merit over later revolutions that it was never
an ideology.
This too is important material, for it again stresses the essentialist* s
chariness of ideologies and absolutes, and buttresses the argument that
philosophical, political and psychological views are ultimately inextricable.
The book also included the finest critique by an essentialist of the
essentialist right flank. Analyzing the spirit of the modem ego which "has lost
no
its faith, and with it the willingness to take risks, " u he found several members of the
essentialist tradition guilty of undue clamour for certainty. "The modems
. . . wanted a single system which should solve the pressing problems of
the hour. For those not attracted by communism there was Anglo-Catholicism;
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still others withdrew into Saint Thomas and the Roman Church; artists sought
for classical models.
. .
1,61 And he went on to lament the extremes of
T. S. Eliot, neo-Thomism and neo-classicism, Irving Babbitt and the so-called
new humanism. He destroyed their basis in tradition very neatly by pointing
out that there never was, in fact, much security or serenity in these early
traditions
:
The belief therefore that the church then afforded
intellectual unity is belied by the quarrels of
Franciscans and Dominicans, mystics and
rationalists, Thomists and Occamites.
. .What
is true of the imaginary medieval serenity holds
good for the classical epoch. . . it takes only a
copy of Thucydides and a little sense of history to
recognize that the Greeks led the most chaotic,
passionate, and disorderly life imaginable.
. . .
To conclude, what is alarming about the modern
ego is. . . that it is walking forward with its head
turned back in fear and longing.
The answer was again a bold, forward looking romanticism, and again Barzun
returned to William James: "This is why America is the land of Romanticism
par excellence and why her greatest philosopher, William James, asserted
the doctrine in its fullness against all absolute, classical limits." °
He saw Romanticism as "the permanent trait of Western man, ” though
frequently submerged. Even Plato he found ambiguous in this respect; there
was the "Plato of the authoritarian, puritanical Republic, " and there was the
"Plato of the romantic ’Laws’." Plato is the first great man of "reason.
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The fullness of Barzun’s vision and some idea of its complex pluralism can
be seen' in his summary that
the Romanticists had the task of reconstruction. The
vast horizons opened up by war and social upheaval gave
romanticism its scope; it was inclusive, impatient of
barriers, eager for diversity* treasured fact and
represented the individual as a source of fact.
Accordingly, its political philosophy was an attempt
to reconcile personal freedom with the inescapable
need of collective action. Rosseau, Burke, Kant,
Hegel, agreeing on the nature of the problem, differed
only in lesser particulars. They were not anarchists
or imperialists, but theorists of equilibriums in
motion.
. . . Romanticism gave an impulse to the arts
which has not yet died out. True to its inclusive purpose,
romantic art was simultaneously idealistic, realistic,
and symbolic; impressionist, expressionist and
surrealist. It produced forms and amassed contents
only now nearing exhaustion, after furnishing the
models for the movements which we enumerate through
the past century as Realism, Symbolism, Impressionism,
Naturalism, and Post-Impressionism.66
Teacher in America
,
published in 1945, while little concerned
with such cultural criticism, did include one highly appropriate aside,
thrown out while discussing the nature of the tutorial method in teaching:
"(The teacher) no matter how much he knows or how fully he has thought, is
relentlessly pushed until his back touches the wall of the great absolutes.
For students are ever seeking final answers and they know how to ask questions
which no wise man would dare answer. This is of value in that it helps
explain the paradoxical idea of absolutes in a tradition which seeks to deny
them, for it suggests that they are ultimate questions rather than ultimate
na
answers. This also helps explain the quotation above that such differing
figures as Burke and Rousseau agree "on the nature of the problem, " for
both are agreed to ask the same absolute questions about man and society.
Barzun’s essay "History, Popular and Unpopular, " published in 1943,
was an application of this philosophy to the nature of historical study. As
an example, he attacked the simplistic, common-place view that the writings
of Voltaire led to the French revolution: ’We have here a good instance of
the way nuances are destroyed by popularization. ” 68 Instead, the historian
must struggle with the two-iold task of relating facts and nuances with some
"unifying principle.
. . lighting up of simple facts by coherent thought.
. .
"
6C
This does not mean that there is a law or science of history; rather it "is the
diagnostic power that it develops. Diagnostic power means seeing the familiar
within the strange without losing the sense of either.
. .
" 70
If this present essay has any value it lies in the attempt to do just that,
to see the unifying principle in Barzun's work and again in the larger body
of essentialist literature. Barzun went on to argue that, as with science,
the facts need interpretation by a human mind or imagination: "consequently
the historical virtues become, in ascending order of value: accuracy,
71intellectual honesty, and artistic imagination. " As usual, we must avoid
absolutes
:
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The antidote to conventionality is not debunking but
variety, which is a test the lay recorder can always
^Ply - He must hold steadfast to the knowledge thatthe events and persons of history were each unique,individual indupiieabie, different from us; and yet
wn
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-^
017 1S human that is to say,
intelligible, communicable within broad limits
popular within the ideal sense of the word. 72
Barzun s charming book of essays on America appeared in 1954
, entitled
God's Country and Mine-A Declaration of love Spiced with a Few Harsh
Words, and it too bears the same stamp. The American genius culturally
is that it
Has no line, no dogma, but works for results.
. . .
It is attention to practice and indifference to over-
arching beliefs that guarantees our innocence, but
our critics are sodden with ideology and cannot take
this in. None the less this nonsectarianism is one
clear sign of our superiority over Russia. Russia
is a hundred years behind us in the mere fact of
being bogged down in the party pamphlet of a couple
of angiy men; Russia’s mental date is theirs: 1848. 75
Something of the same optimism bordering almost on the complacent, appeared
in a later discussion of American policemen who, he argued, "had no ideology
either. They were for the victim whoever he was. " 74 A similar but
characteristic optimism suffuses his conclusion that
Similarly if today many men and women are seeking and
floundering, it argues a genuine moral preoccupation.
The relativism complained of in the press, so far from
being the cause of the floundering, is the chief instrument
for finding the right moral relation to a changed and
ever-changing society. 75
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The same indeterminacy informed Barzun's literary critical and aesthetic
beliefs. The Energies of Art, published in 1956, was a delightful collection
of essays on Barzun's favorite writers. In general, he argued: "1 am moved,
it is clear, by the historical spirit, which never tolerates confinement and which,
m criticism, can always turn up instances to bend or bulge whatever is too
rigid or narrow.
"William James and the Clue to Art" was a magnificently
powerful essay, which me hesitates to dissect less the knife slip. It included
all the now iamiliar themes and persons in the briefest compass. The
argument, briefly and inadequately, was that William James’ ’’Psychology'' of
the early 1890’s remains a textbook for artists and cultural historians, for
it "struck a deathblow at Realism. ” 77 James sought to destroy the pseudo-
scientific belief that the mind copied reality like a photographic plate and to
promote Barzun’s later view that man created more than he copied. James
"revealed Impressionism native and dominant. ’’ 78 His now commonplace view
of the "streams of consciousness" eventually "displaces from the foreground
as ready-made all ideas and objects, it restores primacj^ to sensation and will." 79
Reality is only what we make of it. "Except for the earliest months of infancy
there is no such thing as pure sensation; as soon as the mind acquires the
power to reproduce past sensations, the new and the old fuse into a perception.
This of course reflected on the period debates, and James provided Barzun
with the opinion eventually that Classicism could not have existed without an
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antecedent Romanticism "from which to cut away, refine
,
extract, the
classic forms and pleasures. "81 This is why "poets are at first declared to
be writing nonsense. "82 Barzun linked James with Emerson and Nietzsche:
Like his almost exact contemporary, Nietzsche, he chose Yea-saying after
a harrowing inner storm. The religious and moral impulse derived from his
father's ideas and entourage—the New England Transcendentalists with Emerson
at their head— remained in William the controlling energy. " 83 He further
adumbrated this anti-absolutist tradition with such names of the period
as Samuel Butler, Bergson, Freud, and their predecessors Kierkegaard,
Newman and Bagehot.
A minor "saint" of Barzun, John Jay Chapman, was discussed in the
essay, and reappeared in 1957 as the subject of Barzun's edition of The
Selected Writings of John Jay Chapman . This choice is tellingly illustrative
of Barzun's picture of a tradition of American social and literary critics: "It
is as if our American tradition, begun with Jefferson and Cooper, had ended
in Chapman's day with Mencken and himself. "84 The membership is curiously
like that of our main concern. Barzun elsewhere in the same introduction
included other members of our tradition, such as Emerson and Henry Adams.
He found further that Chapman too believed that "intellect is always concrete
and particular, using abstraction merely as a shorthand to define feelings
and conduct. " 83
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One example will suffice from what may be Barzun's best known book,
TheHouse of Intellect, published in 1959, the book that brought him reknown
with the emerging English essentialists. The example is his attack on Marxist
doctrine and on the feebleness of intellect which allowed it to spread
so rapidly even among intellectuals. Early critics of Marx, such as Shaw,
Croce, or Veblen
had little regard for his formulas and apparatus. They
might remain Socialists and even accept Marx as an
important figure in the history of mankind’s rebellion
against want, but they were not taken in by the jargon
and pseudo-science that were to capture and hold in
fetters a good part of the Western world thirty years
later. What saved these thinkers was that, though they
valued intellect, they never believed in its primacy.
They knew that intellect is a servant, and one to be held
on a short leash. Intellect is not fit to lead, much less
to dominate, for it knows only intermediate or contingent
goals: ’If you want this,' it says, 'you must do that.
'
Or else it assembles instances to guide choices. What is
wanted can be sought and adapted by the intellect, but
cannot spring from its rules or operations. The intellect*,
slave to the passions as Hume said it should be, sorts
them out and brings them to light. It diverts but does
not quell them.
That is why the demand frequently heard that
democracy develop an intellectual system, an ideology
with which to combat communism and catch the minds of
the wavering, is an absurd demand. If democracy means
anything, it is diversity of ends. In that diversity it opposes
all unitary systems, communist or fascist. Therefore a
"system of democracy" must be either a piece of empty
verbalism or the plan of an imposed unity. In pointing this
out, intellect is doing its proper work; in cobbling together
the proposed system it would be usurping that role of will
and making itself a dangerous substitute for satisfactions
which democracy denies. To put this more generally, the
greatest danger of intellect is that it so readily breeds
intellectualism. The symptoms of this disease are unfortunately
infinite. 86
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Barzun went on then to treat the paradox he had apparently created, namely
that men should both rely more on intellect and yet not too much so. "The
paradox or rather, the antinomy, is not one of my creating. It is one that
every state that calls itself free must live with. But since the practical
difficulties are not new, modern societies need not despair. " 87
Almost more impressive, however, was Barzun’s next book, Science:
The Glorious Entertainment
,
of 1964. This was in part a summaiy of his
argument to date, as he pointed out. His entire work was taken up with "this
cultural sovereignty of science and its multiplying effects."88 The founthead
for this is Whitehead's Science and the Modem World, which Barzun read
at the age of nineteen and which had upon him "the effect of a vision. "
Whitehead's view was that the balance produced by the union in science "of
passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to abstract
generalization" had produced a "balance of mind. "89 Barzun's later conclusion
was that the balance had been lost: "What is felt is the curse of abstraction,
the burden of pullulating fact. He promoted the by now familiar role of the
critic; he was not for or against such wholes as science or education or the
Q
I
State: "I can as readily imagine being against sunset and for the tides.
Chapter five, for instance, dealt with philosophies of scientific method from
Bacon to Einstein and Popper; the latter pair are famous relativists, but
even Bacon recognized that purpose "is something which 'has to do with the
09
nature of man, not with the nature of the universe. " Chapter seven,
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"Behavioral Science, " was a typical attack on "the assumptions of physical
science transferred to the study of man. ,t93 Behavioral science has to assmne
without warrant that "studying a small abstracted morsel of the whole
will not distort the re suits ;"94 and our scientific culture often expects of
behavioral science "answers to the question What Ought To Be?" 95 He
attacked the pretentions of Karl Marx and Dr. Kinsey to be more than mere
reporters, and biased at that. Man, in fact, did not so much behave as
misbehave: ’'From developing allergies, which make poison out of delicacies,
to committing crimes which, as in saints and statesmen, can later seem the
highest wisdom. . . these facts of experience require that any science of
the regularities of behavior be always qualified and admonished by another
discipline, a learned love of misbehavior. " 96 Diversity rules again. Chapter
ten, "The Treason of the Artist, " argued that science had invaded art:
"By what I have ventured to call treason, artists share with science the faith
in independent objects, the love of the abstract, the all-importance of method,
the need for structure, and the fear of letting the subjective enter the game by
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way of humanity. " The "burden of modernity" was related to the obsessive
use of abstraction, on which there was another magnificent attack in chapter
98
eleven 1 The final chapter, "One Mind in Many Modes," was suitably powerful
and all inclusive to provide the conclusion of this survey. It began: "What we
discover as the cause of our panic when we examine the burden of modernity
is the imposition of one intellectual purpose upon all experience. To analyze,
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abstract, and objectify is the carrying out of a single, imperialistic mode of
I
thought. To tame this extension of science into our lives we must or may
fence off the machine from our homes, curb language of undue generalization,
regard the self as an end in itself, and keep economy to its proper place:
|
"No house was ever comfortable or beautiful that was not wastefully built,100
or Mind encloses science, and not the other way around. More
generally, his
full answer is twofold.
. . . The first argument
against the primacy of the provable is that the
improvable and even the doubtful are necessary to
man.
. . . The ground for the second half of the
answer to those who fear the subjective.
. . is
characteristically the historian's, for the historian
understands that there is no such thing as unanimity
... to his disciplined eye science is no more at
one with itself than any creed. ... He knows that
mind exists in many modes. ... To put the case
historically, the twentieth century needs that
multiplicty of consciousness which Henry Adams
chronicled.
.
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Barzun concluded that man must be a natural and moral philosopher. He must
return
From zoon to bios. Man alone has a biography, and
he but shares a zoology. .
.
(man may) be skeptical
but gay about the prospects of humankind. . . no god
and only intermittently god-like, he is the judge and
measure of whatever haunts him.10^
Barzun's work, in short, is a most powerful and wide-ranging statement
of the essentialist position; it resists absolutism at every point; it promotes
relativism in its place.
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The Role of Reason and of Criticism
One now has an idea of the essentialist view of himself as the critic
and the disciple of reason from the discussion of absolutism, and from
knowledge of Bagley and Barzun.
Essentialism cannot Jae equated simply with conservatism for its own
sake, only with conservation of what is best. To buttress this argument one
may briefly examine further relevant essentialist discussions under three
headings, for the sake of convenience.
First, there is the theme of social or political critic, going so far in
cases as to incUde the conservative anarchism of Nock or Henry Adams.
The patron saint of this activity was, of course, Socrates; he was the first martyr
of the cause, as one can judge by his rating in the popularity poll of Figure 1.
Meiklejohn for one quoted his most famous remark: "The uncriticized life is
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not worth living. ,r Nock was enthusiastic on this count; he talked of education
as producing critics necessarily: "Education, in a word, leads a person on to
ask a great deal more from life than life, as at present organized, is willing
to give him; and it begets dissatisfaction. A famous version of this,
regularly quoted by other essentialists, was that of 1932; "The lively and
106
peremptory exercise of dissatisfaction is the first condition of progress.
"
Nock compared Artemus Ward with H. L. Mencken as they both put their finger
"upon all the meanness, low-mindedness, greed, viciousness, blood thirstiness,
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and homicidal mania that were rife among us. "107 Mencken himself, whom
most essentialists appear to have read, wrote of the dangers of being a critic:
"Even today, with the scientific passion become familiar in the world,
a Galileo could no more be elected President of the United States than he
could be elected Pope of Rome. Both high posts are reserved for men favored
by God with an extraordinary genius for swathing the bitter facts of life in
bandages of soft illustion. "lu ° Later in the same volume he revealed and
revelled in the feet of clay of such American heroes as Washington and Lincoln
Bernard Iddings Bell claimed his own intention was "10 disturb a
pseudo-patriotic complacency. "109 Bell likewise, in his forward to Mortimer
Smiths And Madly Teach, claimed that Smith was more a revolutionary than
Marx: "This man Smith is really and truly a revolutionist, comrade to Socrates,
to Isaiah and Jeremy, to the Buddha, to the Christian saints. He, and the
rest of us who toss about this sort of dynamite, ought to be locked up. "110
Smith’s own conclusion in that work, on the final page, was that individual
parents must engage in "extensive critical examination. m111 Smith also
wrote an article, "The Perils of Being a Critic, " where he concluded: "The
fundamental mistake lies in judging criticism on the basis of its source rather
than on its merits. " J Albert Lynd, a very similar critic himself, concluded
that "the parent who is opposed to the New Education"113 ought to fight it
vigorously at the local level. Admiral Rickover has written that "as a people
we have always frowned on the critic of social mores. n11^ Barzun linked
128
intellect with its "chief business, cultural criticism. . . these considerations
make only more imperative the safeguard of the master virtues of intellect.
They are, once again: concentration, continuity, articulate precision, and
self-awareness."110 Howard Mumford Jones, himself popular with recent
essentialists
,
wrote of Emerson that "if the protestors but knew it, Emerson
is on their side;" the difference is that modern protesters will not "exert
themselves in the positive sense of Carlyle’s everlasting yea. Walter
Lippmann has written, "it is often the case that the critic understands the play
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better than the actor. " Harry S. Broudy has written of intellectuals that
"they are the sensitive free nerve endings of society. "118
Although this generalization holds true in most cases, we find occasional
evidence that it should not be pressed too hard. Ortega y Gasset was at the edge
of the spectrum when he criticized a certain kind of critic, namely the cynic.
He described Diogenes as "the nihilist of Hellenism. . . The cynic, a parasite
of civilization, lives by denying it, for the very reason that he is convinced
it will not fail. "
119 He broadened the scope, and struck two essentialist
themes, when he went on: "What is your Fascist if he does not speak ill of
liberty, or your Surrealist if he does not blaspheme against art?" 120 It
could perhaps be argued that Ortega y Gasset was only criticizing unreasonable
criticism.
This is precisely the charge that Sidney Hook levelled against Alexander
Meiklejohn, who had urged a more co-operative and less individualistic under-
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standing of society; Hook thus accused him that he risked curbing the role of
critic and losing the "intelligent vigilance against abuse of delegated power
i pi
and against usurpation of authority. "
The second area where one may examine this role of critic is that of
moral and artistic values. Home indulged in his own characteristically pious
tone when he wrote of his vision of the educational truth: "My purpose has
rather been to do the more serviceable, if less spectacular, thing of passing-
on to willing ears the word of the still, small voice as it has vouchsafed to
speak to me. " Michael Demiashkevich, a similarly extreme idealist with
religious leanings, prefaced his Introduction to Philosophy of Education with
the following two quotations, significant in their meaning and their connotations:
"Philosophy is not a potentate’s throne, but a battlefield of ideas" and "Prove
all Things; hold fast that which is Good" (1 Thessalomians 5:21). A. J. Nock
was enthusiastic about Artemus Ward, who earned his way in the world of
letters "by the power of his criticism, and in the same essay Nock linked
Ward in a critical and humorous tradition with Mencken Barzun’s view
of the artist as eternal pragmatist or critic has already been examined; he
spoke, for instance, of Swift that he had "the mettle of the troublesome
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witness, like Rousseau, Nietzsche, John Jay Chapman or Bernard Shaw.
That criticism can also be mere artistic cynicism we have seen in the arguments
of Ortega y Gasset or Irving Babbitt, who both appear, at tliis point
and in
general, on the conservative flank.
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Third, and perhaps fundamentally, one may examine the role of critic
as epistemologist. Phenix argued for the necessity of constant re-evaluation
in modem analytic philosophy. Home sounded curiously modem when he
wrote: "Philosophy has no new facts of its own to consider, it has only to
consider the old facts in a new way. ”126 A. J. Nock talked of this in terms of
a phrase of Plato’s which is often recalled by essentialists, namely that the
intellectual is one who tends to "see things as they are. "3-27 Arthur Bestor
counselled that the critic should 'love the sinner but not his sin. "*23 Bagley
remarked, like Home, that he sought to promote no new fashions "but perhaps
in the end an equally significant function—namely, salvaging from the scrap-
pile and preserving for the future the valuable elements;” and proposed his
twin themes of "disagreeing with most of my fellow workers" and that the only
remedy for prejudice was reason.
W. W. Brickman, editor of School and Society now for many year?,
has frequently demanded more public controversy in the field of education. *2^
He was probably influenced by Hutchins, certainly by the essentialist tradition.
Hutchins saw social and political conformity as one of the principal threats
to American democracy and education, whereas "what is in other countries a
serious hazard to education, philosophical diversity, turns out to be in Utopia
an educational advantage, and "the great new term of reproach nowadays
is ’controversial’;" and as a result the university resorts to public relations
men, a class which he prays may wither away. *3i Indeed, "a university that
132
is not controversial is not a university.
"
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The Philosophy of Science
The philosophy of science has played a large part in this debate already.
The nature of science and scientific proof has, of course, always been
important; essentialists tend to find examples to discuss from among the classical
Greeks. A special impetus to the importance of science was also given by
Dewey's reliance on scientific method for his pragmatic educational views;
it is generally on these apparently neutral, value-free arguments that
essentialists attack him, as we have seen in Barzun's more general attack on
the misapplication, of scientific inquiry to fields where it is not germane. It
may be worth examining a few more essentialist views in this area.
Horace Mann wrote with great excitement about the history of physical
science
s and the inadequacy of science teaching "until dogmatic teaching was
supplanted by the spirit of inquiry. "1^3 Emerson, however, was less impressed,
and argued that "empirical science is apt to cloud the sight. . . a guess is often
more fruitful than an indisputable affirmation. . . and a dream may let us
134deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred conducted experiments. "
A. J. Nock, though accused by his son that he "had no understanding of
science, " was typically skeptical about the ultimate meanings of scientific
endeavor. Science, he argued, still debates and knows nothing of the causes
of things. The answer to the problem of cause and effect we have simply
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moved "a step or two backward. " He discussed this more fully in his
delightful autobiography: "When I was a lad, science had tossed metaphysics
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on the junk pile.
. . straight material monism was the thing.
. . Science
went on with its investigations.
. . like the donkey after the carrot, but the
carrot apparently as far away as ever;” 137 and scientists debating the shape
of space put on ”as fine an exhibit of metaphysics as anything the schoolmen
can show. nl^8 Ortega y Gasset concentrated on the social effects of science:
"Science itself, the root of our civilization, automatically converts one into
mass-man, makes of him a primitive. 1,133 Hutchins took a more moderate
and typical view when he wrote that "the Utopians have nothing but praise for
the scientific method; they are experts at it. Because they are experts at it,
they recognize its limitations. " 14° Mark Van Doren held a very similar
opinion: "If science is master of the intellectual arts proper to the conduct
of its affairs, then science is liberal too. . . .The error is to ape science. '141
Mortimer Smith lamented that too many have been taught "to believe only in
science, in the kind of truth which can be proven by tangible evidence, 1,143
with a consequent impotence in moral or abstract thinking. The Council for
Basic Education's booklet, A Consumer's Guidei, mocked at the use of behavioral
objectives in education as pseudo-scientific}43 and at various other mock
scientific intrusions into education. J. D. Koerner has written that "the
efforts of educationists to develop a bona fide discipline lured them for many
years into the trap of scientism. ,444 Lynd had great fun at the expense of
educational researchers in a chapter titled "Research, It’s Wonderful," where
he concluded that "one of the most wonderful things about Educational research
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is that it may be operated like an Easter egg hunt: it seeks and finds some-
thing which its promoters have put there in the first place. "145 Russell Kirk
has attacked the false scientism of ideologies and behaviorism. 448
Three more sophisticated discussants, along with Bagley and Barzun,
are Mortimer Adler, Philip Phenix and Joseph Wood Krutch. Adler, for
instance, with Milton Mayer argued in The Revolution in Education that the
difference between what he called traditionalists and modernists was the
"fundamentally different views of science, "147 that "where the modernist
asserts the exclusive validity of the scientific method, the traditionalist
maintains that there are many valid methods of inquiry, each appropriate to
its own subject matter, "148 that "it is not, however, the scientist with whom
the traditionalist is arguing taut the modernist,"*49 and paradoxically that
the traditionalist might "require more science than the modernist. "15° Indeed,
he argued that the infamously essentialist or perennialist curriculum of St.
John's College was the only liberal arts course in America that demanded
four years of laboratory science of every student, and that it "takes literally
that glorious Latin pun "that serves as the college motto: 'Facio liberos
ex libris libraque', or 'I make free men out of boys by means of books and
balances'. "
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He dealt with the issue most powerfully, however, elsewhere.
Adler delivered the Aquinas Lecture in 1938 under the auspices of the
Aristotelian Society of Marquette University, and he called his address "St.
Thomas and the Gentiles. " It was modelled on Aquinas' own "Summa Contra
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Gentiles, ” and it was a brilliant attempt to show the relevance of St. Thomas
Aquinas to our own day, not as a Christian system builder, but as a debater
and open-minded philosopher, and he included a discussion of the relation of
science to philosophy. The modem gentiles, by analogy, were those who deny
"that there is any such thing as true philosophical knowledge. "152 He was
acting as "philosopher contra positivists. "153 The only gentiles with whom one
could not reason were "those skeptics who are not even silenced by their own
contradictions.’154 just as Aquinas started from his opponent’s position, so
Adler started from that of the scientists, to show that science presupposed
some philosophy, rather as Barzun argued that both scientific and historical
data were subject to the mind and imagination. Thus "those who affirm the
c onclusions of science to be knowledge of an independent real are themselves
uttering a philosophical proposition. "155 He found various other sucji a
thi v -jc'-'r a
posteriori arguments, and then showed that "the limitations of science provide
a preamble to philosophy. " He defended Aquinas against being a rigid
systematist, though many of his admirers as well as his detractors have
tried to show him so. He quoted Gilson’s conclusion that Aquinas "had no
system in the idealistic sense of the word. .
.
(His) ambition was not to achieve
157
philosophy once and for all, but to maintain it and to serve it. " Aquinas
did not claim to answer everything, but rather eliminated everything except
•r pro
necessary antinomies— "The antinomy points to a mystery. " Adler
argued entertainingly for the perennial character of philosophical truth:
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There is nothing strictly new about modem realism
or idealism, empiricism or rationalism, naturalism
or absolutism. For each of these errors an ancient or
medieval thinker could be named to parallel his modem
counterpart, often superior to the latter in the lucidity
of his deviation from the truth. 159
Aquinas taught us, in short, the two essential conditions of philosophic
methods: 'We must combine the a posteriori method of proceeding always
from experience, which is the great virtue of Locke’s contribution, with the
seIdentical yet constructive exercise of reason, which modem thought
owes to Kant. " This was exactly Barzun’s argument about facts and
imagination. It was a remarkable lecture, the mere footnotes of which in their
complexity one is not worthy to unloose.
Another very powerful book of Adler’s was composed of a series of
lectures delivered by invitation before the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Chicago, in
the spring of 1936, published as What Man Has Made of Man., frith the subtitle,
"A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism in Psychology. " The
argument was, as usual, chiefly epistemological; the psychologist "cannot,
as scientist or philosopher, claim to have knowledge of a certain sort, and
then as a psychologist deny that men are capable of such knowledge. " 161
Perhaps the most instructive thing about this book was the introduction, written
by Dr. Franz Alexander, director of that institute, at Adler’s request. He
vigorously attacked Adler for his "scholasticism, a sterile form of deductive
thinking, " 162 which was supposedly an outlet for thinkers who dared not observe
the word lest any observation conflict with established dogma. Yet there were
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always a priori heretics. The most he allowed Adler was "flawless deductions
from incorrect premises. " 163 This too could be a dangerous admission if
Adler used the claims of science or psychology for his premises. Adler
mildly replied to these remarks: "St. Thomas is a philosopher in the same sense
that Aristotle and Santayana are, " and that scholasticism is not "necromancy wita
buried syllogisms.
Philip Phenix, a contemporary and sophisticated essentialist, has similarly
argued that "the fundamental presupposition of science is taken as a model
for the moral enterprise in all its phases. The scientist assumes that there
is a truth to be progressively discovered, that acknowledgement of truth is
a universal obligation, and that knowledge of it is everyone's privilege. " 165
Phenix's view was ultimately that of a Christian deeply involved in epistemology,
as is evident throughout his work. "Turning to the physical sciences, one
finds an equally comprehensive view of man as that which derives from
reflection on mathematics" and
two features of scientific activity are of the greatest
human importance. The first feature grows out of
the very meaning of science. The subject matter of
science may be taken as those matters of fact on
which it is possible, in principle, to secure universal
agreement. . . The other most humanly significant
feature of the scientific enterprise is its inherent
moral imperative. 1^6
Joseph Wood Krutch is of interest here for he, like Bagley, struggled
hard to reconcile his scientific and naturalistic beliefs with his moral
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idealism. His solution, not unlike Bagley's emergent idealism, related to
consciousness. "Nature has tended if not intended to increase the degree of
consciousness.
. . and to make survival depend more and more upon
conscious intelligence; if a God did not create Nature then perhaps Nature is
creating a God. He was the essentialist who most relied on ecological
concerns for his philosophy:
1 aith in wildness or in Nature,
. . is a philosophy,
a faith.
. . it puts our ultimate trust not in human
intelligence but in whatever it is that created human
intelligence.
. . this is a modern version of ancient
pantheism.
In short, essentialists, though few are expert scientists and many have
difficulty inserting their moral idealism, generally accept science as one of
the chief models of rationality, especially when limited to its proper place.
They resent its application to the less empirical data of, for instance, social
sciences, education or literature. Sometimes they even use science as a
springboard for arguments of philosophy or value; their view might therefore
be justly described as a centralist or moderate one.
There are a number of further related epistemological debates or
dualisms on which the essentialists generally take a moderate, central or
slightly right wing position. These are not entirely distinguishable one from
another, but it will be convenient to deal with the following separately: the
disciplines versus integrated studies; sequential versus incidental learning;
abstract versus concrete learning; liberal versus vocational knowledge; ends
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versus means; work versus play; teaching versus learning; and discipline
versus freedom.
The Intellectual Disciplines versus Integrated Study
Central to the traditional view of knowledge is the nature of the seven
liberal arts of ancient tradition. This was most conveniently discussed in
Mark Van Doren's Liberal Education, though the theme is popular through-
out essentialist literature. Van Doren distinguished between useful, liberal
and fine arts; the liberal arts "are the specifically intellectual arts, and
therefore are keys of man's operation as man. . . Their two most familiar
names are language and mathematics. "169 The classical tradition and the
medieval tradition labelled these arts grammar, rhetoric and logic; arithmetic,
music, geometry and astronomy; and called the two groups the trivium and
the quadrivium respectively. "We have reduced seven to two: The trivium is
literature and the quadrivium is mathematics. "1^ van Doren warned against
assuming that one is more liberal than the other, and reminded the reader that
the seven arts are seldom in proper harmony at any one time, as when rhetoric
came to dominate in Rome or when early Christians resisted the liberal arts
as secular. Literature today has lost its logic, and "has abandoned rhetoric
to advertising and propaganda. It is left with nothing but grammar—which,
because it works in isolation, knows its terms but one at a time, and naively.
This is the same as Barzun's argument above. From this Van Doren goes on
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to argue that "a curriculum already exists,
discovered, "1^2 ^11 r0om for maneuver
parsley, thyme or a hundred other savors.
It remains only to be
is but "garnishing the meat with
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The curriculum he then chose
to discuss was that of St. John's College in Maryland and the "Great
Books".
This might be regarded as an extreme conclusion from reasonable
arguments, though of course no essentialist claims that the Great Books is the
only possible curriculum, with the possible exception of A. J. Nock, who
required ideally that the classics should never be read in translation.
The nineteenth century progressives, topped and epitomised by John
Dewey
,
have rightly castigated much education for being too formal, but have
been attacked in their turn for being as vague as some classicists were vicious
reaction is no excuse for going too far. In fact, essentialists make great
significance of the fact that Dewey and Bode went on record to modify those
extreme progressives who exaggerated them.
Kandel took this moderate view in The Cult Of. Uncertainty ’ where,
invoking John Dewey as another moderate, he argued that the challenge to the
traditional organization might prove salutary: "It may be admitted that the
curriculum of the traditional school was poorly taught without admitting that
the principle on which it was based—the induction of each new generation
into the culture of the race as funded capital to be used and not merely stored
away—was unsound. This remark also recalls Bagley's insistence on
culture as "race-experience.
"
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Demiashkevieh attacked "synthetic or integrated study and undue project
work" first in his doctoral dissertation175 and then in An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Education. His most powerful argument, and there were
several, was that integration suffers from a misconception of synthesis:
There is a synthesis which William James would have
characterized as staring at fact. . .. there is also a
different kind of synthesis, a reconstructive synthesis
which unites things only after their resemblances and
differences have been perceived by means of dismember-
ment worked by analysis. 176
Arthur Bestor used the same word in 1956, when he wrote of the
integrated curriculum that "synthesis is a step in thinking which presupposes
a prior step of analysis. " *77 Bestor was an historian and has argued vigorously
against the incursion of social studies into the place of history in schools; he
was an arch-proponent of the disciplines: "The liberal disciplines are not
chunks of frozen fact. They are not facts at all. They are the powerful tools
and engines by which a man discovers and handles facts. "178 The universities
were the guardians of the liberal arts tradition and so "curriculum-making, in
short, is a task that belongs to the learned world as a whole, "l7^ There can
be no such thing as a general curriculum expert, he argued.
Integration or multi-disciplinary work would only make sense among
experts, as at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. It is thus
understandable that we find Robert Hutchins in his role at that center stating
that "the over-arching theme of studies of the social order now has to be the
J
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However, the finest and fullest expression of the epistemological,
liberal arts tradition belongs to Philip Phenix, in two remarkable books,
both published in 1964, Man and His Becoming and Realms of Meaning.
The latter is well on the way to becoming a classic elsewhere, notably so in
England. The case was more simply stated in the former:
The crucial misconception is that the natural sciences
have to do only with bodily properties, the social
studies only to do with minded behavior, and the
humanistic studies only with spiritual realities.
It will be shown that all three branches of knowledge
have to do with all three of the traditional aspects
of human nature, and that every discipline in fact
studies man as a whole, comprising body, mind and
spirit.188
The argument continued: "In brief then, mathematics and the natural sciences
are the clue to being and becoining human, the social sciences are concerned
with being and becoming related, and the humanities have to do with being
and becoming oneself. ’*89 Phenix then proceeded by an analysis of the
epistemological characteristics of each discipline to demonstrate this. For
instance, mathematics was the study of
the development of disciplined self-awareness.
. .
to be a spiritual being is to have the power of self-
transcendence—the capacity to be simultaneously
a self and an observer and appraiser of the self. . . .
What the postulational method of mathematics shows
is that man as a reflective thinker is free. . . .
The mathematical enterprise shows man as having a
sense of universal obligation. 190
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The argument for the value of the social sciences began significantly with
Martin Buber’s classic land Thou, where Buber "holds that relationships
are not derivative patterns subsisting between essentially self-sufficient
entities, but that they are the primary basis for all being and becoming what-
soever. n191 This underlay the fundamental importance of man-in-relation and
a knowledge of these relationships "adds specificity and richness to the universals
of human nature revealed by and through the natural sciences and mathematics. " 192
The social sciences revealed the many ways humans were alike, for persons
can only exist in relationships, and "relation is essential to being. "
The humanities dealt with each man’s uniqueness:
"in esthetic experiences
there are the roots of what may well be mankind's most fundamental moral
persuasion, namely, the inherent worth of the individual. The esthetic attitude
is essentially one of respect for the thing-in-itself
. and for the freedom of
the perceiving subject. " Essentialists seldom if ever discuss the nature of
dance, but Phenix had it that "the most intricate and direct esthetic
presentation of human nature is attained in the dance.
. . the dance constitutes
a living refutation of the assumption that bodies exist only to support the
higher human functions, "19 ° and he attributed the marginal status of dance
in modem civilization to the dualistic view of man which subordinated the
worth cf the body to that of the mind. Similar arguments were used to establish
music as a spiritual endeavor; "Periodicity is found everywhere.
. . In
rhythmic patterns there is dynamic order
—
patterned process—making possible
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that balance between security and adventure required for creative advance
at every stage in the evolution of the cosmic order. . . music is the art in
196
which this primal fact of constancy-in-change is deliberately celebrated.
"
The value of drama, he argued, consisted in the opportunity it afforded for
’’self-identification through imaginative participation in the being and becoming
of the characters in the play. 'The value of poetry is in its two essentials of
rhythm and metaphor, both of which had the same basic function of establishing
Munity-in-difference—an achievement that is close to the ultimate secret of
being itself. " 198 hi fact, the general theme of the individuation of the
arts was that most close to Barzun's haart, as is the concept of artist as
pragmatist and anti-absolutist. Phenix concluded that ’’all of the arts at their
best—but most powerfully the arts of literature—exemplify the attainment
of unity-in-multiplicity and thus serve as models and resources for the
development of selfhood. "199 History was likewise "a measure of the
meaningfulness of life. "
20
° The final art, religion, was of course for
Phenix the most important, for the "uniqueness of each human person is most
persistently and deliberately affirmed and celebrated in the religious tradition
of mankind. . . the religious question has to do with the importance or
significance of this personal uniqueness. The general theme was very
much that of Barzvn, as is clear from the following: "When generality rides
high, as it does when science is regarded as the only or the best source of
authentic knowledge, those who assert the primacy of the individual are
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dismissed as romantics and anti-intellectuals.”202 Instead, "complete
inwardness is participation in the source and ground of all being. "203 These
themes were gathered up, Barzun's view was as it were consummated, in
Phenix's vision of a Christian epistemology:^**
In the light of the singular and unitary nature of
man, two of the most important and from a
rationalistic standpoint most difficult of the
Christian doctrines may prove of special interest
and relevance. These are the doctrines of
incarnation and resurrection. The doctrine of
incarnation affirms that the clue to the significance
of human life is given in a particular person in history,
and not in any general truths of reason. The ultimate
truth of life is not to be found in a supernatural realm
of spirit or in abstract ideas, but in a real person
living in the world and subject to all the circumstances
of natural existence, including death. The doctrine
-
of resurrection is concerned with the destruction of
meaning that results from death. . . the name for the
resurrectible in personal existence is love. To love
another, one has to affirm the uniqueness and infinite
importance of the other's being. It is not loving to
treat him by the model of one's own uniqueness. 1 To
do that is to play God and incur the penalty of permanent
death. To love is to live for the other and to find the
eternal importance of existence in the act of dying to
the presumptuous importance of one's own being. 205
Phenix reverted to his original theme in the last sentence of the book, which
was:”Thus, through diversified liberal studies, one may grow in the grace of
true humanness, sincere neighborliness, and authentic selfhood. "
The book is a magnificent reconciliation of three strands, the liberal
arts tradition, modern Christian theology, and the most recent epistemology.
The same themes were worked out much more fully in his Realms of
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Meaning
. This was the much fuller work on which Man and his Becoming
was clearly based, and it included a lengthy discussion of each discipline.
Human beings were so because they ’’engender meanings, ” and the "six
fundamental patterns of meaning emerge from the analysis of the possible
distinctive modes of human understanding. These six patterns may be
designated respectively as symbolics, empirics, esthetics, synooetics, ethics
and synoptics. ”207 The only novelty in this list was what Phenix lias
labelled synnoetics, from the Greek synnoesis, meaning ’’meditative thought,”
and which included what Michael Polanyi called ’’personal knowledge” and
Martin Buber the ”I-Thou” relationship— ’’This personal or relational knowledge
is concrete, diverse and existential. ”208 The argument was further structured
by three order factors and four factors of selection. The three order factors
were, briefly, that all children should at all stages receive some instruction
in each of the six areas; that some subjects needed special emphasis at
certain times, as does language initially; and that allowance should be made
for the developmental and maturational characteristics of children, in the
best Piagetian manner. The four factors in the selection and organization of
content were first that the content should be drawn entirely from the fields
of disciplined inquiry; that only those items in a discipline should be chosen
which are particularly representative of that field; that content should be
chosen so as to exemplify the methods of inquiry and the modes of under-
standing in the disciplines studied; and fourthly that materials chosen should be
such as to arouse imagination.
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That Phenix' s view remained moderate, however, can be seen in that,
despite his supremely disciplined approach to knowledge, he had no grudge
against properly epistemological integrated studies. That the content of the
curriculum should come entirely from the disciplines does not imply that
the instruction "ought necessarily to be organized into separate courses each
of which pertains to one of the disciplines. ,r^ J Indeed, a social studies course
might draw upon authoritative material "from the disciplines of history,
economics, sociology, political science and literature. "21° jnodcrale
conclusion was that the discipline principle "in practice tends to favor studies
along the lines of disciplines or in groups of related disciplines, " and that
the difficulty with cross-disciplinary studies was that "they offer a temptation
to shallow, nondisiciplined thinking because of the mixture of methods and
concepts involved.
Sequential versus Incidental Learning
This is a closely related debate to the one above. Phenix wisely
included two lands of sequence factors, that which was implied by the logic
of the subject matter or disepline, and that which was implied by the patterns
of human development. The latter significantly is rarely discussed in
esscntialist literaturo; and Piaget, for instance, is scarcely known amongst
them. The logic of the subject-matter is, however, frequently invoked,
though seldom with the thoroughness and moderation of Phenix, who devoted
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en entire chapter to the problem, "The Logic of Sequence in Studies," in
his Realms of Meaning
. He argued, for instance, that the realm of
symbolics had priority over the other realms for they all "depend on
symbolisms as means of expression. "212 The logic of the synoptic disciplines,
for instance philosophy, placed them last in order "because they depend upon all
the other realms for their materials. "213 This does not mean, of course,
that one realm of meaning has to be completely conquered before embarking
on another; rather enough learning mis t take place in one realm to enable
work to proceed in other subjects that are logically dependent on it. There
is a compromise, as usual:
Balancing the twin factors of integration and sequential
logic, the optimum curriculum for general education
would appear to consist of concurrent studies in all six
realms of meaning, with early major emphasis on
mathematics and languages, and later major emphasis
on synoptic studies
.
214
This sophisticated moderation is not always so apparent, however.
Abraham Flexner wrote that "chaos supervenes unless aims have been sharply
defined and the orderly development of laws and principles assured through
intelligent and forceful guidance. "215 Mortimer Smith has already been quoted
to the effect that modem education tends to eliminate systematic learning of
logically organized subject matter. Barzun demonstrated the same concern
for essential features in the remark: "The only thing worth teaching anybody
is a principle. " The same argument reappears in Koemer's edition of essays
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for the Council for Basic Education, namely that
if. essential facts are presented to secondary school
students as related, logical sequences in a predictable
pattern, the exercise becomes one less of memory
than of reason.
. . too often the victim of inadequate
secondary school teaching is amazed to find that
there is logic in the past. 2-^
The general essentialist argument then is for a return from progressive
projects to more logically disciplined subjects, especially in the secondary
school, though there is a note of moderation generally. Demiashkevich has
written mildly that "desultory, scrappy, haphazard learning, though conducive
to shortcomings, is infinitely less so than the tyranny of monotonous programs
of study and rigid time schedules. The latter sap, if not kill, the elan vital. "218
None of the tradition takes Dr. Johnson’s vigorous attitude; when asked by
Boswell what was best to teach children first, he replied, as quoted by Lynd:
Sir, there is no matter what you teach them first, any
more than what leg you shall put into your breeches
first. Sir, you may stand disputing which is best to
put in first, but in the meantime your backside is
bare.2*9
Liberal versus Vocational Education
On this debate many essentialista are clear that vocation has nothing to
do with formal education, while others see it having a limited place. One
can usefully distinguish the hard-liners and the more moderates.
A typical hard-liner is Mortimer Smith who claimed: "Modem
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education says: It is the duty of the schools to train youth for vocations. "220
Albert Lynd typically lamented the introduction of purely vocational courses
into teacher training.221 Bernard Iddings Bell quoted Sir Bichard Livingstone
of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, that "a technician is a man who understands
everything about his job except its ultimate purpose and its place in the order
of the universe. "222 L L . K<mdel recalled that ,lthe leaders o£^ Revolutk)n
had with few exceptions been trained in the 'aristocratic' studies of Latin,
Greek, Hebrew, History and Philosophy, " and went on to bewail the "emphasis
on the practical" which heralded the twentieth century.223 Adler had clearly
been reading Bell, for he too quoted Sir Richard Livingstone on the nature
of the technician, while arguing that 'Vocational education, as it ordinarily
exists, is undemocratic and unjust, " for it makes the technically trained
person conscious of his practical but not his social responsibilities.^^
Jacques Barztfn was his usual witty self, when he differentiated between
liberal and vocational studies, where the latter "end in a delicious muffin or
a well-drawn lease; they do not lead out to the great network of topics and
questions about which the mind feels a permanent lust to know. ”223 The
most vigorous opponent of vocational education is Robert Hutchins; he
fulminated against the educational program for school janitors at Teachers
College, Columbia, for majorettes at the University of Oklahoma, for
beauticians at Pasadena City College, or for circus performers at Florida
State University, or for teachers of driving at the University of California.
22 ^
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Other essentialists have made similar lists for ridicule. Hutchins went on
from this to argue that teaching too, like many other occupations, had no
intellectual content in its own right: ’Wherever you touch education, it fades
into something else”—so what a teacher needs is knowledge of his subject and
an ability to read, write, speak and figure. "227^ extreme example of
Hutchins' enthusiasm for liberal education occurred when he sought to
exonerate Jefferson from the charge that his educational plans were too
vocational. Although it was clear that Jefferson thought of education "chiefly
as the accumulation of useful information, ” he could be excused on the
grounds that he was not proposing a "plan for the higher learning. He was
proposing, rather, a system of education designed to produce self-sustaining
and law-abiding citizens. " It is "because we have misunderstood Jefferson
that we have not yet secured a university in the United States, " and consequently
"in the higher learning the intellectual love of God has been submerged by
external goods and the moral virtues, " whereas what a university should
229provide is "an education in disciplines. " He concluded later in the same
volume that "it is paradoxical, but true, that the best practical education is
the most theoretical one, " although education should not be a substitute for
experience but "a preparation for it. "230 Elsewhere he argued: "Vocational-
ism leads, then, to triviality, and isolation,"231 again went on to argue that
professional education was primarily intellectual. 222 in a later volume,
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Hutchins leant on Keynesian economics to further his argument; the new
surplus economy willi both give man more time for leisure and at the same
time lessen the significance of his labor: "The worker who previously had
only a little time in which to get drunk, beat his wife, or go to burlesque
shows now has much more time to get drunk, beat his wife, and watch
television," and again "the problem of making work significant in an
industrial, mechanized economy is one of the most difficult in the. modem world. "28^
Vocational education therefore makes less and less sense, and the proposal to
extend vocational training is plainly absurd— "In short, the cure for the disease
of no jobs is training for them. " 235
The only member of the tradition to disagree fundamentally is a doubtful
member, namely J. B. Conant, who argued for more vocational training, while
also hoping to extend an intellectual training especially to the more able
child: Mathematics, foreign languages and sciences I have already indicated
are to be regarded as subjects to be studied primarily with a view to the
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subsequent career of the individual. "
More generally, essentialists seek to compromise on this issue,
usually by denying that there is any real fundamental opposition between the
concepts vocational and liberal. Arthur Bestor, for instance, argued that
"least of all is there a sharp contrast between the intellectualLand the
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practical, " though he elsewhere castigated especially pedagogy for
allowing the development of "pseudo-vocational" programs .288 H. S. Broudy
153
twice quoted Aristotle on the subject, first to the effect that a subject must
be studied for its own sake if it is to remain liberal, and secondly that the
liberal man is a moderate who, in the words of Aristotle, "neither
trusts everybody nor distrusts everybody, but judges people correctly. " 239
Home also sought to compromise: "Any subject in the University catalogue
may be either liberal or professional, according to the student's attitude
thereto. " 4^ Thomas Briggs' definition of liberal education was "that it is
evidenced by the number, the variety, and the depths of intellectual interests
that one possesses. " 244 Nicholas Murray Butler had earlier concluded that
vocational education should not be included in "the six years that are sufficient
for the elementary-school course, properly so-called;" 242 but further argued
that "hand or manual training has an intellectual reaction, if properly planned
and interpreted, "242 A. J. Nock tried to be reasonable, but hovered on the
brink of being his usual extreme self. Nock wanted to insist on cultured
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plumbers, which reminds one of Barzun's delight in the window-cleaner
who enjoyed and recognized the Braque hanging in Barzun's apartment.
More usually Nock revelled in Stephen Leacock's account of Oxford and its
"useless knowledge, " which makes it clear that the business of a university
is "to do what for centuries Oxford has been doing. "245 Typical was his
distinction between education and training: "Education, properly applied to
suitable material, produces something in the way of an Emerson; while
training, properly applied to suitable material, produces something in the
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way of an Edison. "246 Elsewhere he claJmed^ „ was^ q£
training for education which had revolutionized American education for the
247worse. Philip Phenix was, as usual, profound and conciliatory when
he concluded that "liberal education is entirely consistent with a high degree
of specialized technical instruction, provided the latter is carried on
imaginatively and with continuous concern for the wider bearings and the
deeper meanings of the speciality. " 248 Van Doren has already been quoted
above to the effect that "no antipathy appears between technical and liberal
education if we remember that both are concerned with art. n24^ As a final
example, it has been argued in opposition to Hutchins' view that Jefferson
would "regard as empty and meaningless the recurrent discussion of 'liberal'
versus 'vocational' education. "250
Abstract versus Concrete Knowledge
This is another dualism related to those above; it relates most clearly
to the debates about absolutism and the scientific method.
The sort of undue abstraction that John Dewey was objecting to can be
seen in Walter Torrey Harris's volume on educational psychology of 1898, which
was an attempt to "show the genesis of the higher faculties of the mind. "251
His argument was essentially that of Bagley, who owed much to Harris, namely
that the higher faculties absorb and transform the lower— "conception really
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transforms perception into a seeing of each object as a member of a class. "252
John Dewey's critique of this genre of psychology was symptomatic of
the general pragmatic and progressive argument, and it can most neatly be
studied in Dewey's review of Harris's new volume published in The Educational
Review of June, 1898. Dewey distinguished the "new, " scientific psychology
from Harris's more speculative, rational psychology, claiming that the former
is necessary for translating "the more or less vague, abstract and nominal
propositions of the latter into concrete and realizable form.
. .without
recourse to the technical terminology of transcendentalists. "253 q<he 0ider
psychology was too abstract
r
forthe "perception of merely general principles
remains comparatively barren and inert for practice. "254 Dewey struck
what is effectively a compromise when he concluded that what was needed were
the connecting links, "the intermediate terms lying between the formal, general
principles, and the specific details" and that this connection would "make the
former workable while it illuminates and emancipates the latter. 1,255 The
pedagogical consequence of Harris's view was lamentable, for Dewey claimed
that elementary education was moving away from such traditions and introducing
"positive, first-hand contact with the realities of experience, " as distinct
from the "mere symbols of knowledge. " 256
Barzun in turn commented that this criticism was reasonable,, and that
there was an unchanging core of agreement among, for example, Rabelais,
Montaigne, I ocke, Rousseau, Pestallozi, Froebel, James and Dewey, and
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that "the direction is always towards concrete reality, the world of things, from
the spontaneity dimmed by convention. " 257 Barzun's own hatred of
absolutism clearly put him in favor of a proper use of the concrete, though
his concern for proper principles has also been discussed. Adler’s critique
was a similar compromise, namely that while Dewey and the modernists
assert the exclusive validity of the scientific method, the "traditionalist
maintains that there are many valid methods of inquiry. "258 Joseph Wood
Krutch used the example of happiness, for instance, to argue that the
positivist cannot by his own epistemology even begin to consider happiness,
9CQ
for it "cannot be measured. "
William James examined an entertaining example, that of Jack’s love for
Jill, where the onlookers cannot understand. If one asked who had a better
view of the "absolute truth, " James replied that it is Jack, "for Jack realizes
Jill concretely, and we do not. " 260 Barzun may or may not have had this
passage in mind when he described a comparable scene in a train, where he
observed a girl who had eyes only for her very ordinary young man. Barzun
could not understand it, but the girl had "passion, " they had a priceless
possession, and why she chose him was "nobody’s business, not even hers. ”26*
This example was, in fact, preceded by a fascinating application of now
familiar principles to the subject of sexuality. Sexuality "got lost somewhere
on the scientific road of analysis and abstraction. " The Kinsey Report’s
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scientific approach to sex, counting ''outlets” and orgasms, has denied all
aspects of love except one and magnifies this one into an obsession: 'like
seeing human skin under a microscope”;263 this image of disgust must
almost certainly be a half-conscious echo 0f Gulliver's disgust when he first
encountered a giant's breast at close quarters; Barzun has a special sympathy
for Swift. Women have got lost under convention and make-up, and men have
to dig through layers of enamel "to find the woman inside the armadillo. "264
Man has thus selected one detail, abstracted and enlarged its importance, and
consequently "men and women who have lost one another in life cannot find
Looking half humorously into the future, Barzun
per
each other in bed. "
discerned that "sex having become a pure visual abstraction, modem science
will devise for it a simple gadget, which it is easy to imagine though a little
hard to describe. "266
Even A. J. Nock, an extreme intellectualist of the tradition, found time
to condemn false abstracts like "capitalism" when carelessly used: "No society
ever did or could exist without employing capital. " 267 Abraham Flexner
talked in the same breath about the "orderly development of laws and principles"
and "a sound predilection for the concrete as embodied in the environment
and experience of the child. "268
Demiashkevich,. while condemning the activity school vogue as extreme,
allowed that "manualism and intellectualism employ the same Procrustean
principle, " in that one? stretches the child and the other cuts him short, that
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both errors tried to build the school on the principle "idem cuique" instead
of on that of "suum cuique, " or "the same to each" instead of "his own to
each. "269 The same compromise appeared years later when he wrote that
"assuredly, a certain amount of first-hand experience is necessary, "270
but that the school should, "without violently pushing him, lead the educand
along the path of abstract learning. " Later still, at the risk him self of undue
abstraction, he contrasted the English mind with that of the French on just
these grounds. The English with their "impious skepticism" seemed to deny
the possibility of any theory, whereas the French had been obsessively
rationalistic ever since Descartes.2^
Arthur Bestor, while recognizing that few children begin by thinking
in abstracts, compromised thus: "Let the first grader, then, find out all he
can about the local fire-department and the choo-choo, " but this process "is
not to be repeated indefinitely. " All such study must lead on to the "disciplined
study of economics, political science, history, and ultimately philosophy. "272
Philip Phenix had a more sophisicated compromise to offer, based on
Whitehead's distinction between the "wood" and the "trees" of knowledge, where
the wood is the subject as a whole and the trees are particular instances chosen
to exemplify the whole. One can thus teach about the wood by means of the
trees, teach about the wood only, teach about the trees only, or teach about
the trees by means of the wood. Only the first and fourth of these possibilities
were acceptable, with a preference for the former. 2 ^3
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Work Versus Play
This is another apparent dichotomy where the essentialists arrange them-
selves on the golden mean; both work and play are vital, and the compromise
is especially clear in the concept of self-discipline, as distinct from discipline
or punishment.
There are those, first, who lean to the right on this matter. Demiashkevich
quoted Isocrates approvingly to the effect that "education is and shall remain
coercion, " 274 though elsewhere he was more moderate. Irving Babbitt was
angry that, thanks to the elective system of President Eliot, Harvard students
could now 'lounge through their college course along the line, of least resistance."275
W. C. Bagley had used the same phrase in 1911, when he talked of "present
tendencies ... towards ease and comfort and the lines of least resistance. " 2 ‘ 5
Herman Home, while stressing that a man can work too hard, generally
believed that pupils should be taught that the greatest strength was developed
"by doing what they do not like to do;"277he called this a form of "asceticism"
and invoked William James when he said "keep the faculty of effort alive in
you by a little gratuitous exercise every day. The paradoxical conclusion
was that "effort thus leads to interest. " Mortimer Smith claimed that
anyone who knows children knows that "they don’t like to work, "280 though
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he also admitted that in discipline teachers should "arrive at a moderate
middle view, " and that the progressive revolt against discipline was bom
largely in outrage at the "harshness of the older education.
. . .Unfortunately
this feeling became a hard-and-fast principle of pedagogy. "^1 g # g^udy
wrote that to master something a student must realize there is no short-cut,
must have a plan, and must do his homework. 282 Clifton Fadiman has written
starkly
: "We cannot afford pleasure. All education, Aristotle tells us, is
accompanied by pain. "‘i83Adler also invoked Aristotle on this point through the
intermediary of Robert Hutchins, who was "fond of Aristotle’s cryptic
observation that ’education is accompanied by pain. ’"284
Hutchins himself was more complex than this might suggest. He sounded
suspicious of the rhetoric: "The hard-work doctrine would seem to be a defense
mechanism set up to justify our failure to develop anything worth working on;" 285
and a similar thought appeared to be in his mind later: "Thought is hard work,
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but not all hard work is thought. "
Philip Phenix broadened the theme out into its social and political
implications, and discussed the twentieth century changing concept of work
at some length, as had Hutchins in the University of Utopia . Phenix
examined the compulsion to work under "the desire philosophy" which is
accompanied by "a basic devaluation of labor. "287 This separation of life
from work leads men to believe that civilization simply exists and will continue
to nurture man without his effort, and at this point Phenix quoted Ortega y
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Gasset's Revolt of the Masses , to the same effect. In chapter seven of
that book, called Noble Life and Common Life, Ortega y Gasset distinguished
from the masses those noble souls who were "active not merely reactive, for
whom life is a perpetual striving. " These, he concluded, "are the ascetics. "288
The argument was, of course, more complicated than this but equally extreme.
Nicholas Murray Butler had written much earlier that the purpose of
discipline "is to develop the power of self-discipline, " 289and related it to
the theory of democracy, for discipline is concerned with the problems of
reconciling 'liberty with order, progress with permanence, government with
justice. " 29° Jacques Barzua opposed "fooling" with "woik"; he acknowledged
that the former in the early years of school life may be an appropriate
"introduction to objects and ideas that might not engage a child's attention in
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any other way, " but eventually "make-believe turns into the exercises of
serious work. "292
Emerson had forshadowed this view with his argument from nature,
which "is a discipline. . . the exercise of the will, or the lesson of power,
is taught in every event, "2?3 and his anthropomorphic conclusion that "all
things are moral. " ^
Demiashkevich distinguishedbetween good and bad discipline, where
the latter seeks to treat the spirit, but the former is designed "to help the
student to form good moral habits, "299 and he quoted Bagley at and on this
point. Mark Van Doren expressed the compromise perhaps best of all:
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The reconciliation is through discipline
—another word
whose definition involves paradox. There is an inverted
romanticism about discipline which takes pleasure in
contemplating its pains, but its joys are what matter.
Discipline is desirable; indeed, it is craved by all who
want wisdom out of their experience, or ability out of
their acts. 296
W. W. Bnckman used an etymological argument to show that for Greeks and
Romans, who used the same word for leisure and for school ("schole" and
"ludus"), there was a "connection between education and leisure. "297
Theodore Brameld, however, has sought to destroy this compromise
by arguing that essentialist concepts of intellectual and moral discipline
merely serve to build "the cultural habits needed by efficient, obedient
workers, and that this follows from and endorses "essentialist acquiescence
in capitalist-industrialist society. " 29^
Ends versus Means
This is another perpetual debate, and one on which the essentialists are
less clearly identifiable than usual. Their great criticism of Dewey’s
pragmatism and much progressive education has been that pragmatism had
no identifiable ends, only a constant process of change, the means. As
Mortimer Smith put it, "in defining ends Dewey never seems to get beyond
such vague terms as ’desirable’ and 'satisfactory. ™299
Many essentialists argued that education is only the means to the good
life. Alfred Whitney Griswold has written that college is not an end in itself.
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,fbut the means to an end, the preparation for life, not the final experience, ”300
just as Hutchins has argued that education "is not a substitute for experience"
alone. - Barzun has argued that facts and knowledge should "remain means to
the good life and never usurp the place of ends. Indeed, Alexander
Meiklejohn has been criticized, perhaps rather unkindly, that he "dealt only
with policy and not with means, » and that he indulged in "romanticism
regarding the means of implementing those ends. The same flaw marked
his life as that which marks his thought. "302 Perhaps this "romanticism"
was a factor in his removal from the Presidency of Amherst College.
However, there is another strain in essentialist literature which
stresses the idea that the right means are ends in themselves, though
without denying that the right end is the good life, namely a meritocratic
democracy with high standards politically and epistemologically. Clifton
Fadiman has argued that the disciplines are sanctioned "not only by use
and wont but by their intrinsic value. "303 Mark Van Doren has claimed
that knowledge and skill "are ends in themselves, past which there is no
place for the person to go. "304 That this theme is closely linked with that
of liberal versus vocational education and of work versus play can be seen
by reverting to Phenix’s discussion of recreation, where he argued that
liberal education and "the allegedly useless classical education" are ,Tboth
dedicated to intrinsic worth. "3®3
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One possible resolution of this debate is in the ancient classical idea
of the end, and indeed means, of the contemplative life. This may be what
Hutchins meant by the end and means of education being "the intellectual love
of God. " It may be what Ortega y Gasset called "wonder, " which is "the
luxury special to the intellectual man. " 3° 7 it may be the end that Phenix
called "reverent devotion. " 308 it may be the natural beauties which gave
Emerson delight "in and for themselves. "309 ^ concept . g ^ something
of a paradox or mystery, and closely related to Keats’ famous identification
of truth with beauty. On the other hand, it is not far either from John
Dewey's concept of growth for its own sake.
Metaphysics: Idealism and Realism
It is sometimes popularly supposed that the difference between
essentialist and progressive education is that between idealism and realism.
The situation, however, is much more complex. The view here proposed is
that once again the essentialist is generally centralist and resists both
extreme materialism and extreme idealism, though he is on average a little
closer to the latter than to the former, or a little right of center.
Phenix has pointed out the dangers of using traditional nomenclature
in this area, and has argued that the problem is more complex than to decide
merely whether one is "a realist or an idealist. "310 J. S. Brubacher has it
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that essentialism has roots both in idealism and realism, 313- and Theodore
Brameld has concluded that "one basic characteristic of essentialism Is a wide
eclecticism" for it holds within its camp" both professed idealists and
professed realists. In both of these cases, Brameld dismissed the
essentialist as one whose search "for a given and uniform reality is a search
for a harbor of security, " and argued that this is only explicable in political
terms. S. I. Miller fastened on to Brameld's analysis but failed to do
more than to repeat it.
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The evidence for the idealistic strain is strong. Nicholas Murray
Butler, in an address of 1896, proclaimed that "the once-dreaded materialism
has lost all its terrors, " for science itself was explicable by seeing "energy
in terms of will, " for the "seemingly inert stone.
. . is in reality an aggregate
of an infinite number of rapidly moving centers of energy. "315 He concluded
that an idealism, "shorn of its crudities and extravagances, " such as that of
Kant or Hegel, was the final answer to materialism, and that "independent,
self-active being is the father of all things. "316 Similarly, W. T. Harris,
another enthusiastic Hegelian, wrote in 1898 of "the principle of self-activity,
which is invoked as the ultimate principle. "317 The same expression tellingly
recurred in Herman Home's argument that "the self-activity of man,
conditioning his education, is the clearest expression in the limits of time of
the immanent and transcendent self-activity of reality, "318 though Home
went further and identified this with what he called the Absolute, or God, who
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is the "self-conscious unity of all reality, " and he labelled this "the doctrine
of idealistic theism. " 319 That such an idealism recognizes "the place and
value of experimental thinking in the advancement of scientific knowledge"
he admitted later
.
320
A. J. Nock claimed that his idealism was but an aspiration, "a reverence
to a distant, high and unapproachable ideal ;" 321 and M. J. Demiashkevich
used this distinction between absolute idealism and functional ideas to analyze
the English and the French national mind. The English are apparently imbued
with the wisdom of the adage that "it is a malady of the soul to be in love with
impossible things;" and the "English bias is for utility. " 322 Students of
the French find for the latter that rationalism is the "key characteristic of
their national psychology, and that the resultant skepticism had produced
"a greater degree of mystical impoverishment.
. . than in England or
Germany. " France has suffered because "only through a sense of the
mystical transcendent can faithful leaders be brought up to serve the nation. " 324
Germany suffered Nazi conquest because the feeble liberalism of the time
"meant nothing more or less than skepticism, relativism and licentiousness,
individual and social" and was therefore easily overthrown . 323 hi each case
a balanced idealism was seen as lacking.
Alexander Meiklejohn addressed the same problem in his book What .
Does America Mean? He sought to identify the American ideal, and found
that Americans do not think easily in ideal terms: "Rather we shrink from
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them. We are realists. We believe more in facts than in longings. •'32
6
With constant reference back to Socrates, Jesus, Jefferson and others, he
examined the spirit of America, and found it damaged by materialism. So
idealistic was the language, indeed, that Meiklejohn felt obliged to add a
postscript to the book, further explaining his use "of the term Spirit in relation
to men and to nations ." 3??ife, he concluded, where ideals have been replaced
by a theory of mere needs' satisfaction was "nothing else than to take Hamlet
out of the human drama. "328 He claimed that William James, "especially in
his later, philosophic years.
. . was engaged in the same activity ,,as that
which Socrates and Jesus followed. " 329
William James discussed ideals at some length in his Talks to Teachers
on Psychology, but it was a moderate view of idealism tempered by
practicality: "Education is a means of multiplying our ideals" but ideals "taken
by themselves give no reality. " 330 This moderate view of idealism is the
dominant strain in essentialism.
The strain is clear, for instance, in Thomas Jefferson. It is clear in his
hard-headed deism, in his very practical life of morality and self-discipline,
in his balance of political idealism with realism, and his intense dislike of
Plato. The doctrines of "Jesus himself are within the comprehension of a
child; but thousands of volumes have not yet explained the Platonisms engrafted
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on them.
"
Ulich wrote of Jefferson as one with "a disinclination for
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metaphysics, ” 332 as one who lived by "an ethical humanism. " 333
That Emerson, despite his transcendental idealism, could also be
moderate in this area, has been argued above. Robert Ulich ranged Emerson
with "the type we may call Platonic;" 334 but Bararn has recaUed^
beside the Plato of the Idealistic absolutism of The Republic there is also
the more moderate realist of The Laws
.
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The most sophisicated and probably the most useful discussion of this
issue is Mortimer Adler's JSt, Thomas and the fienttW indeed this could
be the central apologia for essentialist moderation. He examined the modem,
though age-old, heresies of "materialism or idealism, empiricism or
rationalism, naturalism or absolutism" and concluded that "all of these
’isms’ are to be understood as extremes, containing some truth, but false
through failure to possess the truth which is also contained in the opposite
extreme. " Thus the whole truth lies "between them in the eminent mean,
which is a synthesis of, not a compromise between, their partial, hence
inadequate, insights. " The true course is to proceed by "salvaging from
the extremes all that could be embraced in moderation and thus rectified. "336
St. Thomas' great contribution is that he is the moderate who sought to
resolve Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle had begun this process by holding to
the truths he learned from Plato "while at the same time correcting their
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excesses and supplementing their lack. " Adler summarized thus:
"Platonism and Aristotelianism can be regarded as extremes, extremes of
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idealism and realism, of theologism and naturalism, which are properly
mediated by St. Thomas by virtue of his being at once a better theologian than
Plato and as much of a natural philosopher as Aristotle. ”338
Barzun, as already argued, took this moderate line in discussing reality,
which he described as "a kind of convention;”339 he declared his indebtedness
to James, who is "among those who reject subjectivism equally with material
causation. ”340 His target was neither "the systematic materialist or idealist"
who both attempt wrongly to "reduce all observable phenomena to one or the
other of these two causes—matter and idea. " 341
William James, in an essay labelled 'What Makes, a Life Significant?"
proposed this same balance between ideals and reals: "The ideals taken by
themselves give no reality. " J42 jje continued amusingly:
Your college professor, with a starched shirt and
spectacles, would, if a stock of ideas were all alone
by itself enough to render a life significant, be the
most absolutely or deeply significant of men. . . .
Ideal aspirations are not enough, when uncombined
with pluck and will. But neither are pluck and will,
. . . when taken all alone. There must be some
sort of fusion, some chemical combination among
these principles, for a life objectively and thoroughly
significant to result.343
His conclusion was strikingly unlike that of a good pragmatist: "Those
philosophers are right who contend that the world is a standing thing, with no
progress, no real history. The changing conditions of history touch only the
surface of the show. The voice could be that of Adler or Hutchins, Home
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or Demiashkevich, even in their less moderate moments.
The two essentialists most usually described as realists are Harry
Broudy and Frederick Breed. 345 Broudy described Us classical reallsm^
realism, because it accepts as regulative principles
the idea of a truth independent of the knower, and the
idea of structures in the universe, man and society
that are normative for man’s striving toward the good
life and for the education that will help him achieve it;
classical, because the fundamental notions about the
structure of human personality, its goals, and its
destiny are adaptations of the theories of Plato and
Aristotle. 46
Philip Phenix conveniently reduced thirteen educational positions to two,
namely what he called Experimentalism and Classical Realism, in his collection
of essays, based on a series of educational television programs, by various
authors. The contributor on the nature of classical realism was Broudy.
Phenix’s differentiation of the two fundamental positions is worth full quotation,
for it lies at the heart of the essentialist argument:
Experimentalism, concerned with the modem and the
changing, is closely related to education for life ad-
justment, for psychological maturity, for cultural
reconstruction, and for freedom—classical realism,
more concerned with established tradition, is closely
. i
related to education for intellectual discipline, for
moral character, for cultural conservatism, and for
national survival, as well as to the thuee major
American religious philosophies of education.
. .
Classical realism stems from ancient Greece,
chiefly from Plato and Aristotle. It formed the
basis for the great medieval systems of thought
which culininated in that of Thomas Aquinas. It has
come down to the present day in important segments of
the literary, philosophic and scientific movements.
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Classical realism, in other words, is indistinguishable from
essentialism. Phenix implicitly allied himself with this viewpoint. Bestor,
Broudy and Kirk did the same in that volume.
The terminology is, of course, confusing. Brubacher used the
categories of pragmatic naturalism, reconstructionism, romantic naturalism,
existentialism, linguistic analysis, idealism, realism, rational humanism,
scholastic realism, fascism, communism, and democracy. F. S. Breed used
the categories instrumentalism, idealism, realism and scholasticism.
Brameld confusingly subdivided essentialism and perennialism. Phenix
implied but two categories, as does this dissertation.
Frederick Breed’s most read contribution is an article entitled "The
Realistic Outlook" in the forty first yearbook of the National Society for the
Study of Education. Breed invoked Bestor and Rousseau and Whitehead to the
effect that "we regard philosophy as continuous with science, not separate
therefrom. " He found that William James, '*though a doughty champion
of pragmatism to the end, also continued to play with the idea of remaining
a realist as well. The principle that unifies realists "is known in brief
as the principle of independence.
. . Can anything exist independent of our
knowledge process?. . . The answer will be in the affirmative. "350
Progressive educators are more likely to regard independent facts as "prior
creations of the mil d of man. • • • Objects once built up from problematic
beginnings are subject later to the rapid rehabilitation of habit.
"
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Instrumentalism is solipsistic and flouts "t)ie intentions of common sense. "352
Paradoxically, the realist has "more respect than the instrumentalist for the
truths of science. "353 Breed appK)ved of a „sane progresslvigm „ when u
avoided either-or arguments and assumed "the both-and attitude" and made
the issue "one of emphasis or degree, rather than of kind. "354 Relying heavily
on Whitehead, he argued that "content" was ultimately "found in the form of
activity "in the patterns of vibration which made up content, that is both
matter and indeed the process of perception by which man realizes matter.355
He denied the popular association of realism with materialism. Of Dewey's
overzealous followers he was especially scornful: ",
. .
yet Dewey is to a degree
responsible, even if somewhat misinterpreted through exaggeration. M 3^6
Progressives are inadequate in their selection and organization of subject
matter for study, and are there opposed by essentialists.357 William James
he commended for doing battle with "the fearsome Goliath of absolute idealism. "358
Of Mortimer Adler he was both critical and approving, as one might expect:
"Forget his scholasticism, his supematuralism, and he still remains a prophet
of the disaster that will overtake a divisive individualism, a flabby liberalism,
and an impotent skepticism. " 35^ jje summe(j Up essentialist objections to
"the progressive extremists" in more than usually formal language:
The battle.
. . is between those whose criterion of
truth is the satisfaction of man and those whose criterion
includes also the satisfaction of fact; between the champions
of education as the creation of environment and the
champions of education as adjustment to environment;
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between advocates of a morality sanctioned by the
natural propensities of the individual and advocates
of a morality that in addition is sanctioned by the
°f a S
ff"
existent social world
; between thosewhose theory of freedom ignores the necessity of .
ex rnal restraints and those who foresee disasterm ignormg such restraint; between believers in an
education determined alone by the inner tensions of
a personality and believers in outer as well as inner
integration.360
Bagley was, of course, a classic case, as has been argued ear her, of
one who strove to relate his scientific and realistic outlook to a conventional
set of ideals. He was much influenced on the one hand by Hegel through
W. T. Harris, and on the other by his own search for objective, scientific
principle. His own compromise, in the form of "emergent idealism, " and
his differences with the idealism of Demiashkevich, have been described.
J. B. Conant sought a similar compromise when discussin g the idea and
the practice of democracy; speaking of America he claimed: "Our unique
contribution is not in abstract thought.
. . it is rather in a demonstration
that a certain type of society long dreamed of by idealists can be closely
approached in reality. ”361
David Riesman believed that "one must live on two levels, that of
practical reform and that of utopian vision, " and activity on the one "may
accompany temporary defeat on the other. "362
Clifton Fadiman found a similar compromise on the nature of man,
which is neither purely animal nor purely rational, but rather "man’s nature
is both animal and rational, " he argued. 363
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Gilbert Highet took refuge, understandably, in the idea of mystery at this
mystery, " and we were not intended "only to diagnose
to wonder. "364
and calculate, but also
in short, the essentialist metaphysic generally steers between materialism
on one hand and extreme idealism on the other. It seems to represent the
iconoclastic good sense of one like H. L. Mencken who could write : "An
idealist is one who, on noticing that a rose smells better than a cabbage,
c oncludes that it will also make better soup. " 365
_Naturalism versus Supematuralism
This is a cognate dimension to that above, and shows the same distribution
of views, that is, generally moderate but skewed to the right; there are no
doctrinaire atheists,just as there are no clear materialists. It has been
implicitly discussed in much of the above.
Furthest to the right in general are the various idealists. Horace Maim
wrote of education as "the universal diffusion and ultimate triumph of all-
glorious Christianity. "366 Home md Demiashkevich referred education to God;
the latter, for instance, proclaimed that "doubtless religion will survive the
agnostic instrumentalism of Dewey" and that religion alone provided the
ultimate certainty which neither science nor philosophy can supply. "367
Russell Kirk’s central thesis was that America and the West were suffering
from normative decay. The three norms of this "common patrimony" were "the
theory and practice of ordered liberty.
. . an intellectual community in the
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great works of literature.
.. and the Christian faith, including its origins in
Judah and Israel. ”3°8
Of the essentialists established in the tradition here discussed, few are
dogmatic about their faith. The most orthodox is, of course, not an American,
though read by all, namely Jacques Maritain, whose views can be most succinctly
found in the fifty-fourth yearbook of the National Society for the Study of
Education, in an article called "Thomist Views on Education.” It is a
conventional rehearsal of the Catholic viewpoint. He rejected pragmatism but
agreed with many of the practices of progressive educators; it was a matter of
"relative emphasis. ”369 A similar article in an earlier yearbook by William
McGucken, an American but not a prominent essentialist, criticized the
intermediate position of such essentialists as Hutchins:
Until the nineteenth century, all education was religious
and God-centered, if we except the brief interlude of
the Encyclopedists and the French Revolution, which had
little immediate influence on school practice. President
Hutchins says that modern man.
. . is obliged to go to
metaphysics to draw education out of its disorder and
chaos. Yet Mr. Hutchins knows very well that meta-
physics necessarily deals with the existence and nature of
God. With the metaphysical principles of which President
Hutchins speaks—which Professor Adler has clearly
enunciated —the Catholic will readily concur. His
only difficulty is that they do not go far enough. 370
In other words, Hutchins and others are not sufficiently orthodox or
theocentric. An excellent example of orthodox Catholic criticism of
essentialists is James Brown’s dissertation, published as a book in 1940
by the Catholic University of America Press. In particular he found Bagley
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lacking any concept of man's divine purpose, and castigated him for "the
sentimentalist doctrine that in man there exists a state of perfect haimony. " 371
Brown's critique of Home is yet more revealing. He dismissed Home's claim
to be a Christian, and rejected his "idealistic theism. " He argued: "hi spite
of Home s repeated emphasis upon the personal nature of the Deity, he
actually seems to make no distinction.
. . between God and creature, thereby
falling into pantheism. " His sectarian bias was revealed when he wrote:
Home, it is true, professes Christianity, being
according to Who's Who a member of the Presbyterian
Church. However, it seems to be not an uncommon
phenomenon in contemporary liberal Protestantism
that a sincere profession of Christian monotheism
involves a somewhat pantheistic conception of God. 372
One of the few orthodox Christians among contemporary essentialists
is Philip Phenix. This is implicit throughout his work, and has been discussed
earlier. His Education and the Common Good , for example, was written to
show that "democratic life should be conceived not as an enterprise of
autonomous men" but rather as a way of "realizing the will of Heaven. "
Its theoretical base is largely that of Paul Tillich. 373
Most essentialists are less orthodox; they are seldom atheists, but they
embrace such intermediate positions as deism, humanism and skepticism,
Thomas Jefferson has been discussed in this respect and supporting
quotation provided. One might simply add Gordon Lee's comment that it may
be fairer to speak of Jefferson as a "deistic humanist" than as a Christian.374
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For the University of Virginia Jefferson proposed no professor of divinity
lest there be sectarian strife; instead he proposed that "the proofs of the
betng of a God.
. . will be in the province of the professor of ethics. "375
Emerson's rejection of conventional Christian dogma is too well known
to need elaboration. The resulting mixture of Deism, idealism, high moral
tone, concern for American culture and scholarship, intimate acquaintance with
European romantic idealists, transcendentalism, New England parochialism
and a gnomic prose style, make Emerson a highly congenial essentialist role
model.
Emerson's enthusiasm for Emanuel Swedenborg is typical and
portentous.. He wrote of him that ”he endeavors to engraft a purely philosophical
Ethic on the popular Christianity of his time. "376 This is ae rii1omn, a
facing all those essentialists who seek the middle ground or mean between
orthodox faith and atheism.
It is also significant how many essentialists are either lay churchmen
or ministers. Albert Jay Nock was, like Emerson, a clergyman who resigned,
and the son of a clergyman to boot. His own later position of doubt is finely
analyzed in his autobiography, though • it is a peaceful doubt; he found
Arnold s account of religion as "morality touched by emotion" in literature
and Dogma very satisfying. He imagined God as "immensely tickled by the
capers of his pretentious little creatures here below. " 377He concluded that
his own religious persuasions were "most imperfect and must always be so. "
378
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He found no evidence that "Jesus laid down any basic doctrine beyond that of
a universal loving God and a universal brotherhood of man. " 3^
He thought Christianity had been vitiated by political ambition, such as
that of Constantine, and by dogmatic complication, as in the case of St. Paul.
He attributed to Paul the creation of dichotomous man, both divine and
bestial, with its train of guilt, penance and persecution. His preferred
alternative is a post- Freudian plea: "Don’t try to repress the bestial side.
. .
put all your work on the positive side, and you can afford to let the bestial side
O O A
take its chances. " His viewpoint thus minimized the doctrine of sin
and forgiveness, as had Jefferson’s and Emerson’s. Robert Ulich says of
Emerson that such doctrines were "alien to his more Apollonian nature. ”381
Canon Bernard Iddings Bell, though more orthodox, was highly critical
of the church throughout history, and provided an interesting analysis of the
state of the faith at various periods, in the Roman World, the middle ages, the
renaissance and thereafter. 382 His analysis of humanism threw light on many
essentialists
:
On examination a humanist usually turns out to be
either one who has degenerated from religion because
he has found the search for God too mentally exacting
or too emotionally exhausting, or else one who has
perceived the inadequacy of things but has not had
enough practice in living to discover that human
companionships are also insufficient. The humanist
is not likely to stop at humanism. He is almost sure,
if he is intelligent, to gravitate either toward scientific
mechanism, negation of purpose, essential hopelessness,
or else toward theism . 3® 3
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This is an excellent analysis of the middle ground on which many essentialists
stand and the ground further left which they try to avoid.
Alexander Meiklejohn tackled this same problem. For him the special
importance of Rousseau was that he first suggested the possibility that "we
modems can create a nontheological civilization which can carry on the work
of morality and intelligence. ”384 it is a classic and powerful statement of the
humanist case. It takes courage and honesty to discard a faith on which one's
civilization has been built; to accept only that of which one has proof is to
"have a principle to whose authority one submits one’s thinking. " 383 if
does not exist, the myths by which man has lived must have been man's own
creation, and "this means that in the lineaments of the God whom he has
imagined, man can discover his own features. "386
Barzun revealed his struggles with similar issues in an essay entitled
"Policeman Within. " He is no orthodox Christian, but "I consider myself a
religious man. " He concluded, faithful to his belief in diversity, "that
there does not exist a single creed which a religious temperament educated
in science, art and democracy can accept. "387 He quoted Cardinal Newman
with approval on the vision which "inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound
ooo
mystery, which is absolutely beyond solution. " Barzun's own choice was
distinctly humanist: "Worshiping the divine in man and in nature is not self-
worship; it makes one humble, not arrogant. "389 great difference comes
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down to whether "one takes the moral and materia! universe as finished
£inished."390 H the latter> ,.then the ^me
or un-
is not one and absolute but scattered
and emergent. ” 391 Barzun believed in revelation, but it is the continuous
revelation of civilization. Modern seers in the tradition of civilization refine
and extend those who went before: "To particularize from among the authors
of modem scripture, I find four most persuasive because most revelatory-
Blake, Nietzsche, William James and Bernard Shaw.”392
It has been said of Irving Babbitt that "although he believed in a
humanist higher will, he admitted that it might also have a supernatural
basis;" and this may explain the interest Roman Catholic writers have taken
in him. 393
The importance, and the ambiguity, of both Adler and his presidential
fnend Hutchins, is that they appear to identify metaphysics with theology.
The personal faith of either is concealed; what appears is a powerful deism;
this, as argued above, was not enough to achieve Catholic orthodoxy. They
didn’t go far enough. Hutchins, for example, exhibited this fusion, some would
say confusion, when he talked of "what used to be called ’the intellectual love
of God', what we now call ’.the pursuit of truth for its own sake. '"394 Both
his thinking and his style are clear in the following argument: "The aim of
higher education is wisdom. Wisdom is knowledge of principle and causes.
Metaphysic s deals with the highest principles and causes. Therefore meta-
physics is the highest wisdom. "395 Again this is the great humanist argument:
18,1
If we cannot appeal to theology, we must turn to metaphysics. Without
theology or metaphysics a unified university cannot exist Adler's
similar arguments have been discussed earlier.
More unashamedly humanists are Marie Van Doren, Gilbert Highet,
Joseph Wood Krutch and W. C. Bagley. Van Doren has again argued from
mystery: 'Religion is the art that teaches us what to do with our ignorance.
"
It may provide no final answers for the humanist but may "dignify" with ritual.
The worm does not confess the inferiority of its knowledge," whereas man
"can do so, and has erected the act into an art. " 397 He invoked Pascal's
Pensees, which will bring men as near to religion "as they can come
without revelation . 1,393
Gilbert Highet relied instead on Ernest Renan to exemplify this same
combination of mystery with profound skepticism, as discussed earlier.
Renan had an "affection for Jesus, which refused to be transformed into
Adoration . 1,399
Joseph Wood Krutch shared the humanist and literary world of Van
Doren and Highet, but, as a well-known ecologist, also shared the more
scientific bent of Bagley. His own compromise was faith in "Wildness or
in Nature. . . it puts our trust not in human intelligence but in whatever
is that created human intelligence. " It was "a modem version of ancient
400pantheism.
"
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Bagley's own refusal to accept Demiashkevich's supematuralism has
been discussed above. Sufficient to recapitulate might be his claim for his
concept of "emergent idealism" that it allows him to be both naturalist and
idealist "without bringing in a metaphysical element of any sort, without
committing ourselves to supematuralism. "401
It is clear why in the greater tradition there is so much enthusiasm
for such thoughtful skeptics as Pascal, Rabelais and Montaigne* They too
stood on this middle ground.
Values versus Lack of Values
This last related dimension is again similar to those above and shows
the same pattern of distribution. Some essentialists appear to have absolute
value systems, whereas most are relativists or moderates. Much of the
evidence is implicit above.
The Christians, and especially the Catholics reveal the clearest
values. A good example is Philip Phenix, for instance in his Philosophy of
Education, which is a sophisticated Christian apologetic: "If values have
their sanction in God, there are resources and judgments for education which
lie beyond individuals, groups and perhaps even beyond human rationality, " 4:02
The two-fold answer for Phenix was love and holiness.
Nicholas Murray Butler found his moral value in the idea of will, "the
only energy of whose direct action we are immediately conscious, " 403 though
he was careful to separate religion from moral values ; he did not accept
Arnold's view that "religion is ethics heightened. "404
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Demiashkevich identified essentialists with Socrates' critique of the
Sophists. Sophists and pragmatists preached that there were no real moral
-ues; Socrates and the essenHalists preached
"permanent, hanging, moral
values. "405 Elsewhere he has written: "The cal, of today.
.. is service
for the good of the whole. It is a good old-fashioned call with a Christian ring
... not primarily for sympathy, but for restraint, for law, for obedience
for duty. "406
and
Home combined Platonism, Kant and ChrisUanity:
"Plato showed that
the idea of the good is the principle of existence, and to "some thinkers,
notably Kant, a good will is the only thing of absolute value in the world. "408
His criticism of Dewey's pragmatism is that it "leads man to rely exclusively
on himself for his social progress. "409
Kandel had the identical objection to pragmatism which "rejects any
predetermined, finite body of doctrines, " in a book suggestively titled
The Cult of Uncertainty.^^
Thomas Jefferson was, however, more typical of essentialists because
less absolute about moral values. His reasons for virtuous behavior, in the
absence of any God, were "the comfort and pleasantness you feel in its
exercise, and the love of others which it will procure for you. "411 m a
phrase reminiscent of Bagley he wrote that education "controls, by the force
of habit, any innate obliquities inour moral organization. "412 Bagley> as
argued above, combined a vigorous moral idealism with a naturalistic meta-
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physic; emergent idealism, inculcated through the formation of good habits,
could be the moral formula of either Jefferson or Bagley.
William James was far from Dewey's position. He laid great emphasis
on the will in his Talks to Teachers
, described life as "shot through with
values and meanings, "413 and frankly disclaimed that he was any sort of
materialist: "In no sense do 1 count myself a materialist. "414 He too
was at neither extreme.
Robert Ulich struck a characteristic note when he argued that a rewarding
life was one, not only of freedom, but "of discipline, duty and self-renunciation. ”415
Robert Hutchins saw civilization as "the deliberate pursuit of a common ideal, "416
and argued that "an educational system without values is a contradiction in
terms ;"417 pragmatism is such a system, he would argue. Walter Lippmann,
talking of Sir Winston Churchill, has said "the springs of greatness lie in the
conviction that one must serve the truth and not opinion. "418 Alexander
Meikle.john’s What Does America Mean? is nothing more nor less than a
plea for American moral values, and his Education Between Two Worlds
suggests how to reach them without resorting to absolutes or to revelation.
Gilbert Highet, though generally more skeptical than most, agreed that "some
values must be postulated. Poetry is better than pinball. "419 ^
Brickman’s regular editorials for School and Society are full of ethical
analysis and injunctions: ,fWe can see the withering away of man if the
standards of interpersonal ethics are allowed to erode. Hope for man
185
remains in education toward moral and ethical commitment and conduct. " 420
H. S. Broudy, in a chapter titled "Education and Values, " concluded that
"the ultimate aim of education is to establish tendencies to choose ." 421
The danger of the extreme wing represented by Dewey, essentialists
argue, is that there can then be no justification for values. This argument
has been amply demonstrated above; one final example may suffice. Mortimer
Adler accused Dewey of assuming a "continuity between value and fact, "422
thereby denying the fact of value, thanks to a false view of the philosophy
of science.
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POLITICS
Nothing is fraught with graver danger than the increasing
disposition to regard our social and economic order--
whether communism, individualism or fascism—as
always the best and the other as the incarnation of all
that is evil. It is just such absolute attitudes.
. . that
lead sooner or later to war. "
W. C. Bagley
Civilization and the Theory of Culture
Essentialist political beliefs are related to their philosophical
beliefs. Their theory of culture or of progressive civilization depends
ultimately upon epistemological grounds, in that knowledge and its history
are responsible for civilization in the essentialist view.
Nicholas Murray Butler wrote that culture is identical with the
Greek concept of paideia or the Roman concept humanitas in
either case the epistemological roots of culture are clear. Irving Babbitt
linked metaphysical concepts with culture when he wrote: MTb repudiate the
traditional Christian and classical checks. . . is to be guilty of high treason
2
to civilization. M A. J. Nock has said that his principal concern was the
quality of civilization in the United States. Bagley equated experience
and education with culture: "The essentialists have always emphasized the
prime significance of race-experience and especially of organized experience
4
or organized culture—in common parlance, subject-matter, " and argued
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that 'language is the most efficient medium for the transmission of
experience. " 5 This idea was repeated in a recent work by Barzun and
others: "The world of books is the most remarkable creation of man. Nothing
else he builds ever lasts." 6 An extreme view was Meiklejohn’s that
the purpose of teaching is "to express the cultural authority of the group
by which the teaching is given. "
7
Barzun has specifically made the same
link: "Democracy is a culture—that is, the deliberate cultivation of an
intellectual passion in people with intellects and feelings. " 8 Elsewhere
he described the American spirit as compounded of three philosophies, namely
the eighteenth century enlightenment view of progress toward social reason,
the Romanticist view of man's diversity, and the "native tradition" of deafness
to doctrine. Arthur Bestor has argued that intellectual training is central
to a healthy culture though not enough without a value system. 10 w. T. Harris
wrote that education could only be "wisely administered.
. . from the high
ground of the spirit of civilization"11 and went on, like Bagley and shortly
before him, to talk of the civilization of "the race. "
Parallel with this theme is the fear that culture today is literally
not what it was. Barzun has written of "signs of a turning point in civilization.
The high Renaissance ideas on which we have lived for five hundred years
have lost their power and we drift. We shall do so until the collective mind
is emptied of dogmas and slogans and turns once again to the actualities of
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teaching and the plain limits of schooling. Then some of the principles found
in the perennial philosophy of the old reformers will regain their place of
honor, after being restated by some crusading genius and being hailed as
great new discoveries. " 12 Mortimer Adler quoted Gordon Dupee of the Great
Books Foundation "that our culture is a culture of blood, guts, gastronomy
and a little God. " 13 Bernard Iddings Bell talked of the "beast-men" of his
generation who appeared determined "permanently to unhitch man's wagon from
the stars, " echoing Emerson. All shared, and many quoted, Ortega y
Gassett's analysis that the rise of the "mass-men" has threatened to "send our
continent back to barbarism. "15 I. L. Kandel attacked pragmatism as the
"cult of change, precariousness, and uncertainty" which expressed a "contempt
for culture as concerned only with the past." This theme is especially popular, for
many essentialists have been historians of one sort or another. Many at this
juncture in the argument included Matthew Arnold, both for his humanized
Christianity and more for his analysis of culture. Kandel discussed his
definition of culture at this point, namely that "culture is a knowledge of the
best that has been said and thought in the past .
"
16 Both A. J. Nock and
Irving Babbitt held modified versions of Arnold's view of cultured man as the
"remnant" in an uncultured horde.
Philip Phenix’ analysis was, as usual, particularly penetrating, and
conveniently linked the theme of cultural crisis with some typical essentialist
factors; to the crisis, he argued, there were "four possible lines of resolution."
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The first of these is "to retreat into pure individualism.
. . affirming the
essential autonomy of the solitary person. " The second is the "creation of a
monolithic universal culture.
. . . The preferred goal of utopian world
planners. " The third system is to "create a system of cooperating cultures. "
The final possibility and the most promising, he proposed, is "the emergence
of a single pluralistic world society. " ^ The first two. of these represent
the two absolute wings that essentialists generally seek to avoid. The third
represents the compromise most seek. The last representa a theme that a
small number have discussed, namely world government with individuality
nontheless preserved. It is remarkable that there appears to be only one
reference to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The Phenomenon of Man , whose
view is the natural apotheosis of much essentialist argument; it is less
remarkable that it is Phenix who makes that reference.
These twin themes of the importance of culture and the imminence of
its collapse run throughout the essentialist analysis and could be much further
documented, at the risk of undue repetition. Almost more important than tins
product is the process of its transmission; the essentialist answer is here to
rely unequivocally on the concept of a Jeffersonian democracy.
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Jeffersonian Democracy
' The founding father of essentialist political theory is Thomas
Jefferson. He is invariably discussed and invariably approved in essentialist
literature; and several have written books on him, including A. J. Nock.
J. B. Conant and Howard Mumford Jones
.
18
Jefferson’s educational view was fundamentally political and moral,
with less regard for epistemological or psychological niceties. He was
vigorously anti-absolutist, and the Declaration of Independence decries
"absolute Despotism. " He relied instead on "the education of the common
people. " The answer, even to "error of opinion, " is that state where
reason is left free to combat it. From the common people there was to
be selected, very much as in Plato’s Republic , those "whom nature hath
endowed with genius and virtue, " who shall be "rendered by liberal education"
fit to "guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow
21
citizens. " To achieve this, Jefferson proposed a system of free public
education for boys and girls who could not otherwise afford it, to be organized
locally, much as it now is. The system was designed to be increasingly
selective; examination at various stages would weed out all but the most able.
This vigorously meritocratic, though at the time most generous, procedure
would be such that "by these means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked
from the rubbish annually;" 22 and it is this phrase which has especially
delighted and astonished essentialists over the generations. Most glory in
211
it, while a few make mild excuses. These geniuses "nature has sown as
liberally among the poor as the rich. 1,23 His conclusion was:
That form of government is best, which provides
the most effectually for a pure selection of these
natural aristoi into the offices of government.^
Together with these major essentialist doctrines, Jefferson also included
a suspicion, of central government, a desire for local initiative, a preference
for small scale and independent farming, a distrust of even limited
industrialization, a happy balance of classical education with a grasp of
practical affairs, and a passion for hard work. It is a powerful but
puritanical doctrine. A characteristic letter to his daughter of March 28,
1787, is harshly loving:
You know what have been my fears for some time
past; that you do not employ yourself as closely as
I would wish. . . of all the cankers of human
happiness, none corrodes it with so silent, yet
so baneful a tooth, as indolence. ... No laborious
person was ever yet hysterical. ... If at any
moment, my dear, you catch yourself in idleness,
start from it as you would from the precipice of a
gulph.
. . . I do not like your saying that you are
unable to read the ancient print of your Livy. . .
It is a part of the American character to consider
nothing as desperate.
. .
25
The only moment at which Jefferson is seen to have feet of clay,
arguably, is at the point when he sought to prescribe the political texts for
students at the University of Virginia. Jefferson and the Board of Visitors,
talking of political views, decided that "none shall be inculcated which are
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incompatible with those on which the Constitution of this State, and of
the United States,were genuinely based, in the common opinion"26 and
made specific suggestions instead. Gordon Lee has argued of this that "some
will argue that here Jefferson woefully contradicted himself. But others
will see in this a measure essential to the very survival of the democratic
27way. Arthur Bestor, in a very scholarly analysis of Three Presidents
andJEheir Books
» conduded on this issue that "the partisan aspects of the
University action have been over-emphasized in most discussion. Only one
of the six documents in the list.
. . reflected in any way the strictly party
position of Jefferson and Madison. " 28 Robert Hutchins found that he could
hot thus condone Jefferson’s action, but concluded that it "must be regarded
as the hasty act or momentary lapse of a politician bearing the scars of
heavy fighting. ” 29
Liberal Democracy versus Fascism and Communism
The more recent heir of Jeffersonian democracy is, for essentialists,
their concept of liberal democracy. The simpler term democracy is generally
used, but it has to be distinguished generally from its perversions, the absolute
democracies of left and right, communism and fascism.
As usual, essentialists see themselves as holding the high middle
ground against absolutes on both sides, though there is some ground for
arguing that they appear often slightly right of center. Sidney Hook so accused
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Alexander Meiklejohn, whose views of cultural authority have already been
examined. Hook feared the "abuse of delegated power and usurpation
of authority » in Meiklejohn's ideal government. 30 However. Meiklejohn
was atypical in this respect, and few have argued as he. Meiklejohn, of
course, anticipated and dealt with this criticism before it was voiced, and
argued that his balance and Rousseau's between the individual and society was
indeed a bulwark against fascism and totalitarianism. 31
More typically, A. J. Nock argued that "the antithesis of democracy
is absolutism; and absolutism may, and notoriously does, prevail under a
republican regime as under any other. " 32 Wey argued that "democratic
societies cannot survive either competition or conflict with totalitarian states"
unless there is a "democratic discipline" that will give strength and solidarity
to the democratic ideal.33 I. L. Kandel wrote a powerful indictment
of national socialism in 1935 and its "cult of absolutism, authoritarianism,
and the will to power, "34 though his friend Bagley was less prescient
on this subject (page 81 above). J. B. Conant wrote that "conversatives
and radicals alike join in repudiating the totalitarian notion that the State as
such is a mystic entity to be worshipped or a transcending force to direct the
lives of ourselves or of our children. " 35 A. W. Griswold wrote of
the "growth of the state throughout the world" and of the "tide of totalitarian
dictatorships" which were obvious "first in Russia, then in Italy and Germany,
then receding from Western Europe but spreading into China. "
3 ^
The
three revolutions most commonly examined ln the ^
the French, and the Russian; whole-hearted appeal is reserved for only one
of these. One of the more sophisticated analyses was Robert Hutchins' passage on
"The Totalitarian Exception" in 1968 37 Barzun found the same cancer
of totalitarianism in "Russia, Spain, China, Italy, Germany, India, Africa. "80
Admiral Kickover spear-headed the most direct attack on totalitarianism
hi his published fears of fttssian military and technological dominance: "We
are engaged in a grim duel
. . . Democracies move slower than totalitarian
dictatorships. "39
The center position is, instead, liberal meritocratic democracy,
and this is at the heart of much essentialist rhetoric. The arguments generally
repeat one another, so the order of presentation is unimportant. There follows
a mere selection of illustrative material, which may serve to deny Brameld's
accusation that both essentialists and perennialists are subversive of
democracy. 40
Howard Mumford Jones, for instance, has argued of Emerson that
'like Jefferson he thought there was a natural aristocracy of genius and
virtue. "41 Yet he has claimed that, for Emerson, Napoleon haunted the
imagination, to the way Hitler later did for others, as a problematic child of
democracy.42 Emerson described Napoleon as "the incarnate Democrat"
for he was the idol of common men, as he had "in transcendent degree the
qualities and powers of common men, "43 one of which is envy. Napoleon,
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in short, furnished Emerson with that typically essentialist caution of
democracy, that it may be too common. Joseph Wood Krutch addressed this
problem in his half humorous essay, "Is Our Common Man Too Common ?" 44
Mencken was more humorous and less forgiving when he exaggerated this
fear to write "adultery is the application of democracy to love, "45 and to
suggest that democracy, like puritanism, depends on the envy of little men
.
46
Elsewhere Mumford Jones has invoked Ortega y Gassett and proposed as a
major problem of American higher education its "multitudinousness. "47
If Mumford Jones appears a little right of center, A. J. Nock
appears at times a little left thereof, and at times further right. For instance,
he resented the untutored mass, and claimed that "the popular idea of democracy
is animated by a very strong resentment of superiority. ”48 Qn the other
hand his violent hatred of government and statism earned him the title of
'latter-day spokesman for an American tradition of anarchist elitism, " 4^
a peculiarly essentialist hybrid. His vigorous preference for Jefferson over
Jackson is abundantly clear in his autobiography
.
50
A favorite source for recent essentialists has been Walter Lippmann,
who shares this concern for how democratic power may be shared: "The
fundamental question is how the formless power of the masses shall be
organized, represented and led. His is a more moderate view of Ortega y
Gassett’s fear of "the political domination of the masses. " 52 Despite his
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apparent extremism, however, Ortega y Gassett purported to take the central
position and averred that no one has ever ruled "essentially on any other
thing than public opinion;" 53 and he opposed "Bolshevism and Fascism" as
the "two clear examples of essential retrogression. "54
Bagley's veiy open-minded view has been discussed above: "It
seems clear that communism or individualism or fascism may be best according
to the situation that confronts a society. "
55
His colleague Demiashkevich
wrote that "the political ideal of the essentialists is in the direction of liberal-
individualist democracy of the type embodied in the American Constitution.
H. H. Home, another idealist, criticized Dewey’s naturalistic
vision . of democracy and proposed a supernatural vision in its place:
"Democracy is a grand ideal. It lacks and, in the judgment of many, it
57
needs the dynamic of a belief in God who works with man, " At
the same moment he allowed that "a democratized society is similar to but
not identical with the religious conception of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. "
In content they are the same, but differ "in inspiration and motive. "58
Philip Phenix made . this identification unabashedly: "Democratic
life should be conceived.
. . as a way of realizing the Will of Heaven.
He distinguished between "the democracy of desire" and "the democracy
of worth, " where the latter centers around devotion to "the good, the right,
60
the true, the excellent. " Alexander Meiklejohn has been examined above
as one seeking to remove this frankly theocratic notion.
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Bernard Iddings Bell, another openly Christian apologist, found in
England surprisingly an example of what he regarded as properly democratic,
namely the scholarship system to English universities.« He too invoked
Ortega y Gassett when discussing the relative roles of what he, Bell, called
the Common Man and the Gentleman. The Common Man had been repeatedly
fooled, though not "if we had bothered to educate him instead of merely training
him technically. ” 62
Mortimer Adler relied a great deal on Robert Ulich in his version
of this discussion; and he may have had Jefferson in mind when he wrote: "The
democratic principle is to be satisfied by an equal quanfiiy of basic schooling
for all, while justice is to be satisfied by differentiation in the kinds of
advanced schooling for children of differing abilities. " 63
Robert Hutchins frankly claimed Jefferson as his support: ’’The
great democrat.
. . divided the community into the laboring and the learned. " 64
Elsewhere he linked two popular themes when he wrote
: ’’The heart of democracy
is independent criticism, the basic freedom is freedom of thought and
65
expression. ” From this he derived the need for constant, public contro-
versy, without it a society "is on the way to totalitarianism and death.-"66
Mortimer Smith went on the attack and claimed that reconstructionists
like Brameld were trying to "have democratic history and biology—in the
interests of reconstruction, ” 67 or to monopolize the truth in authoritarian
manner. Such men are democratic only after they have had the opportunity "to
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68
mold the majority's desires, " he claimed.
Arthur Bestor wrote, in his best known work: "This book is offered
as a confession of faith both in education and in democracy" 69 and nostalgically
recalled Horace Mann whose "ideal is as valid today as it was when he set it
forth. "70
Lynd s argument has been noted earlier, where he criticized
Dewey for concealing the naturalistic consequences of his philosophy from
the average parent. "How many of them would vote for Deweyism if they
understood the philosophical ballot?" 71
Admiral Rickover has argued that the student will have attained
full political maturity "when he realizes that he is personally responsible
for making democracy work, that he has no alibi if his country is badly
72
governed.
"
Mark Van Doren has argued of democracy that "the term is central
to any modern theory of education;" that it is a misuse of democracy where
education devotes all its energy to defending" the democracy in force today"
and that "education, having the same end as democracy, can best serve human
no
good by perfecting itself. "
I. L. Kandel has likewise written at great length on democracy and
education. He has reminded us that "the leaders of the Revolution had with
few exceptions been trained in the 'aristocratic' studies of Latin, Greek,
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Hebrew, history and philosophy. "74 Elsewhere he^ gantayana , s
description of English liberty:
"It moves by a series of checks, mutual
concessions, and limited satisfactions; it couhts on chivalry, sportsmanship,
brotherly love, and on that rarest and least lucrative of virtues, fair-mindedness;
it is broad-based, stupid, blind adventure towards an unknown goal;" and
this, he concluded, "is, in essence, the definition of liberal education. " 75
J. B. Conant defended Jefferson against charges of being an elitist,
though this is unusual in the literature, and may be explained, as it were, by
Conant's own "unsoundness. " Many essentialists have suspected his optimistic
manner. He has written of Jefferson as an "anti-aristocrat" and as "the young
radical of 1779. "76 He was more orthodox his concluslon ftat what
education needed was "to stress the selective principle in education not in terms
of a hierarchy of prestige values but in terms of each individual's realizing his
own potentialities with consequent benefit to himself and to the nation. "77
The same tone appeared in his report on the American high school in 1958, where
he clearly sought to upgrade the academic standards. The document, in fact,
is a fascinating example of compromise between essentialist principles and
progressive demands.78 Elsewhere he has criticized the "Jacksonian
tradition" which "denies the reality of intellectual talent;" and in that same
volume he has revealed himself as vigorous as any essentialist in his attack
on communism: "We must study cancer in order to learn how to defeat it. . .
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if an avowed supporter of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin line can be found, force him
into the open and tear his arguments to pieces with counter-arguments. "79
The term "liberal" and "liberalism" is p TOblematic in the literature.
A. J. Nock may have been exaggerating his dislike of liberals, but one often
senses a longing for radical action. Most generally, however, essentialists
defend the liberal and usually identify him with the balanced democrat.
Kandel talked of "the ideals of liberalism and democracy. "80 Barzun was
more subtle in his perception that "those who face the dilemma are nowadays
branded with the odious name of liberal. " 81 Ortega y Gasset has eulogized
liberalism at some length, for it is "the supreme form of generosity; it
is the right which the majority concedes to minorities. 1,82 Kirk was more
critical, for he saw some forms of secular liberalism as becoming "very
nearly a secular orthodoxy among American writers;"83 and he criticized
David Riesman for being little more than an "amiable liberal" who had lost his
ideals. Brameld's judgment, needless to say, was that essentialism and
the more radical, "later liberalism" were opposed, in spite of any rhetoric
to the contrary.
Individual versus Society
It is clear by now that the essentialist position on this continuum is
again central; much evidence has been seen implicitly to show this compromise.
Brameld has claimed this central position for progressivism perhaps
prematurely: The important thing for our understanding of progressivism
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is that the education for which it stands.
. . is saturated with both kinds of
virtue-individual and social. "86 Dewey ,s posltionwas a UtUe less indivldualistic
"As mere individual, man cannot ascend above savagery.
. . as social whole he
constitutes a living miracle.
The typical essentialist is slightly closer to Brameld in this case,
though there are repeated assertions that essentialists are in danger of being
fascists. This was Hook's fear of Meiklejohn. It is a potential criticism many
essentialists, including Meiklejohn, seek to meet before presented; and indeed
there may be a grain of truth in it, perhaps especially in the idealism of Hegel
and its often nationalistic implications. Curti argued that this was true
of W. T. Harris' use of Hegelianism which "rationalized the victory of
n ationalism, imperialism, and industrial capitalism by insisting that true
individualism could be realized only by subordinating the individual to existing
individuals. " 88
Another comparative extremist, this time straddled across two
extremes, was A. J. Nock, who believed at various times in government by
an elite, and no government at all, best revealed by the title of one of his
books
* .Qur Enemy. The State, or in his statement: "The anarchist and
individualist has a strictly practical aim. He aims at the production of a race
89
of responsible beings.
"
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It has been seen that Rousseau is an interesting dividing line in
this respect; Nicholas Murray Butler accused him of "extreme individualism,"
while Barzun saw him as the proponent of balance. Meiklejohn's view of
Rousseau also places him at the center of a sophisticated compromise between
individual and society. Bagley, Damiashkevich, Home and others used (he
concept of "race experience" or simply "culture" to express this same
identity of individual and society. 92 Demiashkevich pushed this to its logical
conclusion: "We must concentrate upon the individual and seek to give him
the right education for world co-operation. n9 *^
Both Van Doren and Emerson have stressed the individual within the
group, a typical compromise. The former wrote that "democracy wants
millions of one-man revolutions. "94 The latter wrote that "who so would be
a man, must be a nonconformist.
. . . Absolve you to yourself, and you
shall have the suffrage of the world. 1,95
This fear of conformity is fully documented in David Riesman's
powerful study of American character, The Lonely Crowd. This most
powerful work argued briefly that the old individualist or "inner-directed"
person has been replaced by the conformist, "outer-directed" person.
The process begins early in school, where the
breakdown of walls between teacher and student
permits that rapid circulation of tastes which is
a prelude to other-directed socialization. ...
The teacher conveys to the children that what matters
is not their industry or learning as such but their
adjustment in the group.
. . hiding her authority,
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ftl
e
^
er
t
CTPeCr ’ the other-directed parent, undertiie cloak of reasoning and manipulation.
. . often
chi
}
dren back because she fails to realizethat children, left
-to themselves, are capable of
curiosity about highly abstract matters.
. . thus
the children are supposed to learn democracy by
underplaying the skills of intellect and overplaying
the skills of gregariousness and amiability—skilldemocracy, in fact, based on respect for ability
to do something, tends to survive only in athletics96
It can thus be said, with minor caveats, that the essentialist again
takes a centralist line; the individual and the society are both important,
indeed inseparable.
Anarchy versus Statism
This related continuum has also been implicit in much of the above;
as usual, the essentialist seeks to compromise between these two, in the
vision of a government limited only to essential services.
This was, of course, characteristically Jeffersonian. A. J. Nock,
in his biography of Jefferson, quoted him to the effect that "the path we have
to pursue is so quiet that we have nothing scarcely to propose to our
legislature. A noiseless course, not meddling with the affairs of others. "97
His dislike of federalism and preference for local, self-contained farms
has been discussed.
This is also the theme, somewhat transcendentalized, of Emerson's
essay on "Self Reliance, " where he argued, among other things, that the
reliance on property (or any material goods), "including the reliance on
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governments which protect it, is the want of self-reliance. " 98
The most vigorous exponent of this theme, verging on the anarchic,
is A. J. Nock. He quoted his idol thus: "Mr. Jefferson said that if a
centralization of power were ever effected at Washington, the United States
would have the most corrupt government on earth. The purpose of the
state is merely to "enable the continuous economic exploitation of one class by
another.
"
Alexander Meiklejohn represents the essentialist view most in
opposition to Nock's, as has been observed above, and he lamented that "we
Protestant-capitalist democrats, in our zest for individual freedom, have
been accustomed to think of political controls as hostile to that freedom.
"
101
Robert Hutchins has argued that education is the only challenge to
statism, and that this traditional bulwark is in danger: "The greatest danger
to education in America is the attempt, under the guise of patriotism, to
suppress freedom of teaching, inquiry and discussion." Instead, he argued,
"the only protection against government, visible or invisible, is in the
professional tradition" of education. 102
Mortimer Smith quoted frequently from A. J. Nock; and Smith argued
that the family is losing many of its function^ and thus its importance, to the
103
state, and that the best form of government is that which is "one step from
anarchy.
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B. I. Bell devoted a whole chapter to "Education and Statism, "
where he praised the founding fathers but criticized Nock for exaggeration, 105
and lamented "the high-minded gentleman who thinks as he pleases, says what
he likes, goes his own gait, careful to let others do the same."106
Walter Lippmann has applied this principle to private education:
"Harvard stands unqualifiedly for the principle that, unless they are independent
of each other, therelation between universities and governments will not be
healthy. " 107 W. W. Brickman has applied the principle to two other similar
concerns, namely to the relation of church and state, and to the funding of
parochial schooling. 108
J. B. Conant has written of education that "federal control is
potentially far more dangerous than state control. " 109 Gilbert Highet has
likewise fulminated against statism which is increasingly embraced as a faith
"with a passionate enthusiasm inversely proportioned to the understanding of
its dangers. Philip Phenix has debated "political and economic absolutism"
111
in a similar vein.
Equality versus Quality
This debate is also clearly related to and thus much anticipated by
those above; it is also for many essentialists grounded in Thomas Jefferson's
compromise of a natural aristrocracy and a meritocratic democracy. It is
remarkable that only one essentialist has so much as mentioned the famous
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satire on this theme, The Rise of the Meritocracy
, by Michael Young. 112
A. Nock, Ortega y Gassett and Matthew Arnold have been quoted
for their similar view of society divided into the masses and the elite, but
they differed little from the less emphatic Jefferson; the difference is largely
one of terminology, and the idea of a "Saving Remnant, " in Arnold's phrase,
is not infrequently a left as well as a right wing idea.113 Nock summarized
thus: We have found, then, three most serious errors in the theory upon
which the mechanics of our educational system were designed. This theory
contemplates a fantastic and impractical idea of equality, a fantastic and
impractical idea of democracy, and a fantastically exaggerated idea of the
importance of literacy in assuring the support of a sound and enlightened
public order. "114 This enemy of quality is the levelling down process of
populist democracy. Nock quoted Butler and Hutchins in the same breath and
then concluded with the former: "That dreadful average which all laws and
governments and statistics so dearly love and aim to exalt, is the mortal
enemy of excellence.
Bagley's views in this area have been sketched, for instance that
standards in school must involve some failure, and that to molly-coddle a
student "is a serious injustice both to him and the democratic group which, we
repeat, has a fundamental stake in his effective education. "113
Meiklejohn found that pragmatism, and Dewey's Democracy and
Education in particular, "thrills with hatred" and "incites men against
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aristocracy. " This was Mencken’s ^en fea
^
that democracy may rely too
much- on envy.
Michael Demiashkevich made the same point in warning against
"the dangers concealed in an inflated, non-selective, conception of equality of
educational opportunity. ”118 He approved Jefferson , s aristoora£y> ,lU9
which invariably finds its way to the top in due course. These potential future
leaders "should be democratically recruited, but should be trained
aristocratically
.
" They are the "future guardians of the state—to
use the celebrated platonic term. ”121
Robert Ulich argued that this aristocratic education should go on
alongside a shared curriculum where all children come together and "share
the experience of commonality.
. . m physical activities, natural appetites and
emotions. ” The ’’sphere of differentiation” is the intellect. 123 He
formalized the concept thus: ”If we want to preserve in our high schools a
generous degree of equality and communality together with quality, we have to
use emotional education for the purpose of unification, and we have to
differentiate where, after a certain age, people are incurably different: in
the sphere of the intellect. ” 124
The great works of literature have also been seen by essentialists
as a natural aristocracy. Mark Van Doren made the point and quoted Thoreau
on them that they "are a natural and irresistible aristocracy.
. . with no
cause of their own to plead
.
1,125
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There is also a clear imbalance in essentials literature between
concern for the gifted and for the less able. Few have dealt with the latter,
though Bestor is an honorable exception.126 Most deal at some^^
the former. J. D. Koerner and others of the Council for Basic Education,
for instance, in their collection of essays on The Case for Basic Education ,
limit their remarks to the more able student.127
Admiral Kickover has applied the same principle to education and
the arms race with Russia, and is frankly meritocratic: "Everyone who is in
any way unusual suffers from the arrogance of mediocre people. "128
He has quoted Fromm that the only final equality is that all men are created in
the image of God and that "no man must be the means for the ends of another. "129
The saving remnant is tiny: "It has been estimated that the efforts of less
than one per cent of the total population move the world forward. "130 jhe
comprehensive high school, of which he is skeptical, is "uniquely American.
. .
an outgrowth of the post-Jacksonian upsurge of democracy. "131
Economic Theory—Communism versus Free Enterprise
Essentialists again occupy central ground. Brameld has vigorously
denied this, of course, and has labelled as "the single most graphic example
of essentialist support of traditional patterns of belief" the fact that they hold
a "belief in freedom of competition and profit making founded upon the
traditional system of economic relations. " 132 However, so to riamn them
with the epithet "traditional" twice in one paragraph does not prove anything,
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any more than two swallows make a summer. Indeed, John Dewey himself
is currently being arraigned for capitalist tendencies by the economic left and
the revisionist historians.
The essentialist least ashamedly capitalist is Mortimer Adler.
His Capitalist Manifesto, written with economist Louis Kelso, was a
pungent statement of the American free enterprise theory updated
-'Democracy
requires an economic system which supports the political ideals of liberty
and equality for all. ,fl34 of the many critics of nineteenth century capitalism,
including Horace Mann, Henry George, Woodrow Wilson, Hilaire Belloc,
Jacques Maritain and Karl Polanyi, "only Marx, Engels and their followers
proposed communism" ran his argument. Yet man is as economically unfree
under state owned as under private industry. Thus it is socialism, when it has
crept in unheralded, "not capitalism, which is essentially incompatible with
democracy. " 433
At the other end of the continuum might be placed Meiklejohn. His
objections to capitalism were "from moral rather than from economic grounds,
"
for capitalism "is revolting as a form of human behavior.
. . .It does not
make men free. It makes them slaves. " His argument was that totally free
capitalism was incompatible with human dignity and thus with democracy, and his
alternative was to "experiment with one of the new forms of socialization, of
co-operation. " This helps to explain his especial rejection of Locke's
position, namely the "duplicity" of 'fchristian capitalism, the culture which could
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follow two gospels at once.
. . God and Mammon.” Locke was "a good
member of a bad society. "137
However, most essentialists remain less absolute in their views,
as one might expect. They range from radical capitalists to moderate
socialists.
Thomas Jefferson’s own moderate position is the model. A great
entrepreneur himself, and a critic of centralization of any kind, yet concerned
to alleviate the lot of those less fortunate than himself, he took an undogmatic
central line. Horace Mann was characteristically both a traditionalist and a
radical critic. He accepted the need for industry and automation: "Had God
intended that the work of the world should be done by human bones and sinews,
He would have given us an arm as solid and strong as the shaft of a steam
engine. ” At the same time, he could write of the working man: "It is by
the toil of that people, that the instruments of prosperity have been brought into
being. In looking at the creative cause, their muscle bears a closer relation
to the work, than our capital. He also advanced an argument common
amongst radicals today, namely that money spent on armaments would be better
invested in education, and speculated how much could have been done with the
seven hundred million dollars spent between 1789 and 1847 on military expenditure.
Henry Barnard went further in , such speculations in 1840: "Thus, the wars of
Europe, for the brief period of one hundred and odd years, have cost an amount
of money sufficient to establish popular schools, on the most liberal scale,
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throughout the whole world, and to supply them with suitable instruction to the
end of time!" 140
A. J. Nock is likewise hard to pinpoint; he hated centralization and
government, but also hated capitalism, especially where it was large scale and
bureaucratic. It has been said that "in his opinion the instrumental nature of
colleges and universities was simply a result of outside interest groups
wishing a return on their investment. "141 He was disgusted by American
economic imperialism in "the Spanish War and its consequences in the
Caribbean, the mid-pacific and the Far East, ”142 and attributed the
First World War at least in part to British economic aggression. 143 For all his
fear of capitalism, he was more fearful of statism, and preferred a "policy
of economic individualisnf' which can not exist "where the state makes any
positive interventions upon the individual in his economic capacity." 144
The state, he argued elsewhere, "originated in conquest and confiscation, as
a device for maintaining the stratification of society permanently into two
classes an owning and exploiting class, relatively small, and a property-
less dependent class. ”145 Nock’s analysis of Jefferson's economic theory is
interesting. His criticism was that Jefferson did not take his own principle of
non-interference far enough, and as an example he examined Jefferson’s
Embargo Act, where his government took responsibility for halting trade with
Europe, "a measure wholly subversive of the principle of liberty. ”14^ Nock,
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in short, shares the radical protest against capitalism but proposes, not
socialism, but laissez-faire. The position is, arguably, not far from
Adler’s.
Home had a perhaps over optimistic picture of "democratic
capitalism, which "provides for direct participation in control, " and allied
himself cautiously at this point with Dewey, who "aims at an industrial
democracy. "147 j. b. Conant could not go as far as a total "hands off"
policy, but nonetheless argued that "private ownership and the profit motive" are
essential. 148 Walter Lippmann modified his belief in "private enterprise for
private profit" with a concern for "non-commercial institutions." 149
Admiral Rickover has argued for more "investment in human
resources"} 150 Bestor claimed that "good education is less costly to tiie
nation m the long run than cheap and shoddy education, " 151 and explored
the theme more fully in chapter 24 of The Restoration of Learning.
Barzun has said that the argument remains complex and insoluble,152
but has presented a charming, complex and ultimately warm portrait of George,
the realistic businessman, in his portrait of America. 153
Robert Hutchins has used Keynesian economics to show how important
education for leisure and for things worthwhile in themselves will eventually
be in a *workless West." Philip Phenix has used the identical argument,
namely that the "Keynesian revolution" has demonstrated that man is "no
longer seen as subject to ineluctable human forces but as himself responsible
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for deliberately organizing his life-in-relatton according to the requirements
of social justice. ««* ibis vlew he fleshed^ ^ a ^
Education and the Common flood, where he also argued that the West must
stay with its mixed economy, and that "this implicit economic elevation
of economic motives to the position of ultimate principles ali^s the exponents
of the democracy
. of desire with the communists, " and implied
..that both
communists and "ardent free enterprise capitalists" are alike undesirable
absolutists, as they hold economic considerations "ultimate. "156 phenix,
like Bagley and most essentialists, seeks to remain open-minded and
anti-absolutist.
World Government
It appears paradoxical that the essentialist tradition, while
harboring great fears of statism and interference with individual rights, should
also harbor the ideal of world government. Such a government, however,
would operate only at the most general level to assure world peace,
international justice and ecological concern.
Demiashkevich scoffed at the League of Nations as a "pious hope,
for we need better individuals first, but elsewhere he wrote that
"we must concentrate upon the individual and seek to give him the right
education for world co-operation. "158 jqs gjjg^gj. to problem of balance
was a sound nationalism" which "seems to be the broadest form of altruism
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to which men can normally attain," combined with a moderate view of inter-
nationalism which avoids the extreme kind "which preaches the abolition of
all nation states, " His quoted authority for this was Nicholas Murray
Butler. 159
Ortega y Gasset saw that to combat the power of communism "the
building-up of Europe into a great national state is the one enterprise" that
could help. 160 Meiklejohn saw that "as humanity becomes more widely and
deeply reasonable, it becomes a world-state. "161 Ulieh discussed inter-
national education;162 W. W. Brickman has discussed related matters
frequently in School and Society. 163 Philip Phenix^ written a power&1
chapter on the same theme, where he has argued for a world community,
based on international law, inculcated through education, but one where
national sovereignty is not eliminated. 164
The most sophisticated examination of this, and in many ways the
most idiosyncratic, is Robert Hutchins' St. Thomas and the World State.
dedicated to Mortimer Adler. One can do no better than quote Hutchins'
own summary:
hi this lecture I propose to show how St. Thomas,
beginning with the remade of Aristotle that the
state is the perfect community, transmuted that
remark into a political theory relevant in every
age; and how this theory, together with the
teachings of St. Thomas in the Treatise on Law,
leads irresistibly in our day to world law, world
government, and a world state. 165
rpi
.
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US, again, essentialists can be seen to take a moderate position on
most political debates, perhaps with the exceptions of Meiklejohn on the
mildly socialist left, Adler on the capitalist right, and Nock on the radical
right. Meiklejohn and Nock are criticized by many of their essentialist
peers.
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CHAPTER VI!
PSYCHOLOGY
f
80 far 38 wel1 established facts and laws
^re concemed
, mankind knew vastly more
about the raising of pigs than about the mindsof children. (W. C. Bagley)
Bagley was unusual among essentialists in having a scientific back-
ground. and even more so in having a training in experimental psychology.
116 qU°tati0n ab°Ve rOTealS WS ea^ and his assumption that the
then new science would supply answers to philosophical and educational
problems. His eventual disillusionment with the science of psychology has
been described above, and chronicled more fully by Johanningmeier.1 k, this
respect he is paradigmatic; essentialists generally prefer first principles to
experimental data.
There are a number of psychological issues that essentialists have
been quick to debate, generally in a philosophical manner, such as the nature
Of psychology, determinism, heredity and environment, intelligence and
creativity, motivation and developmentaJ
„ theory.
Their psychological views are not only allied to their philosophical
views but also to their political views. As Barzun has argued, "all political
theories begin with a psychology, explicit or assumed, for the same reason
that all revolutions want to control the mind. "2 indeed, the philosophical,
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° Psychological areas are ultimately inextricable. It is inevitable,
r6
’ ~ the
—--
.**,«. at least fc part
In earlier chapters. The central thesis is thus^^^^ ’
10 SteCT^“ C°UrSe b*"~ «» S^a^ Charybdis of opposing
siren absolutes.
jjie Nature of Psychology
w. T. Hams was somewhat on the psychological right™g . he was
cautious of the
-hew psychology stood for ^hority^ ^_
roundly condemned by Dewey; yet, as Merle Curti has pointed out, he was
a moderate in some respects: "The discipline and authority for which he
Stood was intended to be rational in character and to enable the individual
freely to suscribe to the law of the social whole in order fully to realize his
true, spiritual self. » Rather it was "in the hands of the average teacher"
that those ideas might lead to simple authoritarianism. 3
Dewey's criticisms of Harris' Psychologic Foundation,
of 1898 have already been examined, namely that Hams was too little
experimental and too purely mental. Dewey's ennclusion may be seen as the
brave words of a new world which has not even yet come to pass:
I am willing to venture the prophecy that in the long
run the concerns of a spiritual philosophy may be
entrusted most safely to the hands of psychological
science as it is now developing itself; that this willbe the great means of translating the chief points of
view and results of the former into specific, clearly
recognizable forms, capable of being set forth in the
terms of our common language without recourse to the
technical terminology of transcendentalists; and that,
excepting as the idealistic philosophy does re-enforce
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Md vivify itself in this way, it will become more
into th°
r
h
SCh0lastlc and arbitrary, degenerating
e barren explication of certain formal
general categories.
4
That Dewey's prophecy remains but a prophecy most would agree,
certainly every essentials, todeed, Bagley's own progress is an implicit
denial of Dewey, starting from a Hegelian position derived at least in part
from Harris, Bagley then sought desperately to be fully experimental, but
found finally that experimental psychology was not enough, ibe chief
essentials criticism of Dewey has always been that he has forfeited the
language of philosophy and ideals. Bagley sought to compromise with his
concept of a natural "emergent idealism. "
At much the same time, Nicholas Murray Butler was addressing the
question: 'Is There a New Education?" He invoked Royce as his witness,
using the tatter's article
-Is There a Science of Education?" in The Educational
Review of 1891, which periodical printed Dewey’s review of Harris seven years
later. Butler decided, with Royce, that "what the teacher has to gain from the
study of psychology is not rules of procedure, but the psychological spirit."
The teacher should be "a naturalist and cultivate the habit of observing the
mental life of his pupils for its own sake. "5
This is the same moderate attitude adopted by William James in his
Talks to Teachers on Psynhnlngy in 1899. He began with an attempt to
dispel the mystification. So I say at once that i
in my humble opinion there is no ’new psychology’
worthy of the name. There is nothing but the old
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psychology which began in Locke's time, plus a littlephysiology of the brain and senses and (Lory of
dlt°»p
?’ “d afew reftoements of introspective
e ail, for the most part without adaptation to theteacher's use. b
The answer, as for Royce and Butler, is for the teacher to learn to observe
his pupils and come to know them. * A similar general moderation prevails,
for instance, with Brickman, Krutch, Barzun and Phenix, and a little less
with Kirk and Mortimer Smith.
Brickman has written regularly on the need for moderation; an example
might be his stand on freedom and conformity in patterns of child rearing. 8
Joseph Wood Krutch has agreed that psychology bears some useful fruits "but
it has not made it any easier to write a 'Hamlet'. "9 Barzun concluded that
"in sum, the behavior of apes, insects, and barnyard fowl can only cast a
vaguely suggestive light on the human scene." This seems especially true,
he went on, "when we reflect that those who know most about animals have
been forced by their specialization to neglect the study of man in history. "10
Phenix best represents the essentialist conclusion that it seems doubtful that
the demand for complete objectivity in psychology can be justified. 11
Some essentialists are themselves less objective and get very angry
on this question. Kirk accused American thinkers of a new ideology, "the
academic cult called Behaviorism. "12 Mortimer Smith argued that this
"new" science was being overemphasized.^
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Determinism. Heredity md Environment
™8 ^ ^“ PS^cho1^^ is3ue on which ail essentiaiists Join
hands, They are vigorously opposed to all forms of determinism, especially
to the mock-scientism of misunderstood Freudianism or behaviorism. On the
related herediiy-versus-environment argument they take a compromise position.
Typical is Jefferson's view that ability is randomly distributed and
that the answer lies in simple but selective public education. Nicholas Murray
Butler castigated the "time-honored illusion that all boys and girls are bom
equal. " but compromised by agreeing that through education "this obstacle to
progress will be steadily diminished. " 14 It has already been argued that
Bagley's position on this issue was strongly and subtly anti-deterministic,
notably in his collection of essays in 1925, Determinism in Eduction He
was optimistic about the effects of learning, or experience, on the environ-
ment: "The contributions of experience become so numerous and so influential
that it is the height of absurdity to contend that it is a native and unmodified
fact that is being measured. " 15 He saw mind as of a different order from
matter and therefore less susceptible to the natural laws: "Mentality, among
all the variable biological traits, seems to be the only one that distills its
own corrective.
"
This was the sort of optimism that the more extreme A. J. Nock
roundly condemned, of course. Jefferson was misguided, he argued, for "our
system was founded in all good faith that universal elementary education would
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make a citizenry more intelligent; whereas most oviously it has done nothing
of the kind. " Nock took a position on the essentials right wing, that
..education
can regulate what intelligence one. has, but it cannot give one any more. --17
H. H. Home's argument was close to Bagley's, namely that the purpose
of education was to initiate the child into the environment of the rac^experience;
"This sharing of the race's life is education as viewed by sociology, m the
language of President Butler, who first described education in these terms,
'education.
. . must mean gradual adjustment to the spiritual possessions of
the race’. " 18 Home also allied himself in the same book with Harris and
with James. Self-activity and consciousness are used as arguments against
determinism: "To define this central notion of self-activity more closely as
it discovers itself in consciousness, an illustration may be used. A billiard-
ball moves mechanically according to an impact from the outside. A man's
mind moves teleologically according to an idea on the inside. ... To quote
from Dr. Harris, 'self-activity itself we perceive in ourselves by introspection.
When we look within, we become aware of free energy which acts as subject
and object under the forms of feeling, thought and volition. '" 19 On the nature
of free will he quoted James, 20
There are many attacks on mechanistic psychology, for instance
Bagley’s or Kandel’s. The latter wrote scornfully of "the stimulus-response
theory of mechanistic psychology. "21 j. b. Conant attacked the comparable
"Jacksonian tradition" which has "spread the idea that any American child can,
if he wants, with the aid of proper education, become anything he desires. " 22
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Mortimer Smith has repeatedly attacked this and all forms o£ mechanistic
psychology,33 just as Russell Kirk has repeatedly attacked behaviorism.24
As usual, one of the most penetrating analyses has been that of Phenix,
and as usual he reaches a subtle compromise:
There are extremists on both sides of the question
.... There was a time when the hereditists weredominant this was, in effect, the classical view.Then partmulariy under the influence of behaviorist
and stimulus-response psychology, the balanceturned m favor of the environmentalists.
. . but aperson is not just a mixture of heredity and environ-menu
. . he is a heredity-environment complexjust as a mixture of sodium and chlorine transcend
themselves m the new compound. Heredity and
environment therefore both operate both as limitation
and as resource in education.25
The most powerful and persistent attack, however, belongs to Barzun,
as argued above. He found that man's will had been vindicated once more in the
late 19th century, after a period of false scientism spurred on by Darwin,
Marx, and Wagner, with "the rehabilitation of the will by Nietzsche, Bergson
and William James—the will which vindicated the artist by brushing aside
determinism and supplying a principle of control in the complexity of altered
sensations. "2« of Thomas Hardy he has written that 'While the enlightened
opinion of his day saw man only as a physico-chemical compound, that is to
say as a moving slice of his own environment, Hardy steadfastly held to the
belief that life and consciousness are no mere illusions in a world of atoms. "27
His attack on behavioral science has already been discussed.28
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Perhaps most secant, however, is Barzun's great reliance on and
reverence for William James as the great defender of the importance of the
human will. James, for instance, argued that "we can never work the laws of
association forwardt starting from the present field as a cue, we can never
cipher out in advance just what the person will be thinking of five minutes
later But, although we cannot work the laws of association forward, we
can always work them backwards. "29 This is the famous
prediction and postdiction which has so long been associated with the Freudian
debate.
in fact, essentialist views of Freud are both significant and predictable,
though perhaps one should say postdictable. They deny any implications of
prediction or determinism, while allowing that Freud teaches man to recognize
the postdictive determinants of his thinking and emotions, which are thus not
fully determined. There is, in fact, a modified acceptance of Freud.
Some, like Mencken, waxed satirical on the subject and argued the ad
absurdum example:
"one of the laudable by-products of the Freudian quackery
is the discovery that lying, in most canes, is involuntary and inevitable, "
which transfers it "from the department of free will to that of determinism. " 30
Joseph Wood Krutch's first book, not counting a doctoral thesis, was
a biographical-critical study of Edgar Allen Poe, who was "a perfect sitting
duck for the amateur psychoanalyst. ” Krutch, in his early enthusiasm, argued
that Poe's neuroses were his genius and that this was usually the case with
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great imaginative writers; he later recanted much of argued^
art is essentially sane, " and compromised with the milder statement that
disturbed than those of ordinary men "31 hc • r,b . He remained firmly hut not
simplistically concerned with Freudian questions.
Gilbert Highet also objected that "the pupils o£ Freud have made the
problem too simple.
" Adler argued that they had made it too complex, in his
four lectures to the Institute lor Psychoanalysis in Chicago. In the fourth
lecture, specifically concerned with psychoanalysis, he sought to differentiate
in Freudian theory between "sound philosophical analysis" and the "bad
Philosophizing" of unsubstantiated jessing. Having done that he sought "in
that part which is good analysis, to distinguish what is an original contribution
from what is merely a translation of the Aristotelian tradition into the conceptual
vocabulary of psychoanalysis. "33 He found that Freud had contributed little,
and that that little was chiefly philosophical.
PhUip Phenix was more generous and included psychoanalysis as one
Of the fields which "underscore the connection between being and the process
of becoming, particularly emphasizing the fact that the later development of a
person is largely a working out of patterns early established in the family. "34
Interpersonal psychology also demonstrates that emotions "have a profound
effect on the life of reason. "35 A person then 'becomes integral, or healthy,
largely through relationships with other persons, "36 Phenix argued, thus
implicitly linking the contributions of Freud and of the theologian who was
253most concerned with the
-ground of being- and on whont Pheni* much relied
namely Paul Tillich. Indeed. Phenix widened the argument to include all thl
social sciences, for they all
-reveal the different ways humans are alike.
Alike they must be, for a person cannot exist in isolation. Relation is
essential to being. *>37
Barzun had a great deal to say about Freud. In 1943 he objected to
the way
"pseudo-psychoanalysis- had attacked the reputation of the romantic
writers, namely that they
-from Rousseau to Oscar Wilde, were contemptible
lunatics whose ideas had no applicability to life. -38 1939 * had
those who tried to use Freud as an excuse to
-act like maniacs, - for Freud
had proved rather that
-die head and the heart, die flesh and the spirit, which
have been looked upon for centuries as fighting an endless batde, must hence-
forth be looked upon as a team pulling in the same direction. ”39 while thus
generally approving Freud, Barzun resented his analysis of art, for "Freud
has overlooked two facts. He fails to see, first, that in psychoanalyzing art
he has far less evidence to work with than in two or three years of daily
sessions with a patient; and, second, he is led by this scarcity to attach a
single meaning to each symbol. " 40 The reason for this error was that Freud
"wishes above all things to have his work recognized as science. Having been
cruelly mistreated by feUow scientists in his early career, he wishes recognition
to come from the same quarter where he was first condemned. "41 This is to
treat Freud with his own medicine with a vengeance. He went on approvingly
to quote Freud's almost essentlalist attack on the uncertainties of a fully fledged
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pragmatism where, in Freud's own words,
"according to this anarchistic
cohere is no such thing as truth, no assured q£^^
world. ..42 Freud was also Mly discussed in Barsun's Darwin. Marx and
in 1941. Barzun there saw Freud as an antidote to 19th century
mechanism and moral fatalism.** He commended ,,he woik q£
and Freud upon the will. ”44 He argued that "for Freud the human soul is not
a mechanism, even though one side of psychoanalysis appears to continue
materialistic science. "45
closing chapter of^^^^
welcome creations of the "reign of relativity" he listed Freud, together with
William James and others. Freud’s work was "devoted to freeing man from
thralldom through the use of intelligence" but it has "been blindly misinterpreted
an proving the necessary slavey of man to ’unconscious urges'.
.. and his
intent has been turned by ignorant popularization into its contrary absolute,
and led a whole generation to believe that sex was the new devil or divinity,
cause of all its ills and salvation as well, explanation of all of life, art,
biography and human character. ”46 Freud showed "that reason and feeling
are not at war" and that man "has no need to have complete freedom in order
to have some freedom;"*? and this last quotation represents a highly characteristic
essentialist compromise.
In general, therefore, there is fear that Freud has been misused; at the
same time there is much agreement that Freud makes man more, not less,
responsible.
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Intelligence. Creativity and t
Essentialist views of intelligence, creativity and leading are so
intimately concerned with their philosophical turd poUtical beliefs that most of
““ area has already been, in effect, discussed above. Learning is seen as
deeply concemedwith acquiring the culture or race experience, Just as there
are things objectively worth knowing and indeed essential. These essentials
are Sorbed by intelligent, that is receptive but critical, concentration and
hard work. Creativity, because ultimately there is
-nothing new under the
sun, - plays a correspondingly smaller part. That is, knowledge exists in
the scholarly traditions, and does not need to be constantly rediscovered.
This interdependence of psychological and philosophical views was
wen argued by Adler, who claimed that 'the controversy between the modernist
and the traditionalist" arose from their "flatly opposed views of the nature of
mquuy, an opposition which, in tom, arises from differing concepts of the
nature of reality and the natere of intelligence. "48 Perhaps the most
difference involves that between the essentialist view of mind as "a faculty
for knowing the features of an independent reality" and the pragmatist view
Of mind as a biological instrument which, like other vital organs of the body,
functions to maintain and advance the living process. "49
This leads inevitably to a greater concern for the so-called higher
faculties of the mind. The rejection of mechanistic views of intelligence,
especially in stimulus-response learning theory and behaviorism, for a concept
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of self-directed mind leading to a «Pifself-conscious culture, has th
a continuous strand in essentialist thinking The ,,Ju K , evidence for this h„ =
above in one form or another but ™ .
Weared
t one may simply recall fnr.
„ ...
y y I1
> for example, w. tn. insistence on self-activity> or^ ^ ‘
Begley s analysis of mind on three levels, which is a paradigm of much
~ist argument. Bagley distinguished the primitive level of hehaviorist
2 1r i
s> fte co~ ° r tosishtfti1 ieamins which tr~-
eve
.
and thirdly die social-moral level, where "I should find a place for
the unfettered operation of ideas vu- • ^
judgment. " 50
3180 arSUed f°r the^^ence of, for example, intelligence
and philosophical and political theory. His f^m^^
was a
monumental analysis of education in terms of ,tbe realms of meaning to be
*.
o
,^^
*“ a“‘ r' " "“* *"•'""»«
—
»
«*.»
_k
intellectual life of reason supports and is supported by the ideal of democracy
for four reasons. It is intellect that
-sets mankind off into a separate species’. -
Second, intellectual life "is crucial to democracy because it is the source of
the human community.
" Third, it is "the source of human freedom," and
"fourth, intelligence is die foundation of individuality, which is another central
idea of democracy. "52 The result „^ ^^^ ^
educated intelligence are to discover the truth and to advance the realisadon of
other forms of excellence. * short, reason shoul<1 he devote, to serving
whatever is of worth.^3 intelligence cannot therefore be defined without
recourse to philosophy and politics.
If the chief distinction of essentialist views of intelligence is this
concept of it as something concerned with truth and value ratter than mere
adjustment to the environment, the second distinction is the essentialist view
of its distribution, The founthead here is agtttt Jefferson; inference is no,
equally distributed, but it must be given the proper, meritocratic ratter than
aristocratic, chance to flourish. This has been argued above, but one may
recall, for example, Arthur Bestor's very Jeffersonian argument that what
poor students lacked was often cultural rather than innate: "Until the people
as a whole have enjoyed real educational opportunity and until they have
assimilated its results, a diminished cultural background in the student body
of a non-selective school is to be expected. To remedy this cultural poverty,
indeed, is precisely the purpose of the free public-school system. " 54
is a popular essentialist theme, of which there axe many further examples.
On the subject of creativity essentialists are, at least apparently, a
little ambiguous. They scorn the popular overemphasis on creativity if at the
expense of standards, but conversely they view intelligence as more concerned
with creation and imagination than with mere response to stimuli. That Bagley
represented this latter view has been argued. Demiashkevich used the authority
of Bergson to argue that "all true understanding is creative, " and contrasted
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tins view with what he took to be the
"progressive doctrine- of
-undirected
a0ttVl<y
’ h0wevererra«°. and self-nourished a**** however meagre. "55
instead, his ardent was that booh learning could be hi^y creattve> ^
"whatever we understand in the thought or work of others, we create, as it
were, over again for ourselves. obis again is a popular essentials
argument, often repeated, as in the case of Barzun, where for example he
argued the superiority of imagination even over accuracy in the writing of
history. He has, however, forcefully condemned the baneful influence of
mock research techniques and demands for creativity in areas improper for
them, in a chapter entitled "The Cult of Research and Creativity, where
he found that, for example, creative writing has come to express
"individuality
instead of common form. "59 The consciences of such a reversal were
explored in Barzun's House of Intellect, where he berated 'the awe-struck
acceptance of the pupil's ways and opinions as if these were the symptom or
promiseof genius. » The teacher has become "so respectful that it generally
excludes criticism.
. . hence in the school the perpetual adoration of the
Magi before the infant expression of 'original views’ on everything but the
multiplication table. "60
Probably the most wide-ranging analysis of creativity is that of Phenix.
The shift from the idea of intelligence to that of creativity is that "from man
the knower to man the maker, from the abstractions of rations! discoursed
the concrete products of his handiwork. ’ 61 As wWl ^teUigence, ttere are
"standards of wortt by which these products can be evaluated.
" involves
an analysis of aesthetic excellence, manners, work, and recreation, a,
creative aspect of work is that "broadly speaking it is an art. "62 Eyen sQ
humble a human activity as eating should be conducted "so as to show mastery
over appetite rather than subservience to appetite;"63 thus discipline leads
to creative behavior in the simplest places.
Motivation
Again the essentialist takes a central view. He believes that motivation
and interest are important, but that man also has a duty or obligation to learn,
to discipline himself, and that certain things are worth learning regardless of
one’s motivation. Both work and play are important. Not everything can be
best learned through the doctrine of needs' satisfaction.
Nicholas Murray Butler, for instance, though a hard-liner in many
respects, epitomized the moderate line on motivation. He declared himself
indebted to Herbart for the doctrine of interest;
64
and said that "we have
still to learn what interest means, how it is changed from indirect to direct"
and how "it is built up into a permanent element of character. " 65 The
compromise is that "a boy ought to know a great deal of literature" but "this
does not mean Homer,, pr Dante or Shakespeare, " 66 and "the fetish of
thoroughness is another form of the pedagogue's paganism. " ^ His model
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was O, lohnsonwho, when asked what he would teach any children he might
have, replied:
"I hope I shonid have willing lived on bread^^
instruction tor then, hut , wouid not have set their hiture friendship to hazard
for the sake of thrusting into their heads knowledge of things for which they
-ght not perhaps have either taste or necessity. You teach your deters
the diameters of the planets, and wonder when you have done that they do not
delight in your company.
Bagley's view was likewise a compromise; he was agtdnst the simple
doctrine of interest unless it included
-the desire for satisfaction of acquired
needs. ”
Home turned the progressive dictum upside down by deciding that 'one
vice versa.
is interested in that concerning which one knows something"™ not
"Effort thus leads to interest. "71 He quoted James to the effect that the
teacher should start with the child's interests and then draw in by careful
association those things the teacher wishes to instil.™ The secret of
interesting the mind "is to present it with a variety in unity. " 73
An extreme view, where the interest of immediacy appears to be denied,
is Hutchins' contention that "it is hard to master the intellectual content of a
profession while one is practicing it, "
74
but this is a comparatively extreme
view.
William James' compromise was typical. At one moment he could
write: "Soft pedagogies have taken the place of the old steep and rocky
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path to learning. But from thislukewarm air die bracing oxyge„ of effort is
left out. "75 At the same time the teacher must use a child's interest "when
the native impulse is most acutely present. "
76
Tbe fact is that some teachers
are interesting and some are not. and "psychology and general pedagogy here
confess their failure, and hand things over to the deeper springs of human
personality to conduct the task. " 77 James is an exemplary essentials in
this area.^s
Indeed, extreme interpretations of the interest doctrine were equally
repugnant even to Bode and Dewey. The former claimed that "it is just as
impossible to find educational objectives by inspecting the individual child as it
IS by looking for them in a transcendental realm. "79 His conclusion is almost
startling: "It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the purpose of sound
education is precisely to emancipate the pupil from dependence on immediate
interests. "80 Dewey wrote disgust o£ extremes he may mwlttingly haye
generated: "I have heard of cases in which children are surrounded with objects
and materials and then left entirely to themselves, the teacher being loath to
suggest even what might be done with the materials lest freedom be infringed
upon. m8 1
Phenix found this problem of central importance, and proposed that
imagination was the answer. He took the "unprogressive" line that Mthe
principle of appeal to imagination calls for the selection of materials that are
drawn from the extraordinary rather than from the experience of everyday
life. "82
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Bernard Iddings Bell sounded like a modem Maehiavelli in his mixture
Of the old and new, of progressive and essentially of the different ways of
motivating a child he wrote: "None of them is as effective as that which
capitalizes love.
. . obviously the manifestations of affection must be withheld
as long as and to the degree that the child ceases to exert himself in constructive
endeavor that love is to be won is what the child must learn, and that
that which wins it is the child's own desire to understand and to attain. *»
Again, therefore, with a few exceptions, it can be said that essentialists
take a moderate view, and that they seek to balance the twin truths of intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation, or of desire and duty.
Developmental Psychology
Bell is typical of the essentialist compromise position on developmental
psychology and the concept of readiness. He saw two common mistakes, namely
that of regarding children as ’little men and little women” and that of ’’regarding
fairly developed children in the light of discoveries once made in the nursery. ” 84
This characteristic compromise on the matter is typical of essentialist
analysis, though it does not, of course, reveal how infrequent such analysis is
in that area. Essentialists are perhaps weakest at this point. For instance,
there is scarcely one reference to Piaget in the entire essentialist literature,
although it is fair to say that Piaget was long ignored by educationalists in
general. A rare exception to this is the discussion of Piaget’s developmental
theories in the Council for Basic Education's Consumer Guide to Educational
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Innovations of 1972. , .attitude to him resembles the essentialist attitude
to Dewey, that he talks good though common sense, but is taken too far
Of context by his more enthusiastic devotees.
or out
that learning is most satisfactory when its
He is applauded for "implying
pace is neither too slow nor too
fast" but he is also
"unquestionably the inspiration for many of the more bizarre
and permissive of the practices
schools,
now going on in informal,
'open-classroom 1
As the authors of this consumer guide point out, Piaget’s theories are
refinements upon, indeed a natural development, of earlier developmental
theories; they cite Gessell and Montessori. It is for similar reasons that
Rousseau proved so cnntroversial among essentialists, as the one who first
argued the extreme case for awaiting a child's readiness before teaching. It
is not therefore surprising that essentialist opinion of Rousseau has been so
varied.
Even Jefferson, however, held some rudimentary developmental theories,
and he too took a moderate position: "There is a certain period of life, say
from eight to fifteen or sixteen years of age, when the mind like the body is
not yet firm enough for laborious and close operations. If applied to such, it
falls an early victim to premature exertion; exhibiting, indeed, at first, in
these young and tender subjects, the flattering appearance of their being men
while they are yet children, but ending in reducing them to be children when
they should be men. The memory is then most susceptible and tenacious of
impressions; and the learning of languages being chiefly a work of memory,
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f0r aCqiUrmg^ m°re US6M l3DgUaSeS
>“ and modem.
.
. ftat tlme „
not lost which is employed In providing tools tor future operation.
. . if this
period is suffered to pass in idleness, the mind becomes lethargic and impotent,
as would the body it Inhabits if unexercised during the same time. " 86 A
progressive critic of this passage might reasonably ar^ie that it was a pity that
Jefferson, starting from such an appreciation of child development, ehose to
buttress such an old-fashioned view of education with it.
William James, writing as early as 1899, might almost be mistaken
for Piaget:
"Theoretic curiosity, curiosity about the rational relation between
things, can hardly be said to awake at all until adolescence is reached.
. . when
the theoretic instinct is once alive in the pupil, an entirely new order of pedagogic
relations begins for him. Reasons, causes, abstract conceptions, suddenly
grow full of zest, a fact with which all teachers are familiar. "87
If James can sound like Piaget, Home can sound surprisingly like an
emergent Erikson: "If childhood is the individualizing epoch, youth must be
called the relating epoch. "88 The concepts are contemporary:
"Each later
stage in mental development is but the blossoming of powers that were budding
earlier.
. . the youth's feelings still centre in self, but they reach out in fond
attachments and friendship for others. " The language, however, marks Home
off as though from a different era: "The brook of delightful promise empties
itself into the river of service. Out of the ear grows the full com. The
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blossoming of youth becomes the fruitage of maturity. This period covers
the work done by the colleges and the universities. " 89
More typical, however, is Bestor's argument that the teacher must
push the child along as fast as possible. While he admitted that "children
begin to think in terms of concrete objects and situations rather than
abstractions. " his advice was: "Let the first-grader, then, find out all he
can about the local fire department and the choo-choo. But this process is
not to be repeated indefinitely Studies of the local community are all
very well to start with, but they are a dead-end street unless they lead on into
the disciplined study of economics, political science, history, and ultimately
philosophy. " 90 The contempt is obvious in his tone, and indeed the tenor
of the essentialist argument is here best portrayed. Such implied accusations
abound in the literature.
Ulichwas more gentle. While admitting that "after a certain age,
people are incurably different, and in the sphere of the intellect, "9 ^ he also
advocated as proper pedagogy ’"beginning with the simple but unadulterated,
however, and thence ascending to higher levels, " whereby the "pupils and
teachers might find out that the very greatest art and thought contain elements
of depth accessible to everyone who is willing to understand, ”92 a remark
worthy of Bruner at his boldest.
As so often, Phenix has a discussion of this issue which is essentialist,
moderate, and penetrating. His analysis of the consequences of developmental
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theories, notably of Erikson and Piaget, leads to a typical compromise stance,
that "if some experience comes too early, it cannot be grasped at all or only
at the price of excessive strain and frustration. If it comes too late, other
learning dependent upon it will be postponed and the whole development of the
person will be retarded.
"
93
Developmental schemes, however, are only
approximations, and "in reality every person is different, and in principle a
different curriculum is needed for every person to take account of the way he
uniquely develops. " 94 Developmental study may suggest what is possible,
"but 11 does not follow from the fact that a person can learn something at a
given stage in his growth that he ought to learn it then. "95 Further, the
hypothetical stages are not discrete, but rather "continuous with each other,
interrelated, and overlapping. " 96 Studies of the growth of mathematical ideas
in children suggest both that some ideas precede others, and that "on the
other hand.
. . with proper methods of instruction many important mathematical
ideas can successfully be taught much earlier than was once thought possible or
desirable. " 97 Phenix's especial interest in Erikson's psychoanalytic work in
human development can be understood from the use he makes of it as a
springboard to such, almost theological, conclusions as:
Every linguistic attainment, every empirical insight,
every esthetic perception, every moral judgment,
every integrative perspective belongs to a developing
person and is colored by the quality of his relations to
himself and others. Since a meaning in any realm is
a meaning to a person, the value of that meaning depends
on personal well-being. In more familiar terms, though
one speak many tongues, know all the secrets of nature,
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create things of beauty, perform deeds of the highestWrtue, and have the combined wisdom of Socrates
911 S0l
°S°
n
* if he haS no love
> these Profit him
nothmg.yS
The general essentialist does not concern himself at great length with
developmental theory; if he does so, he takes a modest but skeptical view of
its value; only Phenix among essentialists sees it as identical with growth
through human relationships and thus identical with being and thence with
the ultimate.
Essentialists tend to be more concerned with a mental rather than
experiential approach; their psychological views reflect and parallel their
views elsewhere, especially in philosophy, and they take a central view on
most psychological issues.
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CHAPTER Vlii
PEDAGOGY
These pairings of assumed opposites are mis-
leading, for each member of each pair
represents a legitimate—indeed a needed-
factor in the education process. (W. C. Bagley)
Bagley's constant compromise between apparent oppositesiis typical
of the essentialists' position at every point, not least in their analysis of the
curriculum. This contention could be maintained for every area of the
curriculum but, for the sake of brevity, it may be adequate to sample simply
one area of essentialist pedagogy, namely the teaching of language and
literature, especially Latin and English.
One might expect that the essentialist would die hard for the retention
of the classics; but that is the kind of loose assumption that helps to highlight,
upon examination, the essentially open-minded nature of these moderates.
To be sure, there are some essentialists who clamorously defend the
classics. One might expect it in Jefferson's case for, moderate though he
was, the time of radical questioning of the classics was then far off. He
remarked that, although the study of Latin and Greek was even then going
into disuse amongst Europeans, "I know not what their manners and occupation
may call for: but it would be very ill-judged in us to follow their example in
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this instance. "1 That his was no elitist hankering after a prestigious
tradition, however, has been argued above; this is clear from his contemptuous
rejection of Plato, and Hutchins has argued the point forcefully that Jefferson
was less interested in learning for its own sake than to "make his people
prosperous and civilized. "
2
Arthur Bestor took up this point, and argued
that Jefferson's respect for the classics was a selective and critical one, for
Jefferson recommended their study for statesmen but not for merchants:
"For the merchant I should not say that the classical languages are a
necessity.
. . to them they are but ornament and comfort.
W. T. Harris was a staunch defender of faith in the classics,
'believing that Latin and Greek vocabularies and syntax provided students
with the most effective insight into the embryonic period of Western civilization
and enabled them better to understand the forms and usages of their intellectual
4
and moral being.
"
The staunchest defender, however, though his tone is rather more
than defensive, was Albert Jay Nock, who stands as the extreme in this
respect. Nock was educated partly at home in a clergyman's family and,
in due course, at St. Stephen's, now known as Bard College. In 1890 it had
a faculty of eight and eighty-one students .5 He described this education
/»
fondly on a number of occasions, and modeled his ideal college on his
7
own experience. His argument is an extreme example of the great books
ideal: "The literatures of Greece and Rome comprise the longest, most
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complete and most nearly continuous record we have of what the strange
creature known as Homo sapiens has been busy about in virtually every
department of spiritual, intellectual and social activity.
. . . Hence the
mmd which has attentively canvassed this record is much more than a
disciplined mind, it is an experienced mind. "8 Even current politics
would be thus illuminated, for "reincarnate any first-class 'Realpolitiker'
of the ancient world, from 3800 B. C. to 1500 A. D.
,
put him in charge of
the foreign office in any modem imperialist capital, and he would have hard
work to convince himself that he was not still doing business at the old
9
stand. " His only standard for entry to his ideal college was the ability
to read and write Latin and Greek, and some elementary mathematics.10
Study thereafter would be literary and intellectual only, for the grasp of
l anguage would already have been acquired. He was skeptical about classics
in translation, but "I suppose it may be better to read Latin and Greek in
translation than not to read them at all. m11 There would be no student
activities of any kind, and no representation of either students or alumni on
the college government. However, he does allow that the classics were "as
a rule administered poorly and, which is worse, indiscriminately
. . . Too
often a routine of elementary Greek and Latin was forced upon ineducable
children.
"
12
A more moderate version of this, more a defense this time than an
attack, appeared in a volume sponsored by the Council for Basic Education
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in 1959, designed modestly to show that Latin "has basic educational value
today. » 13 Little attempt was made to include Greek in this defense, as it
was clearly a lost cause. The two main arguments were that "to the
linguistic virtues and capabilities of Latin for basic education we must add
its cultural values. "14 The third was the special literary and aesthetic
value of Latin, where "their quality has to be savored in the original. " 15
Gilbert Highet took an uncompromising stand on this issue, claiming
for the classical literature that nowhere else is there "such a rich, varied
and deeply thoughtful collection of books" and that they had to be studied in the
original" partlybecause there are so few good translators and partly because
English is a poorer, weaker language than Greek and has so far been less
subtly developed than Latin. "
16
Strong though these arguments are, today no less than in Nock's
time, they are as effectively countered from within the essentialist ranks as
from without. A few examples must represent the general attitude.
Even Emerson "took a sceptical view of the classics.
. . lamenting
that young men grow up in libraries. " 17 Bagley's, however, was perhaps
the best early analysis of the problem. He sensibly accepted most of the
claims made for the classical education and questioned only the efficiency
or uniqueness of such a process. The argument for the transfer of training,
(and he is one of the few to consider this topic), he deals with at some
length,18 and the rest is worth quoting in full:
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The period of time that must elapse before a pupil
can appreciate classic literature in a degree sufficient
to permit a realization of its unique values is inordinately
long and the requisite effort is inordinately severe.
The question is really not one of the absolute worth of
classical study; it is rather one of relative worth. If
the intrinsic values of the classics—that is, the values
accruing to the instructional and inspirational functions
of the thought-content itself-can be gained in some measure
through translations as well as through the originals, the
unique disciplinary function will be left as the last support
of extended classical study. Place this discipline as high
as one will, it still seems quite impossible to make it
justify any extended study of the classics in their original
form as a necessary part of general education.^
The footnote at this point indicated that one authority he was challenging
was his own mentor, W. T. Harris.
Nicholas Murray Butler at much the same time was arguing a
similarly moderate line, that the chief value of the classics was cultural
not linguistic. He condemned "the waste of time they have involved" but
concluded that "it seems quite safe to predict that no culture will ever be
considered broad and deep unless it rests upon an understanding and
appreciation of the civilization of Greece and Rome. " 20 This generally
mild emphasis is continued throughout the more recent literature, as for
instance with W. W . Brickman, the editor of School and Society who
concluded inconclusively that "there is a likelihood that some stress on Latin
will enhance the cultural and educational values held dear by the American
people.
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Mark Van Doren was surprisingly iconoclastic and claimed that a
classical education, while it ought "to be a great thing", for centuries "has
been less than that;" and went on to quote Alfred North Whitehead who claimed
that "of all types of man today existing, classical scholars are the most
remote from the Greeks of the Periclean times, "^2
Even Robert Hutchins, often reviled for his defense of the great books
program, was sufficiently distant from Nock to say that '1 do not suggest
that learning the languages or the grammar in which the ancient classics
were written is necessary to general education. " Translations now exist, and
unless it can be shown that the study of Greek and Latin grammar is
essential to the study of English grammar or that the mastery of the Greek and
Latin languages is essential to mastery of our own, " they too can be ignored
as part of "general education. "23
In short, even in that area where one. might expect to find essentialists
most intransigent, one finds them tractable.
The teaching of English language and literature is the natural successor
to the teaching of classics; and the history of its comparatively recent growth
as this alternative needs more documentation than this work allows. There
are those even today who maintain that a study of the classics is a prerequisite
to that of English, or any other, literature; the schools of English at, for
instance, Oxford and Cambridge still rely heavily on classical and pseudo-
classical scholarship to support their respectability; some English private
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high schools still harbour a mild suspicion of English departments as unrigorou;
:and culturally subversive.
The best essentialist example of this extreme view, and it is a rare
one, is the case of A. J, Nock. He wrote of his own classical education that
it fitted him naturally with the critical apparatus for analyzing English
literature, that "no one dreamed of teaching English literature; indeed, I do
not see how it can be effectively taught in any formal fashion, how a really
competent acquaintance with it can be brought about in any other way than
the way by which it was brought about in us;" he went on to argue that the
then new popularity of English studies in American universities was on account
of their easiness, and that for the new students, whom he despised, "something
has to be found for them to do that they can do. ”24 He produced at this
point, as essentialists have often done to bolster similar arguments, a
collection of examples of poor English usage to prove his point, and went on
to recall a visit he made to a friend teaching English in "a huge swollen
institution that went by the name of a State university.
. .
I found him
engaged on a kind of thing that by the very handsomest concession was only
eighth-grade work. " He seems not to have imagined what would have
been the result if these same students had been taught the classics.
In general, however, in spite of Jefferson’s desire to the contrary,
American education appears to have forsaken the classics faster and farther
than has the European, and correspondingly to have accepted the normality
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of English studies with less suspicion. Indeed, if there is any one area
where essentialists are mostly clearly concerned, it is in the analysis of
culture through literature. There is not one who does not rely on literature
for evidence at some point, and a large number rely regularly on their study
of literature, for example Barzun, Bagley, Bestor, Brickman, Briggs,
Conant, Demiashkevich, Fadiman, Highet, Home, Hutchins, Kirk, Krutch,
Mumford Jones, Nock, Phenix, Riesman, Smith, Ulich, and Van Doren; of
the earlier figures nearly all were also deeply concerned, Jefferson, Mann,
Harris, Emerson, Thoreau and William James.
One can only therefore sample the evidence; and much of it has been
reviewed above. The following discussion is designed to show the general
agreement, together with some minor disagreements.
Thomas Jefferson, writing as late as 1818, betrayed a lamentable
lack of concern for contemporary literature, surprisingly. His view was a
stolidly eighteenth century view, that reading matter should be ’’reason and
fact, plain and unadorned. " He feared the "inordinate passion prevalent
for novels, ’’ and suggested that "much poetry should not be indulged, " for
the "mass of trash" resulted, he would argue, in "a bloated imagination,
sickly judgment, and disgust towards all the real businesses of life. ” 26
He admitted the value of Shakespeare and a few seventeenth and eighteenth
century English and French classics. On the other hand, such a view was not
uncommon at the time, and he was correspondingly insistent on general
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literacy as a safeguard of democracy, and proposed a public library in his
—
°n the State of Virpinia. 27 This concern for the literacy of the
electorate became a popular theme, as did the concern for public libraries
to a lesser extent. Jefferson's own collections of books and his generosity
with them to the nation is legendary.
Horace Mann likewise suffered from what today would be considered
literary myopia. He inveighed against what he called "bubble literature, "
which concerned itself with "mere amusement, as contradistinguished from
instruction in the practical concern of life.
. . and reflection upon the great
realities of existence. " 28 Walter Scott and others had caused an "epidemic 1
in the reading of novels. Such reading was dangerous because people "have
no touchstone whereby they can distinguish between what is extravagant,
marvellous and supernatural, and what, from its accordance to the standard
of nature, is simple, instructive, and elevating. "29 It is dangerous to
'‘neglect the wonderful works of the Creator, in order to become familiar
with the fables of men. ... It is impossible to polish vacuity, or give a
lustre to the surface of emptiness. ”30 His answer also was Jefferson's,
namely an insistence on public literacy and suitably stocked libraries; for
"every book which a child reads with intelligence is like a cast of the weaver's
shuttle, adding another thread to the indestructible web of existence. "31
He therefore analyzed the distribution of public libraries in Massachusetts
and proposed to remedy the inadequacies
.
32
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Henry Barnard's analysis and his vision were similar to Mann's.
He computed that in 1844 there were "but three libraries, containing twelve
hundred volumes, in the agricultural districts" of Rhode Island. His hope
was that "whatever else may be taught, or omitted, the ability, and the taste
for reading, should be communicated in the school, and the means of continuing
the habit at home, through the long winter evenings by convenient access to
district or town school libraries, should be furnished. "33 it is hard not to
be moved, and a little chastened, by the optimistic vision of such pioneers
as Jefferson, Mann and Barnard, as when the last of these planned that "there
shall not be a rural district which is not animated with true intellectual and
O A
moral life. " It may have represented a patronizing Christianity, but it
was well meaning and powerful. Barnard planned a library in every village,
not only with books of "useful knowledge" but also "a good supply of judiciously
chosen works of fiction. " 35 The proper innoculation against "the dens of
iniquity, which abound in all large villages, " would be the "contemplation of
God's works, and the perusal of good books. ,36
Of course, each of these three also had a hearty disrespect for the
scholar who was out of touch with life, and books were but an instrument.
Barnard claimed, for instance, that education "should deal less with books
and more with real objects in nature around. "37
Emerson held the same caution of book learning, and wrote that
"books are for the scholar's idle times. When he can read God directly, the
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hour is too precious to be wasted in other men’s transcripts. " 38 However,
he had more time than many for literature in the education of the child, for
imagination can bring books more alive for him paradoxically than real
people. "Culture makes his books realities to him, their characters more
brilliant, more effective on his mind, than his actual mates. Do not spare
to put novels into the hands of young people as an occasional holiday and
experiment; but, above all, good poetry in all kinds, epic, tragedy, lyric.
If we can touch the imagination, we serve them, they will never forget it.
Let him read Tom Brown at Rugby, read Tom Brown at Oxford. "
39
Indeed,
children naturally embody the best characteristics of literature in themselves,
for "in their fun and extreme freak they hit on the topmost sense of Horace."40
This attitude, so typical of later essentialists, is altogether less stern and
moralizing than that of Jefferson, Mann or Barnard. Nonetheless, literature
maintains its didactic purpose, though in a more subtle guise: "The production
of a work of art throws a light upon the mystery of humanity. A work of
art is an abstract or epitome of the world. " 41
A. J. Nock was more cautious of mere literacy, and argued that it
was 'not an absolute good in itself. ... To prove this, one has but to look
at what our literates mostly read. " 4^ His own life was consumed by
literature, and his autobiography is a treasure trove of literary asides. There
is detailed description of his earliest reading, his self-taught Latin, his
sampling of more modem classics in periodicals, and his later more select
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passions like that for Rabelais. His taste is vigorous and clear cut, if
sometimes a little simplistic. His loves are
-’work done in the great progressive
eras—the work of the Augustan and Periclean periods. The work of the
Elizabethans, of Erasmus, Rabelais, Cervantes, Montaigne—one accepts
them as classics, not air all because they are old, but because they are objective
and therefore strong, sound, joyous, healthy. ” 43 His hates are such as
"the Rimbauds, Verlaines and Gaugins
. of the last century. Revolting as
they are, they are nevertheless precisely the forms of organic life which
one must expect to see, and does see, if one insists on turning over the social
plank which has so long lain rotting in the muck of economism. "44 Literature
for Nock is as it was for Arnold, whom he invokes on this issue, namely
keeping good company” which is "spiritually dynamogenous, elevating, bracing.
It makes one better. ”4^ It is a theory of literary criticism not far removed
from Jefferson's.
Nicholas Murray Butler has already been quoted to the effect that "a
boy ought to know a good deal of literature, to love it, and to have caught a
bit of the literary spirit, ,l4^ and he was also intensely concerned, like all
essentialists, that education should provide the child with "correctness and
precision in the use of the mother tongue. "47 Interestingly, he chose
Abraham Lincoln, "the greatest personality that ever lived on this continent, "
to represent his ideal prose style, where its "very simple and direct nature
reflected without guile and without complexity the impressions and convictions
that he had. ” 48
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This is highly representative of the essentialist ideal for prose style,
though not all achieve it themselves. Nock's ideal formula was that "you
must have a point. Second, you must make it out. Thirdly you must make it
out in eighteen-carat, impeccable, idiomatic English."
49
Most essentialists
achieve this style, some almost outdo it. Reading Barzun, Hutchins, Adler,
Nock or Phenix can be a powerful literary experience in its own right. Others
can be a little ponderous, like Demiashkevich or even Bagley.
Perhaps the finest stylist is Mencken, and it is chiefly for his pungent
style that essentialists love him. He too cites Abraham Lincoln, who "in
middle life purged his style of ornament and it became almost baldly simple. "
Of the Gettysburg speech Mencken wrote "nothing else precisely like
it is to be found in the whole range of oratory. " However, Mencken then
argued perversely that this address was "beauty, not sense, " for in spite of
the rhetoric of freedom, "the Union soldiers in that battle actually fought
against self-determination; it was the Confederates who fought for the right
of their people to govern themselves. "50
The third essentialist to analyze Lincoln*s style was Barzun, in a
little limited edition called Lincoln, the Literary Genius, j in 1960. He
described that style as T,unique in English prose and doubly astonishing in
the history of English Literature, for nothing led up to it. "
51
The style is
as though designed by Nock; Barzun describes it as "order first, and then
a lightning-like brevity. " In a fascinatingly complex paragraph Barzun
seeks to establish a tradition of style:
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Lincoln’s exampl^plainly, helped to break the
monopoly of the dealers in literary plush. After
Lincoln comes Mark Twain, and out of Mark Twain
come contemporaries of ours as diverse as Sherwood
Anderson, H. L. Mencken, and Ernest Hemingway,
remote from New England gentility, in the midst of
which Emerson and Thoreau rise like rugged and
inaccessible islands; a reproof to Johnsonese and
journalese.
. . not even touched by the clean and
dry generalizing of Jefferson and the ’Federalist
papers', which he so aptly studied. The style
Lincoln fashioned for his uses—epistolary,
argumentative, and exalted—is his alone
.
33
Alistair Cooke has characterized Mencken’s style similarly as "a
style flexible, fancy-free, ribald, and always beautifully lucid: a native
product unlike any other style in the language;” and has said of him, with a
surreptitious glance at Ben Jonson's dictum on Shakespeare, that Mencken
"need hardly have blotted a sentence. "34
This form of covert quotation is one of the most significant essentialist
stylistic tricks. It belies the simple lucidity of their best stylists by its
almost snobbish assumption that the reader will pick up the unacknowledged
allusion and, if he does not, that it is his loss. Some examples, suitably
unexplained, might be Mortimer Smith’s title And Madly Teach; or perhaps
Russell Kirk’s subtitle, "Observations of Abnormality in Literature and
Politics, " or any one of many examples from Barzun, for example the phrase
describing Swift as "wounded by his own aggression;"33 or Barnard’s "curses not loud
but deep;" 56 or Home's educational
"still, small voice. " 57 Sometimes
87
one is left wondering whether the trick was intentional, as with Barzun’
writes of genealogies:
"It* s a
phrase above or another of his, where he
thriving industry to dig them out of churchyards with the aid of a vaulting
imagination. "58 The most popular
Shakespeare and the Bible.
sources of such echoes are, of course,
Mencken's literary criteria exclude an undue concern for moral
judgments, unlike most essentialists. He said of Babbitt and others that
"you win spend a long while going through their works.
. . before even you
encounter a purely aesthetic judgment upon an aesthetic question. It is
almost as if a man estimating daffodils should do it in terms of artichokes.
"
Such as Babbitt can never, he claimed, do justice to "the whole, gross,
glittering, excessively dynamic, infinitely grotesque, infinitely stupendous
drama of American life. " 60
Babbitt and Mencken both contributed essays to the collection Criticism
Babbltt ' s is a late example of the older, more puritan criticism.
He spoke longingly of the "two great traditions, " where the Christian tradition
promoted humility, and the classical tradition promoted decorum or a sense
of proportion: "To repudiate the traditional Christian and classical checks,
and at the same time fail to work out some new and more vital control upon
impulse and temperament, is to be guilty of high treason to civilization. "61
Babbitt characteristically lamented "sheer imaginatitn and emotional
unrestraint in the name of expression, " for "Dr. Johnson was right in
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condem ning the whole primitivistic notion of genius and the lazy drifting
with temperament that it encouraged. " 62 llis essay LimUs q£
Naturalism" in his The New Laokoon, An Essay on the Confusion of the
of 1910, is interesting to compare with Barzun's more moderate and more
perceptive arguments on the difference between classic and romantic.
Babbitt's conclusion was that "the neo-classic school had converted the ideas
of unity and measure and purpose and of law itself into mere formalism; the
romanticists in getting rid of formalism were for getting rid at the same time
of the ideas of unity and measure and purpose and law itself. They would be
aimless and lawless and live in a perpetual paradox. ”63 He attacked Rousseau
for his "horror 0f every constraint upon his emotional impulse. " 64 Such
lawbreakers deserved his neologistic charge of "eleutheromania.
. . the
instinct to throw off not simply outer and artificial limitations, but all
limitations whatsoever. ” 65 It is interesting that he shares Barzun's
distaste for Wagner, while Barzun later criticized Babbitt for his intemperate
views in general and especially on the subject of Rousseau. 66
Barzun's views on language have been hinted at in his eulogy of
Lincoln. It is a typically essentialist and simple view, like Nock's. It
needs no further definition than that hinted by his remark about the language
of advertisements: "Side by side with florid nonsense, one finds in our ads
some of the best, tersest prose now written. " 6^
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His views on literature were more complex, and more subtle than
his expressed view flat "all books are good and consequently a child should
be allowed to read everything he lays his hands on. Trash is excellent. "68
It may be convenient to rely at this point only on his collection of essays,
~ EnerSleS °f Ar>
~ H1S critical Philosophy rested, like all his views, on
an anti-absolutism, for "the one certainty is that men do not act from single
motives, from which it follows that no product of human hands is pure. "69
From this he derived the view that no one critical view or theory could ever
be enough to account for literature. His was the historical view which "in
criticism, can always turn up instances to bend or bulge whatever is too
rigid or narrow. 'TO He would prefer "several lines of criticism, which
may at any time cross and combine, " which is the "only price at which I can
momentarily endure the newer critical games of counting tropes and reducing
the finished work to a set of symbols, like a boy dismantling his construction
toy and putting the pieces away. "71 The reason for this is that critics
"ape the impersonality of science," 72 another theme of Baram's. The
collection of essays is full, not surprisingly therefore, of illuminative
and varied literary criticism.
For instance, Barzun scoffs at the different Shakespeare- that
successive schools of criticism have created: MJust as in the previous,
purely poetic analysis Shakespeare ismade out a virtuoso of sounding words
and tinkling symbols, so here he plays us a toccata of social precepts. " 73
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It is a fine point and wittily made, with another concealed quotation to keep
the reader chuckling. There is an excellent analysis of Swift's prose style:
"His prose is transparent, certainly, but what we see through it is what he
put there. " 74 His analysis of Shaw's prose is a simdar, minor masterpiece.™
To do the work justice, one would be obliged to quote it in full. Suffice to
remember one powerful judgment: "With Shakespeare, with the Romantics,
one must not remain abstract or stay a specialist. One must be capable of
thought and disposed to leam, which is a different thing. » 76
Marie Van Doren, a friend of Barzun's, grappled with similar problems
m MS
~
ral Education. The concept was Barzun's, namely that the
discipline of literature must not ape that of science; but the style was
unmistakably that of Emerson, whom Van Doren edited and eulogized.
The passage must be quoted at length to catch the comparison:
The humanist makes claims for his books which nobody
is bound to recognize. He may shame us occasionally
with the thought that we are not "fine" enough, but we
observe that he is only fine, and we know that to be
only fine is to be less than a man can be. The humanist
suffers most in our estimation when he fails to convince
us that he has a discipline. The discipline of science
may be narrow, but it is real. The study of literature
is not rigorous enough to be real. Criticism has its
victories no less than investigation. But the laws by
which they are won are hard laws; they are the rules of
an art, or a set of arts, which the humanist has forgotten.
His worst enemy is not the chemist or the engineer, it is
himself if he has forgotten that knowledge in his domain
can be as exact as it is anywhere. Perhaps more exact,
though if he knew what that meant he would be a
philosopher. He is too literaiy because he is not
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pWlosopMcal enough. But even the philosophers
mamtaJn a solitude which assists us
« u has been c“
*e humanities,
ZZZZsm tTT' ? tte humanitles ^e nothingumanism, as we have known it, their dominanpp
will be no better than that of the ribboned hat whichmistakes iteeu for the head. Education prefers^, bedominated by humanity. Man is in the same breath
metaphysician, philosopher, scientist, and poet If
thaf.
S
't^
SO nU“bsku11 “d genius. education has to admitat it cannot cope with those. 77 ^u
Van Doren might almost have been parodying Emerson; there is the
same pretentious yet unfinished logic; die same admixture of vocabulary that
is both Latinate and very simple; the same breathless sentences poured out
on top of one another. As Van Doren said of Emerson, the unit of construction
IS the sentence. They are not always clearly linked, but lie alongside each
other, excitedly.
Bagley had argued earlier for the primacy of language in the develop-
ment of culture and social evolution. 78 Demiashkevich took the splendid
view that "we are elastic creatures. A sentence in a book.
. . can set our
fancy free, and instantly our heads are bathed in galaxies. " 79 He made
great use of language and literature in his analysis of England, France and
Germany in his The National Mind. He described the English language as
"best adapted, in the very brevity of its Anglo-Saxon words, for brief, clear
orders or directions. The Englishman is a mature man of action who rarely,
if ever, yields to those outbursts of primitive passion which in other countries
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so often undo the results of the methodical labor of generations of men. "80
Whether this conflicts with his later statement about the Englishman and his
speech is a moot point, where he talked of "a curious form of intellectual
hypocrisy, the circumlocution so typical of English speech. The fear of the
direct and appropriate term creates a sort of no-man's land around one's
thought. " Demiashkevich revealed an artistic conservatism that was
reminiscent of Babbitt when, writing of the Germans, he declaimed:
"Futurist
and cubist works are always the sign of racial disintegration which expresses
itself in fondness of picturing corporal deformities. "82 His view of the
function of language as ,lthe verbal embodiment of experience "83 is, of
course, similar to his colleague Bagievs. Indeed, language is at the veiy
basis of politics, for "the printing press is among the most important safe-
guards of sound democracy, "8^ and "democracy.
. . is government by
discussion, by talk, by persuasion. "88
There is always great concern among essentialists about functional
illiteracy in America. W. W. Brickman wrote regularly about it in School
q r*
and Society
. One of many complaints was Hutchins that "in the high
school of the University of Chicago, which has a highly selected student
body, not less than ten percent of the pupils are functionally illiterate. "87
He blamed the contemporary teaching of English, which placed emphasis
"either on the most trivial details or on what is called self-expression. "88
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Some eseentialists have even resorted to a form of statistical analysis
m relatmg the state of culture to the amount of literature "consumed. " Mann
and Barnard counted books available. BagLey computed books "consumed per
capita. " Adler used the same technique: "In England, where education is still
far from universal, 55 per cent of the adults can be found reading a book at
any time; in the United States, the land of universal education, only 17 per
cent are reading a book, any book. Of the books written, published, and
purchased between 1945 and 1955, the top ten each sold more than three
million copies apiece. What were they? Numbers one, two, three, four,
five, six, and seven were titles by Micky Spillane. " 89
The recent Consumers Guide to Educational Innovations
, published
by the Council for Basic Education, was vigorously opposed to "Black English,
"
cautious of the application of linguistics to the teaching of English, hostile
to "The New English, ” hostile to teaching reading by the "whole-word" method
and in favor of "the phonic" method, and cautious about "Sesame Street. "
This guide quoted with great approval Rudolph Flesch’s book, Why
Johnny Can’t Read, which reappears often in the literature to bolster the
phonics case. J. D. Koemer, for instance, used it,90 and his The
Miseducation of American Teachers devoted a chapter to "English or
Educanto?" He wrote that "in the hands of an experienced man, who I suppose
must be called an "Educantoid", the language of Education can be practically
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incomprehensible. It can also induce severe nausea. " 91
One of the more sophisticated in this area was Joseph Wood Krutch,
at one point professor of dramatic literature at Columbia University. His
’
View reminds one of Barzun-s claim for the artist as eternal pragmatist: for
Krutch, literature concerns itself with important truths that the organized
disciplines have failed to take account of: "it is from literature that we get
the reassuring conviction that the meaning of life has not been exhausted by
the statement of any principles or laws. "92 A great deal of his published work
is about literature, and very good reading it makes in its own right. Like
Barzun, he scoffs at the more solemn schools of literary criticism. 93
Like Bagley, he claims to have avoided all bids for popularity in the pursuit
of the unfashionable truth.94 Like Node,, he abhors ihe superabundance of
works that are "beatnik, sadistic, existential or sexually perverse.
.
.
guide-
posts to perdition. " 99 His early enthusiasm for psychoanalytic literary
criticism waned to a great caution thereof: "Personally I have never heard
of a child who confessed to being dangerously terrified by Alice or of
an adult who attributed his downfall to a trauma received from a book in
infancy. No doubt that proves nothing. The fears inspired are subconscious
also. "96 If Freudian literary analysis is one form of false scientism, so
is Marxist literary theory, which is too simply concerned with reality and
social theory: "Valid art was now destined by the communist theoreticians
to be a literally accurate picture of reality as Marxism perceived it. 1,97
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TTere are many olher critiques of Marxist literary theory, of which
one of the more interesting was Russell Kirk-s. For him, the four principal
themes which had inspired Western literature were religion, love, heroism,
and private fortune:
-Now none of these themes or sources of inspiration is
available to the Marxist writer. Religion has become the opiate of the masses
it fs forbidden. Love has become the gratification of physical impulse: it is
tolerated only. Heroism has become service to the producaon-consumpHon
state: it is sorvlle
. Private fortoo> with^ Qf ciafis ^ ^
social diversity, has grown subversive: it is ..98
Kirk s view of the value of literature is characteristically high. His
analysis of the "common patrimony" of western civilization was that it rested
on, first, Christianity; second, on "our theory and practice of ordered
liberty and
yet the third article.
. . is more enduring, perhaps,
than even political usage. Great works of literaturejoin us in an intellectual community. And the ethical
cast of enduring humane letters, working upon the
imagination, is as normative as is religious doctrine
or political principle. Humane literature teaches us
what it is to be a man. Homer and Hesiod; Herodotus
and Thucydides; Sophocles and Plato; Virgil and
Horace; Livy and Tacitus; Cicero and Seneca; Epictetus
and Marcus Aurelius; Dante, Petrarch, Erasmus,
Shakespeare, Cervantes, Goethe, and all tho rest—
these have formed the mind and character of Americans
as well as Europeans. The best of American literature
is part and parcel of the normative continuity of
literature extending back beyond the dawn of history.^
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This is a magnificently essentials passage. Perhaps only Phenix can
provide a better conclusion. His analysis of "the phenomenon of language"
mcely " illustrates the synthesis of physical, mental, and spiritual aspects in
human nature. "100 His analysis, both in Man and his Becoming
Realms of Meaning
,
of both language and literature is thoroughly essentials,
while also being entirely modem and tolerant. To sample this powerful stuff
one passage may suffice to suggest the rest:
The two essentials of poetry are rhythm and metaphor.
Both have the same basic function of establishing unity-
m-difference—an achievement (as already pointed out)
that is close to the ultimate secret of being itself. In
rhythm change is given intelligible order. Metaphor
discloses likenesses in different things and thus provides
a common bond between what would otherwise be disparate
entities. A successful poem penetrates the darkness of
temporal succession. It reveals that the apparently
haphazard order of unrelated human experience need not
be the only or final answer to the question of life's
meaning.103.
Phenix, as so often, is not simply representative of the essentialist
tradition, but consummates and transcends it.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY
In conclusion, it can be said that, although tew people have more than
an intuitive understanding of what is generally called
"traditional" education,
a clear tradition does exist. This study has sought to present the theories
behind the traditional practice. It has sought to present a conceptual analysis
of the many individual statements of the traditional case, written chiefy in
the twentieth century by those Americans who saw progressive educational
ideas as a threat to excellence.
The question of nomenclature has been left unresolved. Instead, it
has been argued that there is a real identity of views among twentieth century
essentialists, and a sense of agreement between them and the classical
tradition of education stretching back through the major nineteenth century
American educators to the perennial classics of Europe and of the Graeco-
Roman world.
It has been argued that this tradition regularly opposes the more recent
progressive educational philosophy, but that this opposition is best seen in
terms of emphasis; a useful model has been that of a continuum, from
progressive to conservative and that this continuum pertains to every
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conceptual area. This model is based on W. c. Bagley' s model of what he
called "assumed opposites.
"
It has then been argued that essentially are not extremists on this
continuum, that they are rather, and see themselves, as moderates fighting
the excesses of progressive or of any absolutism or totalitarianism; and
that they maintain a position central on this continuum, though skewed
slightly in general, extremely in a few cases, to the right or traditionalist end
of the scale.
There is a genuine tradition, although there are, of course, divergences
within it; it is not only an identity of views, but also an historical tradition.
This has been described in detail to prove with what assiduity essentialists
read and rely on each other. The degree of quotation reflects this. Each
essentialist is found to rely heavily on those who went before. The result is
something of a covert club, membership of which comes by way of an identity
of views and of mutual quotation. Each essentialist tends to read and quote a
few special favorites. This thesis attempts to see this in broader terms and
to collate all the favorites into a greater or perennial tradition. An appropriate
metaphor used is that of the "saints" of the tradition and the "heretics"
outside it. Bagley and Barzun are treated in greater detail as exemplary
"saints. " Dewey is examined as a source of great "heresy. "
The review of literature finds that there has been little appreciation
of this tradition. The general histories or philosophies of education mention
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but do not adequately analyze the essentialists. The doctoral dissertations
and periodical literature, although scholarly and detailed, seldom generalize
at all.
Philosophically, the central concept of the essentialist is anti-
absolutism or, more simply, moderation. This concept of a central position
is thereafter seen to permeate essentialist thinking on all issues,
philosophical, political, psychological, and pedagogical. They see themselves
as moderates opposed to progressive extremism in all these areas.
The conventional view of essentialists as conservative extremists or
hard-liners is belied by their moderation on such epistemological issues
as the nature of science, and on such continua as those of the disciplines
versus integrated study, sequential versus incidental learning, liberal
versus vocational education, abstract versus concrete learning, work versus
play, ends versus means; and on such metaphysical continua as those of
idealism versus realism, naturalism versus supernaturalism, and of value
systems versus nihilism.
Politically, this same anti-absolutism obtains. Starting from a view
of society as based on the accumulated culture of mankind, though limited
largely to the Graeco-Roman and European culture, they proceed to a vision
of liberal democracy that is highly Jeffersonian or meritocratic. They
take an appropriately central stand on such issues as elitism versus
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populism, anarchy versus statism, the value of the individual versus the
supremacy of society, and communism versus capitalism. They hate the
totalitarian extremes represented by either fascism or communism.
Psychologically, they again strive for middle ground; they seek for
moderate positions, opposed to progressive extremes, on such issues as
those of the nature of psychology, on determinism, heredity versus
environment, intelligence, creativity, learning theory, developmental theory,
and motivation. Freud, in particular, is reclaimed to the fold as one who
promoted a relativistic view of man, not deterministic.
Pedagogically
,
they are surprisingly moderate. Their moderate
views on the curriculum stem from their moderation elsewhere, rather than
vice versa. Language and literature are chosen in this study for special
discussion, as generally these are seen by essentialists to be central to
the culture of mankind. Essentialists are not die-hards for the study of
Greek and Latin (with a few exceptions). Rather, the study of culture best
continues with a scholarly pursuit of English language and literature, they
would argue, together with scholarship in all the other disciplines.
In sum, there is a real tradition of essentialist thinking; it is
generally self consistent, it differs clearly from the progressive view, it is
self-consciously moderate rather than extreme. This moderation is perhaps
most apparent in the more recent and sophisticated essentialists, especially
Jacques Barzun and Philip Phenix. The tradition is more conservationist
than conservative.
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APPENDIX B
CURRICULUM OF ST. JOHN’S COLLEGE, MARYLAND:
Excerpt from Mark Van Doren, Liberal Education
!.
But there 1S 0ne contemporary college whose entire effort
is concentrated upon the reading, uniformly by all of its
students through four years, of a list of great books which
is so long and so excellent, and at the same time so arduous,
t at it might appear to exhaust the category. It scarcely
does that, nor would anyone be wrong who supposed that
this or any other list should be challenged and revised- the
college in question does in fact continually revise it. But
the heart of the tradition is there with its essential cham-
bers, and it is kept working for all of the students all of the
time. It is the end of every other activity in this college;
languages are learned so that these books may be read, and
among the languages are those of mathematics and the
laboratory. There are no textbooks to which the great books
are supplementary; the great books are the textbooks of
this college, as in a sense they are its teachers. For the
acuity reads them too, in preparation for seminars where
they will be discussed. And since there are no departments
or divisions, all of the faculty must do what all of the stu-
dents do: read all of the books.
The curriculum of St. John’s College in Maryland, to be
specific, is as follows:
Homer: Iliad and Odyssey
Aeschylus: Oresteia
Herodotus: History
Sophocles: Oedipus Rex
Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine and Airs, Waters, and Places
Euripides: Medea
Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War
Aristophanes: Frogs, Clouds, Birds
Aristarchus: On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon
Plato: Dialogues
Aristotle: Organon, Poetics, Physics, Politics
Archimedes: Selected Works
Euclid: Elements
Apollonius: Conics
Cicero: On Duties
Lucretius: On the Nature of Things
Virgil: Aeneid
The Bible
Epictetus: Moral Discourses
Nicomachus: Introduction to Arithmetic
Plutarch: Lives
Tacitus: The Histories
Ptolemy: Mathematical Composition
Lucian: True History
Galen: On the Natural Faculties
Plotinus: Enneads
Augustine: Confessions, On Music, Concerning the Teacher
Justinian: Institutes
Song of Roland
Saga of Burnt Njal
Crosseteste: On Light
Bonaventure: On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology
Aquinas: On Being and Essence, Treatise on God, Treatise on Man
Dante: Divine Comedy
Chaucer: Canterbury Tales
Oresrne: On the Breadths of Forms
Pico della Mirandola: On the Dignity of Man
Leonardo: Note Books
Machiavelli: The Prince
Erasmus: In Praise of Folly
Rabelais: Gargantua
Copernicus: On the Revolutions of the Spheres
Calvin: Institutes
Montaigne: Essays
Gilbert: On the Loadstone
Cervantes: Don Quixote
Shakespeare: Henry IV, Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, TempestFrancis Bacon: Novum Organum
t
Kepler: Epitome of Astronomy
Harvey: On the Motion of the Heart
Corneille: Le Cid
Galileo: Two New Sciences
Descartes: Geometry, Discourse on Method, Meditations
Hobbes: Leviathan
Boyle: Sceptical Chymist
Moliere: Tartuffe
Pascal: Pcnsees
Milton: Paradise Lost
Racine: Phedre
Crotius: Law of War and Peace
Spinoza: Ethics, Theological-Political Treatise
Newton: Principia Mathematica
Locke: Second Treatise on Civil Government
Huygens: Treatise on Light
Berkeley: Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, Monadology
Vico: Scicnza Nuova
Swift: Gulliver’s Travels
llumc: Treatise of Human Nature
Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws
Fielding: Tom lones
\ oltaire: Candida, Micromegas
Rousseau: Social Contract
Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
Smith: Wealth of Nations
Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Constitution of the United States
Federalist Papers
Bentham: Principles of Morals and Legislation
Lavoisier: Treatise on Chemistry
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Malthus: Principles of Population
Dalton: A New System of Chemical Philosophy
Hegel: Philosophy of History
Fourier: Analytical Theory of Heat
Goethe: Faust
Lobachevski: Theory of Parallels
Faraday: Experimental Researches in Electricity
Peacock: Treatise on Algebra
Boole: Laws of Thought
Virchow: Cellular Pathology
Mill: On Liberty
Darwin: Origin of Species
Bernard: Introduction to Experimental '
Mendel: Experiments in Plant Hybri
Riemann: Hypotheses of Geometr
Dostoevski: The Possessed
Marx: Capital
Tolstoy: War and Peace
Dedekind: Essays on Numbers
Maxwell: Electricity and Magnetism
Flaubert: Bouvard and Pecuchet
Ibsen: Ghosts, Rosmersholm
Joule: Scientific Papers
James: Principles of Psychology
Freud: Studies in Hysteria
Cantor: Transfinite Ntimbers
Hilbert: Foundations of Geometry
Poincare: Science and Hypothesis
Russell: Principles of Mathematics
Veblen and Young: Projective Geometry
If such a curriculum seems formidable, education is
formidable. If it seems bare, that is because the beholder
does not know the books. For one who knows them the mere
list of their titles is a curriculum bursting with content,
and a content with which no other can compare. Descrip-
tions in college catalogues of courses “about” things do not
compare; they only suggest a cushion of history or exposi-
tion between the student and some “subject,” a cushion
which textbooks neatly cut and stuff, and which the teacher
adjusts to every learner’s comfort. The curriculum of St. t
John’s College is not trimmed, padded, labeled, or ad-
justable. It makes inexorable demands which are the same
for all. Nor are they impossible demands; they are indeed
more practicable than any others, because more rewarding.
It is assumed by those who avoid great books that such
books are especially difficult. The contrary is true. Most of
them were written for everybody, in “a basic language
about everything.” A classic is always fresh, vernacular,
sensible, and responsible. Even the mathematical and scien-
tific classics were written in a tradition which made them
intelligible; if we have lost contact with that tradition, the
thing to do is to regain it—by mastering its classics—so that
we may cease to be the gapers at abstraction which half of
us now are.
If the list is imperfect, it can be improved by those who
have the learning and the will to do so. Its present rele-
vance to liberal education is immense in any case, for it
represents the first serious effort in contemporary America
to build a single and rational curriculum suited to the needs
of minds which have work to do, and which someday should
be unwilling to forgive any system of education that had
required of them less discipline than this. Education is hon-
ored when it is hard, but it is most honored when it is hard
and good. The human mind naturally delights in exercise.
Any student is to be envied who has passed this much
through his mind, and any teacher who does so annually.
The great books of the West are in several languages, and
the flawless situation would be one in which the student
read them as Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Ger-
man, or Russian originals. Such a situation will never be;
translations are necessary. But the necessity is not lament-
able. The better a book the more meaning it keeps in trans-
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\N ESSENTIALIST’S PLATFORM FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF AMERICAN EDUCATION
WILLIAM C. BAGLEY
PREFATORY NOTE
The first three sections of this paper were prepared by the writer for discus-
sion by a small group which met at Atlantic City on February 26, 1938, and
which adopted the name, The Essentialist Committee for the Advancement of
American Education. An unauthorized release to the press including a few
statements from this paper gave rise to rather wide publicity and led to
somewhat fiery denunciations by prominent leaders in American educational
theory. For this reason the first three sections are here published essentially
as they were first presented. The article is published on the sole responsibility
of the writer, and not as an official pronouncement of the Committee, although
the members of the Committee are in substantial agreement with the position
here taken and have suggested only minor changes, almost all of which have
been made in revising the original draft. The Managing Editor of Educa-
tional Administration and Supervision has kindly agreed to publish further
articles dealing with the same problem. It is hoped that other members of
the Committee will make contributions. The Committee includes in addition
to the writer: Dr. M. Demiashkevich; Dr. Walter H. Ryle; Dr. M. L. Shane;
Mr. F. Alden Shaw, Chairman and Organizer; Dr. Louis Shores; Dr. Guy M.
Whipple.
I. THE SITUATION
In spite of its vast extent and its heavy cost to society, public
education in the United States is in many ways appallingly weak and
ineffective. For the sake of brevity only a few outstanding evidences
of this weakness will be set forth here:
1- Age for age, the average pupil of our elementary schools does
not meet the standards of achievement in the fundamentals of educa-
bon that are attained in the elementary schools of many other coun-
fnes. In so far as English-speaking countries are concerned, this
statement can be and has been substantiated by the scores made in
Ihe elementary schools of these countries on American achievement
tes ts, the norms of which represent the average scores of large, unselected
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groups of American pupils. In the most extended investigation' 0f Hetypo lu- differences revealed are so wide as to justify no other
cine than that American elementary-school achievement is far |,.i“
" 1( could be and what it should be.
be
*0w
2. Similar comparisons relative to secondary education can™be made because the secondary schools of practically all other counSare not intended for “all the children of all the people” as are ourS
T hl
) S
+nV
S generally agreed among competent students of theprob em that our average 18-year-old high-school graduate is scholasti
y far behind the average 18-year-old graduates of the secondary schools of many other countries. This difference has beenrecognized in the practice of admitting the latter to junior-year
standing in many American colleges. But even granting that secondary
education elsewhere is in general selective, there is abundant evident*
that in our laudable efforts to send everyone to and through high school
standards have been unnecessarily lowered. Both the bright and the
slow pupils are handicapped by weaknesses in the fundamentals that
all except those hopelessly subnormal are able to master. Within the
past decade the effectiveness of high-school instruction has been
weakened by increasing disabilities in so basic an accomplishment as
reading. It is scarcely too much to say, indeed, that increasing propor-
tions of pupils in the junior and senior high schools are essentially
illiterate. Failures in such high-school studies as mathematics and
natural science are in many cases traceable to the fact that pupils
cannot read effectively. Classes in “remedial ” reading are now neces-
sary on the secondary level to bring pupils to a standard of literacy
that primary- and intermediate-grade instruction could and should
have insured. Equally lamentable weaknesses in basic arithmetic
1 The study here referred to was published by the University of London Press
in 1934 for the Scottish Council for Research in Education. (MacGregor, G.:
Achievement Tests in the Primary Schools: A Comparative Study with American Teslt
in Fife.) A battery of American achievement tests was given to every eleven-
year-old child in the County of Fife—about seven thousand in all. Even mentally
defective children were included. While the findings are somewhat difficult to
evaluate because Scottish children enter school at five rather than six, the conclu-
sion stated in the text is clearly justified. The use of achievement tests in Canadian
schools tells a similar story, for example in the province-wide survey of the schools
of British Columbia conducted by Professor Peter Sandiford. One of the writer’s
colleagues who has constructed many tests reports that when he has included
significant numbers of Canadian pupils in “standardizing” the tests, the norms
have been raised to a point where the tests could not be used equitably with Ameri-
can pupils.
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are reported. And it is now taken for granted by high-school teachers
of Latm and modern languages that one of their chief duties is to
teach their pupils the rudiments of English grammar
3. In other and not at all exclusively scholastic accomplishments
American education is relatively ineffective. A recent study surest!
that juvenile delinquency may be correlated in many cases with these
reading disabilities which we contend are almost always unnecessary
and easily avoidable by appropriate elementary education. And
while no causal relationship is claimed, it is well to know that during
the one hundred years m which universal elementary education has
been increasingly the pohcy of all civilised countries, ours is apparently
the only country m which the expansion of the universal school has
not been paralleled by a significant and in some cases a remarkable
decrease in the ratios of serious crime.
II. THE causes: a. general economic and social factors
4. American education has been confronted with uniquely difficult
and complicated problems which have arisen from a rapid growth in
population; from a constantly advancing frontier; from the increase
in national wealth; from the arrival year after year and decade afterdecade of millions of immigrants of widely diverse national origins;
rom the complex social and political situations involved in racial
differences; from the profound changes brought about by the transition
>rom a predominantly agricultural to a predominantly industrial
civilization; from the growth of cities; from an ever-increasing mobility
of .he population; and from a multitude of other factors which have
operated here with a force unprecedented in history and unparalleled
in any other part of the world.
The American public school has met some of these problems with
a notable measure of success. Of outstanding significance is the factinat among the states which by any test would be rated as the most
avanced in civilization are those which have had the heaviest burden
o immigration from backward countries to assimilate. And it should
£
said that, in general, the states that have had the most substantial
lout not necessarily the most “Progressive”) school systems have by
ar he °west ratios of serious crime. In a notable degree, too, these
states, manT which do not rank high in per capita wealth,
f<T <<
a
°f.
e tbat have been least dePeQdent upon the federal government
r relief” during the depression years. Beyond all this, the schools
n c aim a very high degree of definitely measurable success for their
Programs of physical development and health education.
334
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5. The upward expansion of mass-education first to the sern^and now to the college level, which is probably the chief causeeducational ineffectiveness, has been an outcome, not alone of
1"
pervasive faith in education, to the realization of which the matwealth of the country was fairly adequate, but also and perhaps mo'fundamentally of economic factors. Power-driven machinery wh?in many cases reducing occupational opportunities on th/nj?
routine levels, quite as markedly opened new occupational ZoJunities in types of work that could not be done by machinery Workthat involved deliberation and judgment; work for which a broadfoundation in general education as well as specialized technical andvocational training was advantageous and often essential Thatincreasing numbers of young persons should seek the advantages 0an extended education has been inevitable. Fortunately the wealth
o the country has enabled the people of many sections to meet thisdemand. In opening the high schools and colleges to ever-inereasine
ho
,
wever
’
Jt was
i ust as inevitable that scholastic standards
should be relaxed, and when such a need arises it is only natural that
those responsible for the administration of education should welcome
any theory or philosophy which justifies or rationalizes such a policy—
any theory of education which can make a virtue of necessity. Under
such a condition, it is easy to understand why the relaxation of stand-
ards has been carried far beyond the actual needs of the case.
III. THi CAUSES. B. EDUCATIONAL THEORIES THAT ARE ESSENTIALLY
ENFEEBLING
6- Throughout the long history of education—and organized educa-
tion is practically as old as civilization
—two opposing theories have
been in evidence. Although over-simplification is always dangerous,
one with this caution may contrast these two theories of education by
certain conflicting concepts summed up in pairing such opposites as
‘‘individual vs. society,” “freedom vs. discipline,” “interest vs. effort,”
play vs. work, or to use more recently current expressions, “imme-
diate needs vs. remote goals,” “personal experience vs. race experience,”
psychological organization vs. logical organization,” “pupil-initiative
vs. teacher-initiative.” The fundamental dualism suggested by these
terms has persisted over the centuries. It came out sharply in Greek
education during the Age of the Sophists. It was reflected in the
educational changes brought about by the Italian Renaissance. It
appeared in the 17th Century in a definite school of educational theory
the adherents of which even at that time styled themselves the
4
For the Advancement of American Education 245
“Progressives.” It was explicit in the successive educational reforms
proposed by Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart. In American
education it was reflected in the theories advocated and practiced by
Bronson Alcott, in the work of Horace Mann, and later in the work of
E. A. Sheldon and Francis W. Parker; while the present outstanding
leader, John Dewey
,
first came into prominence during the last decade
of the 19th Century in an effort to resolve the dualism through an
integration expressed in the title of his classic essay, now called “Inter-
est and Effort in Education.”
7. Under the necessity which confronted American education of
rationalizing the loosening of standards and the relaxation of rigor
if mass-education were to be expanded upward, the theories which
emphasized interest, freedom, immediate needs, personal experience
psychological organization, and pupil-initiative, and which in so doing
tended to discredit and even condemn their opposites—effort, disci-
pline, remote goals, race-experience, logical sequence, and teacher-
mitiative—naturally made a powerful appeal. Over more than a
generation these theories have increasingly influenced the lower
schools. 1 They find specific expression today in a variety of definite
movements so numerous that even the more outstanding can here
be listed.
(fl) The complete abandonment in many school systems of rigorous
standards of scholastic achievement as a condition of promotion from
grade to grade, and the passing of all pupils “on schedule .” This policy
which found a strong initial support thirty years ago in the studies
of retardation and elimination” has of late been given even a wider
appeal by the teachings of mental hygiene regarding the possible
'Dr. H. C. Morrison (School and Commonwealth, Chicago, 1937, p. 11) states
that an educational philosophy embodying such theories has been gradually taking
form in American education during the past fifty or sixty years. The present writer
as publicly called attention for more than thirty years to manifestations of thisjn uence, and to its weakening tendencies. His charges, with evidence supporting
em
’
are matters of published record, duly documented. They have been fre-
quently denounced, but never answered. In addition to published articles, the
ollowing books by the present writer make references to the problem: The Educa-
116
.
rocess
i 1905; Classroom Management
,
1907; School Discipline
,
1914; Deter-
wiaisro in Education, 1925; Education, Crime, and Social Progress, 1932; Education
“ mergent Man,
.1934. The theories were influencing the schools long before
a
aCtivity Pro6ram ,” “integrated curriculum,” “child-centered school,”
the like came into vogue or had even been coined. It should be noted, too, that
6Se ^leories have had no comparable recognition in the school systems of other
ountries except the Soviet Union, where after twelve years of consistent applica-
on they were abandoned in 1933 as hopelessly weak and ineffective.
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effects of failure in disintegrating personality. The problem •
extremely complicated as a later reference to it will show, bur
movement has already resulted in at least one very important chan
Instead of having “overage” pupils piling up in the intermedia^
grades, we now have “overgraded” pupils handicapped in the work" '
the junior and senior high schools by their lack of thorough traimn°-
in the fundamentals already referred to.
(6) The disparagement of system and sequence in learning and
dogmatic denial of any value in, even of any possibility of learrann
through, the logical, chronological, and causal relationships of learnur
materials. This has led to an enthronement of the doctrine of inci-
dental learning. Only as one becomes acquainted with facts and
principles through applying them to vital problems that appeal to
one as worth solving at the moment (so the theory holds) can one
truly learn such facts and principles. And on the side of skills
such as the fundamental arts of language, measurement, and com-
putation—mastery as far as possible should await an occasion when one
of them is needed. As someone has said in effect, “These things are
only tools, and when a workman needs a tool he goes to the shop and
gets it.” And yet this theory that “mind wall not learn what is
alien to its fundamental vital purposes,” Thorndike has pronounced
on the basis of extended experimentation, “to be attractive and plausi-
ble but definitely false.” 1 The disparagement of systematic and
sequential learning has also been criticized in no uncertain terms by
John Dewey. 2
(c) The wide vogue of the so-called “ activity movemeJit.” This is an
outgrowth of the so-called “project-method” which in its turn was an
effort to find, or to encourage the learner to find, problems or vital
purposes in the solution of which desirable learnings could be
effected. The activity movement and the resulting “activity
programs” and “activity curricula,” like the project-method, have
an important place—a central function in the primary school, and a
very useful supplementary function on all educational levels. The
tendency to make them a substitute for systematic and sequential
learning and to go even further and regard activity as a sufficient end
in itself irrespective of whether or not anything is learned through the
activity is another matter. It is, however, an intriguing proposal
As one enthusiastic activist said, “Let us not use activities as pegs on
which to hang subject-matter.” If the schools only provide an abun-
1 Thorndike, E. L.: Adult Interests. New York, 1935, p. 52.
1 Especially in an article in The New Era referred to below.
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dance of
‘
rich experiences for the learner, it seems, other things will
miraculously take care of themselves. This is not at all absurd if one
accepts the premises, it is a thoroughly consistent result of the theory
of incidental learning carried to its logical conclusion.
(d) The discrediting of the exact and exacting studies. The most
significant barrier to opening the high schools to the masses was at the
outset the practically universal requirement of Latin, algebra, and
geometry in the secondary program. Perhaps inherently and cer-
tainly as commonly taught, the difficulties in mastering these subjects
were quite beyond a large proportion of pupils. At the same time the
practical value of the subjects was difficult to defend. Their central
place in the curriculum, however, was believed to be justified in a high
degree by the mental discipline that their mastery involved. Any-
thing that would tend to discredit this justification was seized upon
by those responsible for the upward expansion of mass-education.
Most fortunately for their purposes there appeared just at the turn
of the century the report of the first careful psychological experiments
testing the validity of the theory of mental discipline. These really
classic experiments of Thorndike and Woodworth were followed by a
long series of similar investigations that aimed to determine in how
far learnings acquired in one subject were, or could be, applied in
other situations. The results in general indicated that such a “trans-
fer” was far from inevitable and in some cases either quite negative
or so slight as to bring the whole theory into question.
The proponents of the universal high school and of other educa-
tional movements that were impeded by the requirement of subjects
inherently difficult to the average mind were not slow to capitalize
these experimental findings. As is natural under conditions of this
sort, the evidence was generalized to a far greater extent than the
experiments warranted, and with far-reaching results in school
practice. Although the absolute number enrolled in Latin classes has
increased, only a small proportion of pupils graduating from the high
schools during the past ten years have even been exposed to Latin.
Increasing proportions, too, are quite innocent of any training in
elementary mathematics beyond the increasingly ineffective modicum
°f arithmetic acquired in the elementary schools. But the important
lact is that there has been a growing practice of discouraging even com-
petent learners from undertaking the studies that are exact though
exacting; hence the upward expansion of mass-education, while
sincerely a democratic movement, is not guarding itself against the
Potentially most fatal pitfall of democracy. It has deliberately
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adQpied the easy policy of leveling-down rather than facing resnltie difficult task of leveling-up—and upon the possibility of evelm ^the future of democracy indisputably depends. As John nl 8
'Up
contended, the older curncuhnn of clLcsand mafteX
a unique value to those competent to its mastery—a value forthe so-called reform movements have not as yet in his iuH
^
provided a substitute. 1
y ' Judgment,
(e) An increasingly heavy emphasis upon the “social studiedlie the exact and exacting studies were in effect being discredit jthe primrose-path of least resistance was opened ever wider in tfcfi
1
known as the social studies. The argument here is plausible!
appealing. “Education for citizenship" is a ringing slogan 2Wless potent^httes, especially in an age when high-soundm
shibboleths easily formulated, can masquerade as fundamental
p mises and postulates wrought through the agony of hard thinkingObviously no fundamental premise in educational thinking couldfail to recognize the importance of a firm foundation in the historyo uman institutions, or of an acquaintance with present and pressing
social problems especially in the light of their genesis, or of an acquain-tance with such principles of economics, sociology, and political science
as have been well established.
But just as obviously the social sciences, so called, are not in the
same class with the natural sciences. Their generalizations permit
trustworthy predictions only in a few cases and then only in a slight
degree. When the human element enters, uncertainty enters—else
the world could have anticipated and adjusted itself to Hitler and
Mussolini and Stalin and the military oligarchy of Japan and would not
be standing dazed and impotent as it stands today. And while to
expect an educational pabulum of social studies in the lower schools
essentially to overcome this inherent limitation of the social sciences is
an alluring prospect, it is to expect nothing less than a miracle. It is,
indeed, just as sensible' as would be a brave and desperate effort to
incite immature minds to square the circle.
(/) Using the lower schools to establish a new social order. The
proposal definitely and deliberately to indoctrinate immature learners
1
“Development
. . . ia a continuous process, and continuity signifies con-
secutiveness of action. Here was the strong point of traditional education at its
best.
. . . The subject-matter of the classics and mathematics involved of
necessity
,
for those who mastered it, a consecutive and orderly development along
definite lines. Here lies, perhaps, the greatest problem of the newer efforts in
education. Dewey, J. : “The Need of a Philosophy of Education.” The New
Era, London, November, 1934, pp. 214/.
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jjj the interest of
a specific social order and one that involves wide
departures from that which prevails in our country is to be questioned,
,f for no other reasons, upon the grounds set forth in the preceding
paragraphs. With the growing ineffectiveness of the lower schools in
failing to lay adequate foundations in fundamental and established
learnings of unquestioned permanence and value, such efforts would
necessarily be superficial in the last degree. It would be an extreme
case of building what may be characterized for the sake of argument
as a perfectly splendid edifice on shifting sands—in this case, quick-
sands would be the more appropriate metaphor. And here we might
well study certain peoples that have actually achieved a social order
which is pointed to by our idealists as exemplifying in many ways the
realization of their dreams. Reference is made, of course, to such
countries as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand. An
outstanding fact of fundamental significance is that these countries
have not achieved these laudable results by emasculating their educa-
tional systems. Their peoples indeed would stand aghast at the very
suggestion.
(g ) The “ curriculum^revision” movement and its vagaries. The
various reform proposals just discussed have culminated in the general
movement known as curriculum-revision which has dominated the
lower schools for nearly twenty years. A primary emphasis has been
the alleged need of building the programs of instruction around the
local community. As long ago as 1933 more than 30,000 different
curricula were on file in the curriculum-laboratory of Teachers College,
Columbia University. Most of these had been prepared during the
preceding decade by committees of teachers in local school systems
throughout the country. Sometimes the committees were personally
directed by a “curriculum-expert”; in practically all cases a rapidly
developing theory evolved by these specialists guided the work. In
so far as we can learn, this theory has never explicitly recognized
that the state or the nation has a stake in the content of school instruc-
tion. The need of common elements in the basic culture of all people,
especially in a democracy, has in effect been denied. Furthermore,
v, ith the American people the most mobile in the world, with stability
°f residence over the period of school attendance the exception and
not the rule in many sections of the country, and with a significantly
higher average of school failure among pupils whose parents move
from place to place than among those who remain in the same com-
munity, the curriculum theorists have been totally insensitive to the
need of a certain measure of uniformity in school requirements and
250 Educational Administration and Supervision
IV. THE PROBLEM AND THE PLATFORM
8. It is particularly unfortunate that American education
nnnppAccQrilTr Tirz-v «-* « a: i . 4UAi
The American people are facing an economic problem which both •ureand . ^ Dothu
It is the indicated and imminent task of the present dominantgeneration to solve this problem under whatever expert guidance atthe hands of the economist and the social engineer it may find and
accept.
.
The student of education must cooperate with all other
citizens in this task. It is his own specific duty, however, to considei
the problems in his field that are bound to arise in the changes that
seem now to be inevitable, regardless of the form which the solution
of the present desperate economic situation may take—this with one
exception, for if in desperation the American people discard democracy
and yield to a dictator the sincere student of education will have no
function and consequently no duty. The yes-man and the rubber-
stamp will take his place. He will be a luxury without a purpose;
and the dictators have standardized a simple but effective technique
for liquidating luxuries of this sort.
9. We shall assume, however, that “it can’t happen here” and that,
whatever may be the new economic and social order, the political order
based upon representative government and the Bill of Rights will per-
sist. Hence a primary function of American education will be to
safeguard and strengthen these ideals of American democracy, with
especial emphasis upon freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion. It is clear enough now
that whenever any one of these is permitted to collapse, the whole
democratic structure will topple like a house of cards. These, then,
are among the first essentials in the platform of the Essentialist.
10. Democracy is now distinctly on trial. It is under criticism
and suspicion. Every weakness will be watched for and welcomed by
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its enemies. Inevitably the future will bring competition if not clashes
and conflicts with the now militantly anti-democratic peoples. Demo-
cratic societies cannot survive either competition or conflict with
totalitarian states unless there is a democratic discipline that will give
strength and solidarity to the democratic purpose and ideal If
the theory of democracy finds no place for discipline, then, the theory
will have before long only historical significance. French education,
much closer to the danger, has recognized this imperative need. Still
unswerving in fidelity to the ideals of democracy, and still giving its
first emphasis to clarity of thought and independence in individual
thinking as the time-honored objectives of French education, it recog-
nizes no less the fundamental importance of social solidarity in the
defense of democracy. 1
American educational theory long since dropped the term “dis-
cipline from its vocabulary. Today its most vocal and influential
spokesmen enthrone the right even of the immature learner to choose
what he shall learn. They condemn as “authoritarian” all learning
tasks that are imposed by the teacher. They deny any value in the
systematic and sequential mastery of the lessons that the race has
learned at so great a cost. They condone and rationalize the refusal
of the learner to attack a task that does not interest him. In effect
they open wide the lines of least resistance and least effort. Obedience
they stigmatize as a sign of weakness. All this they advocate in the
magic names of “democracy” and “freedom.”
Now, obviously, the freedom of the immature to choose what they
fahall learn is of negligible consequence compared with their later
freedom from the want, fear, fraud, superstition, and error which may
letter the ignorant as cruelly as the chains of the slave-driver—and
tue price of this freedom is systematic and sustained effort often
evoted to the mastery of materials the significance of which must at
the time be taken on faith.
11. This problem is far more than merely personal or individual in
its reference. A democratic society has a vital, collective stake in the
m ormed intelligence of every individual citizen. That a literate
p cctorate is absolutely indispensable not only to its welfare but to its
Vcry survival is clearly demonstrated by the sorry fate that so speedily
nerlook every unschooled and illiterate democracy founded as a
^ *ke War that was to “Make the world safe for democracy.”
'Culf
66
r^
6 concludln8 paragraphs of Bougie, C.: “The French Conception of
ApriMQ
^n^rale,’ ” a series of lectures at Teachers College, Columbia University,
> 38. To be published by the Teachers College Bureau of Publications.
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And literacy m this sense means, of course, far more than th
ability to translate printed letters into spoken words- it m',
*
development and expansion of ideas; it means the basis’ for int P ir
Ut
understanding and for the collective thought and judgment
the essence of democratic institutions. These needs are so f,, T
mental to an effective democracy that it would be folly to leave tKto the whim or caprice of either learner or teacher.
’ Qea
Among the essentials of the Essentialist, then, is a recognition
ofu right of the immature learner to guidance and direction when tK
are needed either for his individual welfare or for the welfare Zprogress of the democratic group. The responsibility of the
for the instruction and control of the immature is the biological meaning
of the extended period of human immaturity and necessary depend'
ence. It took the human race untold ages to recognize this respond
i ity. It is literally true that until this recognition dawned ma-
remained a savage. Primitive societies, as numerous students have
observed ^and their testimony seems to be unanimous), pamper andindulge their young. Freedom of children from control, guidance, and
discipline is with them a rule so nearly universal that its only brief but
significant exception during the nearly universal savage ceremonies
marking the adolescent onset of maturity is regarded as the first faint
beginning of consciously directed human education.
It would be futile to deny that control ard discipline may be stupid
and brutal and used for unworthy ends. It would be futile to deny
the need for the development of self-discipline and for the relaxation of
external discipline with the growth of volitional maturity. But all this
does not alter the fundamental truth that freedom must go hand in
hand with responsibility, and that responsible freedom is always a
conquest, never a gift.
1^. An effective democracy demands a community of culture.
Educationally this means that each generation be placed in possession
of a common core of ideas, meanings, understandings, and ideals
representing the most precious elements of the human heritage.
There can be little question as to the essentials. It is by no means
a mere accident that the arts of recording, computing, and measuring
have been among the first concerns of organized education. They are
basic social arts. Every civilized society has been founded upon these
arts, and when these arts have been lost, civilization has invariably and
inevitably collapsed. Egypt, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia are
strewn with the ruins of civilizations that forgot how to read and write
Contemporary civilization, for the first time in history has attempted
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{o insure its
continuance by making these arts in so far as possible the
prerogative of all.
Nor is it at all accidental that a knowledge of the world that lies
beyond one’s immediate experience has been among the recognized
essentials of universal education, and that at least a speaking acquaint-
ance with man’s past and especially with the story of one’s own country
was early provided for in the program of the universal school. Widen-
ing the space horizon and extending the time perspective are essential
if the citizen is to be protected from the fallacies of the local and the
immediate.
Investigation, invention, and creative art have added to the herit-
age and the list of recognized essentials has been extended and will be
further extended. Health instruction and the inculcation of health
practices are now basic phases of the work of the lower schools. The
elements of natural science have their place. Neither the fine arts nor
the industrial arts are neglected.
We repeat that there can be little question as to the essentials of
universal education. As Charles A. Beard has so well said: “While
education constantly touches the practical affairs of the hour and day,
and responds to political and economic exigencies, it has its own
treasures heavy with the thought and sacrifice of the centuries. It
possesses a heritage of knowledge and heroic examples—accepted values
stamped with the seal of permanence.” 1
13. A specific program of studies including these essentials should
he the heart of a democratic system of education. In a country like
ours with its highly mobile population there should be an agreement as
to the order and grade-placement of subjects and especially of crucial
topics. 2 There is no valid reason for the extreme localism that has
come to characterize American education. There is no valid reason
for the failure of the American elementary school to lay as firm a
foundation in the fundamentals of education as do the elementary
schools of other democracies. It is especially regrettable that con-
temporary educational theory should in effect condone and rationalize
scamped work by ridiculing such traits as thoroughness, accuracy,
persistence, and the ideal of good workmanship for its own sake. One
may be very sure that democracy schooled to the easy way will have
1 The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy. Washington:
c Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association,
^37
, p . 71 .
Fortunately the National Society for the Study of Education is sponsoring a
tarbook dealing with this problem. This will be published in 1939 .
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cjrrn once provided on the farm and in the home. Manual training and
-he household arts were among the first responses to this demand. The
parallel development of physical training with its later ramifications
into various forms of health education are traceable in part to the same
causes.
Playgrounds, gymnasiums, and swimming pools are material
expressions of the effort to meet these recognized needs. School and
college athletics are lusty by-products representing in a very real sense
the importance of finding a substitute for the vigorous physical work
that once devolved of necessity upon the great majority of young
jicople.
With the profound changes in the conditions of life already in
progress, and with their clearly predictable extension and intensifica-
tion in the immediate future, analogous substitutes must be sought for
other educative experiences which the simpler conditions of life
naturally and normally provided. Bread-winning employment is now
postponed for vast numbers of young people. Willy-nilly they must
remain dependent upon society, whether in attendance at school or col-
lege, or in such highly important educational enterprises as the Civilian
Conservation Corps, or in “made work” of one variety or another.
The analogy of our civilization with the older civilizations based
upon slavery is in no sense far-fetched. It has, indeed, a profound
significance. Our slaves, it is true, are mechanical and not human.
They are power-driven and increasingly they are being automatically
controlled. They can do much more economically than human slaves
the heavy work and the routine work. In some tasks they can perceive
distinctions far too fine to be detected by the human senses, and they
can respond far more quickly and far more accurately and dependably
than can human nerves and muscles. Fortunately they can neither feel
nor suffer, and so the grossest evils of the old slave civilizations are
avoided. The fact remains, however, that the perils to those who are
the supposed beneficiaries of a slave civilization are in no significant
degree changed, whether the slaves be men or robots. Every slave civili-
zation has within it the seeds of degeneration, decay, and ultimate
extinction. Struggle and competition, selection and rejection, have
°ften been cruel, but in both biological and social evolution they have
been primary factors of progress. In societies that have lifted themselves
above the plane of the brute and the savage, a most powerful steady-
lng and civilizing force has been the ideal of personal economic responsi-
bility for one’s own survival and for one’s old age and the care of one’s
dependents.
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Generally speaking, then,
“social security” litroe om has been a conquest, not a gift Making it
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1 generatl0n are at basis distinctly of the latter type
I
Es®entiabsts have recognized and still recognize the contributions of
eal value that these theories have made to educational practice.
I hey believe, however, that these positive elements can be preserved
an ocational theory which finds its basis in the necessary depend-
o e immature upon the mature for guidance, instruction, and
iscipline. This dependence is inherent in human nature. “What
4
,as been ordained among the prehistoric protozoa,” said Huxley.
cannot be altered by act of Parliament ”—nor, we may add, by the
wis u t in ng of educational theorists, however sincere their motives
uthontanamsm ” is an ugly word. But when those who detest it
carry their laudable rebellion against certain of its implications solar
as to reject the authority of plain facts, their arguments, while well
adapted perhaps to the generation of heat, become lamentably lacking
m light.
—

